Hartmann v. H.K.E. Realty Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hartmann v. H.K.E. Realty Corp.

228 A.D.2d 558, 644 N.Y.2d 331, 644 N.Y.S.2d 331, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7118

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 17, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 228 A.D.2d 558 (Hartmann v. H.K.E. Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hartmann v. H.K.E. Realty Corp., 228 A.D.2d 558, 644 N.Y.2d 331, 644 N.Y.S.2d 331, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7118 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

The plaintiff Ingrid Hartmann allegedly slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the dance floor at the Taconic Brau Haus, although the substance was never specifically identified. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants were on constructive notice of this alleged dangerous condition because, one-half-hour earlier, one of their dinner companions noticed that an area of the floor near where the injured plaintiff fell was slippery.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, this evidence is insufficient for any trier of fact to infer that the defendants had constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition (see, Moss v JNK Capital, 211 AD2d 769). Without any evidence that the alleged dangerous condition was visible and apparent for a sufficient period of time, the complaint must be dismissed (see, Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836; Moss v JNK Capital, supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J. P., Ritter, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

The plaintiff Ingrid Hartmann allegedly slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the dance floor at the Taconic Brau Haus, although the substance was never specifically identified. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants were on constructive notice of this alleged dangerous condition because, one-half-hour earlier, one of their dinner companions noticed that an area of the floor near where the injured plaintiff fell was slippery.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, this evidence is insufficient for any trier of fact to infer that the defendants had constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition (see, Moss v JNK Capital, 211 AD2d 769). Without any evidence that the alleged dangerous condition was visible and apparent for a sufficient period of time, the complaint must be dismissed (see, Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836; Moss v JNK Capital, supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J. P., Ritter, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

228 A.D.2d 558, 644 N.Y.2d 331, 644 N.Y.S.2d 331, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hartmann-v-hke-realty-corp-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack