Hartmann v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 17, 2023
• Docket: 54, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DETLEF HARTMANN, § § No. 54, 2023 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § C.A. No. K23M-01-025 STATE OF DELAWARE, § Crim. ID No. 9912000027 (K) § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: March 8, 2023 Decided: March 17, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

(1) The appellant, Detlef Hartmann, filed this appeal from the Superior

Court’s order, dated January 27, 2023, denying his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The State has moved to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is

manifest on the face of Hartmann’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.

We agree and affirm.

(2) In March 2001, Hartmann pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful

sexual intercourse and two counts of unlawful sexual contact. The Superior Court sentenced Hartmann to a total of nineteen years of imprisonment, to be suspended

after ten years for decreasing levels of supervision.1

(3) In 2012, the Superior Court found Hartmann to be in violation of

probation (“VOP”) and sentenced him for that violation. Hartmann appealed, and

this Court affirmed.2

(4) In 2019, the Superior Court found Hartmann to be in violation of

probation for a second time. The court sentenced Hartmann as follows: (i) for the

first count of unlawful sexual contact, to two years at Level V Transitions Sex

Offender Program; and (ii) for the second count of unlawful sexual contact, to two

years of Level V incarceration, suspended after one year and successful completion

of the Transitions Sex Offender Program for two years of Level III probation. This

Court affirmed.3

(5) In January 2023, Hartmann filed documents in the Superior Court in

which he sought a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition. The Superior

Court denied the request, holding that Hartmann was not entitled to habeas corpus

relief because Hartmann was legally detained under the 2019 VOP sentence order.

Specifically, the court stated that the 2019 VOP sentence order provided for

suspension of the two-year sentence for the second count of unlawful sexual contact

1 Hartmann v. State, 2013 WL 434052, at *1 (Del. Feb. 4, 2013). 2 Id. 3 Hartmann v. State, 2019 WL 6813986 (Del. Dec. 12, 2019). 2 only after one year at Level V and successful completion of the Transitions Sex

Offender Program, and Hartmann had not completed the Transitions Sex Offender

Program. Hartmann has appealed to this Court. He appears to claim that the

Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the VOP proceedings, both in

2019 and as to the first VOP—or as to new criminal charges that gave rise to the

VOPs—because of alleged procedural defects in the proceedings that violated his

due-process and other rights. For example, Hartmann asserts that he was detained

without a preliminary hearing; the allegations against him were false and the result

of malicious prosecution; his counsel was ineffective; and he was confined in illegal

conditions.

(6) “[T]he writ of habeas corpus under Delaware law provides relief on a

very limited basis.”4 Specifically, it provides a prisoner with a means of challenging

an allegedly unlawful detention on the basis that the court ordering the commitment

lacked jurisdiction.5 “Habeas corpus relief is not available to ‘[p]ersons committed

or detained on a charge of treason or felony, the species whereof is plainly and fully

set forth in the commitment.’”6

(7) The Superior Court did not err by denying Hartmann’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Hartmann is serving a sentence imposed by the Superior

4 Hall v. Carr, 692 A.2d 888, 891 (Del. 1997). 5 Id. 6 Id. (quoting 10 Del. C. § 6902(1)) (alteration in original). 3 Court after the court found him to be in violation of probation; the Superior Court

had jurisdiction to adjudicate the VOP and impose that sentence.7 Because

Hartmann was being held pursuant to a valid commitment, the Superior Court

correctly determined that he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.8

(8) To the extent that Hartmann argues that the Superior Court erred by not

explicitly addressing his request for a writ of prohibition, we find no basis for

reversal. Although the documents that Hartmann filed in the Superior Court referred

to a writ of prohibition, they established no basis for that relief. “The writ of

prohibition is a writ issued by a superior to an inferior court to prevent such court

from exercising jurisdiction over matters not legally within its cognizance, or to

prevent it from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it admittedly has

cognizance.”9 Hartmann was not requesting that the Superior Court direct another

court to do anything. Moreover, to the extent that Hartmann is seeking to invoke

this Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to the Superior Court,

Hartmann has not shown that he is entitled to such relief. Because the purpose of a

writ of prohibition is to keep a trial court within the limits of its own jurisdiction,

7 See Campbell v. Williams, 2004 WL 339608, at *1 (Del. Feb. 17, 2004) (“In this case, the record reflects that Campbell is serving a sentence imposed by the Superior Court, which had jurisdiction to find a VOP and impose a VOP sentence.” (citing 11 Del. C. §§ 4302, 4334(c)). 8 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996). 9 Canady v. Superior Court, 116 A.2d 678, 681 (Del. 1955). 4 and we have concluded that the Superior Court did not exceed its jurisdiction, a writ

of prohibition is not warranted.

(9) Hartmann filed several motions with his opening brief. The motion for

expedited review and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis are moot. The

“Motion for Attorney Funds If Habeas Corpus or Prohibition Writ[s] Are Denied”

is denied. The Court finds no basis for the expenditure of State funds for counsel in

the circumstances of this case.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The motion for

attorney funds is DENIED. The appellant’s motions for expedited review and to

proceed in forma pauperis are moot.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice