BENTON, J.
In this Jimmy Ryce Act case, Alton Hartzog urges as error the denial of his motion for a new trial. After a jury determined that he qualified as a “sexually violent predator” as that term is defined in sections 394.912(10) and 775.21(4)(d), Florida Statutes (2012), he was committed to continued confinement in the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida, pursuant to section 394.917(2), Florida Statutes (2012). He argues that the expert testimony adduced by the state — two psychologists testified against him — was legally insufficient to support an order finding a need for indefinite confinement because the psychologists relied sole[572]*572ly upon evaluations done in 2008, information which was too stale, as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
These proceedings began when, in May of 2008, the state attorney filed a petition in circuit court alleging that appellant was a “sexually violent predator.” The petition alleged that appellant had been interviewed on April 14, 2008, and evaluated by two psychologists, Drs. Falb and Kline. But appellant’s trial did not take place until January 29, 2013.1 At the trial, both psychologists testified and both recommended commitment, basing their testimony on the interviews they had conducted and reports they had prepared in April of 2008. Neither expert had had any contact with appellant since then.
On appeal, as below,2 appellant argues that the state failed to present clear and convincing evidence of two of the three elements it was burdened to prove, because the psychologists’ evaluations relied on were so old. Appellant’s motion for a new trial3 preserved this sufficiency [573]*573of the evidence point. See Givans v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 82 So.3d 864, 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“After the jury returned its verdict, Givans filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for new trial, arguing, among other things, that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because FMCC failed to establish that it asked Givans for payment. Givans’ post-trial motion preserved her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence[.]”); Scarfone v. Magaldi, 522 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“First, we conclude that the above issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. Although the plaintiff made no motion for a directed verdict below, he did file a motion for new trial in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”); Yoder v. Adriatico, 459 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (“In response the Yoders, while admitting that they filed no motion for directed verdict, contend that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was preserved by their motion for new trial, relying upon Ruth v. Sorensen, 104 So.2d 10 (Fla.1958).”).
On motion for new trial on grounds the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court must determine whether or not “a greater amount of credible evidence supports” the verdict. Geibel v. State, 817 So.2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). On appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for new trial based on manifest weight of the evidence, we review for abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 497-98 (Fla.1999). But appellant contends here primarily that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, because its obsolescence was incompatible with the Jimmy Ryce Act. On that premise, he argues persuasively, the proper standard of review is de novo. See Mistretta v. Mistretta, 31 So.3d 206, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (recognizing “ ‘when a motion for new trial addresses only issues of law, the standard of review is essentially de novo ’”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 943 So.2d 997, 999-1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).
In order to prove appellant was a sexually violent predator, the state was required to prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that appellant had been convicted of a “sexually violent” offense, 2) that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and 3) that this makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2012). Appellant’s conviction for “promoting sexual performances by a child” by photographing two little girls (then 7 and 9 years old) in states of partial undress in sexually suggestive poses satisfied the first element, even though no violence was proven (or even suggested) as to either of the children.4
[574]*574But the state’s sole evidence that appellant currently suffers from a mental or personality disorder was the psychologists’ 2008 diagnosis, as documented in reports almost five years old, and their opinion that the diagnosis ought not to be changed in the absence of extensive treatment. The state offered no other evidence to prove factors two and three, ie., that appellant suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder in 2013, as opposed to five years earlier, much less that any such disorder makes it likely that he would commit a sexually violent offense.
Diagnoses almost five years old as the basis for a hold contested under section 394.917 do not comport with the legislative design of the Jimmy Ryce Act. Section 394.918(1) requires that a person who has been committed have a mental examination “once every year or more frequently at the court’s discretion.” A person who is ordered to be detained under the Jimmy Ryce Act may be entitled to a non-jury trial on the question of his release as often as once a year.5 See § 394.918(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). These provisions make clear, albeit implicitly, that a five-year-old evaluation is a legally insufficient basis for confining a citizen who is not, after all, under criminal sentence. Mr. Hartzog had not even had a prior (initial) adjudication under the Jimmy Ryce Act. A person facing an initial deprivation of liberty should be afforded at least the same level of procedural protection as detainees already determined to be appropriate subjects of preventive detention.
Based on an interview in 2008, Dr. Kline diagnosed appellant with pedophilia and paraphilia. Both psychologists conceded Mr. Hartzog had undergone physiological changes since 2008 that they did not take into account in formulating the opinions they offered at trial.6 Mr. Hartzog testified that, while at FCCC awaiting trial, he received therapy three to four times a week. Neither psychologist was aware of this therapy (which the state contended was not therapy for sexual disorders).
The other “tool” (in addition to the interview) used by Dr. Kline, he testified, was the “Static-99,” an actuarial program designed to measure the likelihood that adult male sex offenders will reoffend, by placing them on a scale from zero to twelve. Appellant scored a three in 2008, said to correlate with a “moderately low risk for reoffense.” But “Static-99” has since been updated to “Static-99R,” and Dr. Falb testified that, in his opinion, appellant would only score a one on the “Static-99R” to[575]*575day.7 Dr. Kline also diagnosed appellant with pedophilia and scored appellant at three using the “Static-99” in 2008.
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BENTON, J.
In this Jimmy Ryce Act case, Alton Hartzog urges as error the denial of his motion for a new trial. After a jury determined that he qualified as a “sexually violent predator” as that term is defined in sections 394.912(10) and 775.21(4)(d), Florida Statutes (2012), he was committed to continued confinement in the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida, pursuant to section 394.917(2), Florida Statutes (2012). He argues that the expert testimony adduced by the state — two psychologists testified against him — was legally insufficient to support an order finding a need for indefinite confinement because the psychologists relied sole[572]*572ly upon evaluations done in 2008, information which was too stale, as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
These proceedings began when, in May of 2008, the state attorney filed a petition in circuit court alleging that appellant was a “sexually violent predator.” The petition alleged that appellant had been interviewed on April 14, 2008, and evaluated by two psychologists, Drs. Falb and Kline. But appellant’s trial did not take place until January 29, 2013.1 At the trial, both psychologists testified and both recommended commitment, basing their testimony on the interviews they had conducted and reports they had prepared in April of 2008. Neither expert had had any contact with appellant since then.
On appeal, as below,2 appellant argues that the state failed to present clear and convincing evidence of two of the three elements it was burdened to prove, because the psychologists’ evaluations relied on were so old. Appellant’s motion for a new trial3 preserved this sufficiency [573]*573of the evidence point. See Givans v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 82 So.3d 864, 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“After the jury returned its verdict, Givans filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for new trial, arguing, among other things, that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because FMCC failed to establish that it asked Givans for payment. Givans’ post-trial motion preserved her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence[.]”); Scarfone v. Magaldi, 522 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“First, we conclude that the above issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. Although the plaintiff made no motion for a directed verdict below, he did file a motion for new trial in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”); Yoder v. Adriatico, 459 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (“In response the Yoders, while admitting that they filed no motion for directed verdict, contend that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was preserved by their motion for new trial, relying upon Ruth v. Sorensen, 104 So.2d 10 (Fla.1958).”).
On motion for new trial on grounds the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court must determine whether or not “a greater amount of credible evidence supports” the verdict. Geibel v. State, 817 So.2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). On appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for new trial based on manifest weight of the evidence, we review for abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 497-98 (Fla.1999). But appellant contends here primarily that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, because its obsolescence was incompatible with the Jimmy Ryce Act. On that premise, he argues persuasively, the proper standard of review is de novo. See Mistretta v. Mistretta, 31 So.3d 206, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (recognizing “ ‘when a motion for new trial addresses only issues of law, the standard of review is essentially de novo ’”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 943 So.2d 997, 999-1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).
In order to prove appellant was a sexually violent predator, the state was required to prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that appellant had been convicted of a “sexually violent” offense, 2) that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and 3) that this makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2012). Appellant’s conviction for “promoting sexual performances by a child” by photographing two little girls (then 7 and 9 years old) in states of partial undress in sexually suggestive poses satisfied the first element, even though no violence was proven (or even suggested) as to either of the children.4
[574]*574But the state’s sole evidence that appellant currently suffers from a mental or personality disorder was the psychologists’ 2008 diagnosis, as documented in reports almost five years old, and their opinion that the diagnosis ought not to be changed in the absence of extensive treatment. The state offered no other evidence to prove factors two and three, ie., that appellant suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder in 2013, as opposed to five years earlier, much less that any such disorder makes it likely that he would commit a sexually violent offense.
Diagnoses almost five years old as the basis for a hold contested under section 394.917 do not comport with the legislative design of the Jimmy Ryce Act. Section 394.918(1) requires that a person who has been committed have a mental examination “once every year or more frequently at the court’s discretion.” A person who is ordered to be detained under the Jimmy Ryce Act may be entitled to a non-jury trial on the question of his release as often as once a year.5 See § 394.918(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). These provisions make clear, albeit implicitly, that a five-year-old evaluation is a legally insufficient basis for confining a citizen who is not, after all, under criminal sentence. Mr. Hartzog had not even had a prior (initial) adjudication under the Jimmy Ryce Act. A person facing an initial deprivation of liberty should be afforded at least the same level of procedural protection as detainees already determined to be appropriate subjects of preventive detention.
Based on an interview in 2008, Dr. Kline diagnosed appellant with pedophilia and paraphilia. Both psychologists conceded Mr. Hartzog had undergone physiological changes since 2008 that they did not take into account in formulating the opinions they offered at trial.6 Mr. Hartzog testified that, while at FCCC awaiting trial, he received therapy three to four times a week. Neither psychologist was aware of this therapy (which the state contended was not therapy for sexual disorders).
The other “tool” (in addition to the interview) used by Dr. Kline, he testified, was the “Static-99,” an actuarial program designed to measure the likelihood that adult male sex offenders will reoffend, by placing them on a scale from zero to twelve. Appellant scored a three in 2008, said to correlate with a “moderately low risk for reoffense.” But “Static-99” has since been updated to “Static-99R,” and Dr. Falb testified that, in his opinion, appellant would only score a one on the “Static-99R” to[575]*575day.7 Dr. Kline also diagnosed appellant with pedophilia and scored appellant at three using the “Static-99” in 2008. In his opinion, however, rescoring appellant in 2018 on the “Static-99R” would result in a score of zero. A score of zero supposedly correlates with a 7.2 percent chance of reoffending in five years, and a 12.5 percent chance of reoffending in ten years. As a 78-year-old diabetic survivor of vascular surgery, Mr. Hartzog’s chances of living another five or ten years were not taken into account.
We have addressed the use of outdated mental health evaluations in other legal contexts. We said in Duncan v. State, 115 So.3d 1121, 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), for example, that “[n]ew mental health evaluations should be performed prior to the [competency] hearing as the ones at issue are now over a year old.” There we cited to In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So.2d 453, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), in which the Second District held that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency. In In re Commitment of Drayton, 27 So.3d 243, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), the court ruled that “experts’ observations dating back to 2003” used in an involuntary commitment hearing under section 393.11(8), Florida Statutes (2007) in 2007 and 2008 were not “competent substantial evidence,” citing Reilly.
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. The Supreme Court of California,8 for example, in Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.4th 796, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 23 P.3d 611 (2001), discussed the need for current information about a detainee’s mental state, relying on statutorily required annual mental examinations for committed persons not unlike those in the Jimmy Ryce Act:
The district attorney has an interest in obtaining information concerning the individual’s current mental state for two reasons: to avoid committing a person who does not currently suffer from a qualifying mental disorder, and to support the commitment of a person who does suffer from a qualifying mental disorder.
The SVPA also sheds light on what the Legislature considers to be “current” for purposes of the Act. Section 6605, subdivision (a), requires that each person actually committed as an SVP undergo a “current examination of his or her mental condition ... at least once every year.” (Italics added.) This suggests the Legislature’s recognition that diagnoses can change in light of treatment, severity of mental disorder, changed circumstances, and the passage of time. As observed in Butler v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1180, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, evaluations like those of Drs. Korpi and Hupka “performed at the initial commitment stage would not reflect the [petitioner’s] current medical condition” at a subsequent stage, well more than a year later. (Accord, Peters v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 845, 850, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 350 [“the use of potentially stale reports subverts the manifest intent of the SVPA — the state must prove that the party suffers from a currently diagnosed mental disorder which predisposes him to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior”].)
[576]*576Id. 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 23 P.3d at 615-16. See also People v. Landau, 214 Cal. App.4th 1, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 27 (2013) (holding a mental evaluation a year old was “presumably stale,” citing Albertson).
Because, as a matter of law, the state did not meet its burden to prove clearly and convincingly that appellant suffered from a mental or personality disorder at the time of trial, we do not need to reach the perhaps more problematic question of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the third element the state was required to prove — a present likelihood of reoffending on account of a disorder.9 The trial court erred in finding the five-year-old evaluations and 2008 reports relied upon by the psychologists were legally sufficient to prove clearly and convincingly appellant’s mental status at the time of his 2013 trial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
PAD OVAN O and RAY, JJ., concur.