Hartman v. Remington Arms Co.

143 F.R.D. 673, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20611, 1992 WL 293286
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedApril 13, 1992
DocketNo. 90-4074-CV-C-5
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 143 F.R.D. 673 (Hartman v. Remington Arms Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hartman v. Remington Arms Co., 143 F.R.D. 673, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20611, 1992 WL 293286 (W.D. Mo. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

SCOTT O. WRIGHT, Senior District Judge.

The Court has completed its review of the documents submitted in camera and the briefs concerning plaintiff’s original motion to compel production of documents. This issue came before the Court on remand from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In re Remington Arms Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir.1991). After review of the matter, the Court rules that Remington Arms Co., Inc. shall produce the documents specified in Appendix A under the safeguard of a protective order.

Defendant Remington Arms Co., Inc. presents two arguments for the Court to find that it should not be required to produce the documents. First, Remington argues that the documents should not be disclosed, or should only be disclosed under the most restrictive of protective orders, because: (1) they are irrelevant to plaintiff's claims concerning the Model 700 rifle; and (2) they are highly sensitive trade secrets, pertaining to an as yet not developed New Bolt Action Rifle. “NBAR” is the acronym for “New Bolt Action Rifle.” Secondly, Remington contends that the documents should not be released even under a protective order, because a protective order cannot adequately protect their interest in confidentiality. At the heart of Remington’s second argument is the claim that counsel for plaintiff previously has violated protective orders issued in other cases.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) affords protection in cases where discovery involves trade secrets. The rule provides that a court may limit the terms of disclosure or refuse disclosure where good cause is shown, such as in the case of a trade secret or confidential information. A court must balance the competing interest in disclosure and discovery against the interest in confidentiality.

As the Eighth Circuit has advised, the court inquiry involves two parts. First, the party opposing discovery must show that the information is a trade secret or confidential information of a proprietary nature requiring protection, within the meaning of Rule 26(c)(7). Missouri law applies to determine whether the documents are trade secrets. See A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Mo.App.1986) (defining trade secret in context of employment contract restricting disclosure). Then the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to establish relevancy and need. In re' Remington Arms, 952 F.2d at 1032. If the party successfully shows both relevance and need, then the court must weigh the potential injury from disclosure against the moving party’s need for the information.

In this case, if Remington shows the NBAR documents are trade secrets and Plaintiff Hartman shows their relevancy and need, then the Court must issue an appropriate protective order to preserve the interests of the parties. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir.1981). Before designing a proper protective order, the Court must consider Remington’s second contention that plaintiff’s counsel has permitted unauthorized disclosures of informa[675]*675tion covered by protective orders in prior cases. If a protective order cannot prevent unauthorized disclosure by plaintiff, then the Court may find it appropriate to deny production of the documents.

Trade Secrets

The Court has reviewed each of the documents filed in camera. Defendant claims the NBAR documents are privileged and should remain confidential because they are trade secrets. Although some of the documents are privileged and constitute trade secrets independently, defendant maintains that all are privileged because they are part of the compiled NBAR files. According to Remington, once it included the documents in the NBAR development files, they became part of the NBAR trade secret and would show the company’s developmental design process and files.

Missouri law utilizes the definition of trade secret presented in Restatement of Torts § 757(b). Trade secret information, such as a process, formula or design, must be secret or it loses its privilege of confidentiality. A.B. Chance Co., 719 S.W.2d at 858 (quoting five factors from Restatements § 757(b), defining a trade secret). Trade secret is a flexible term and involves a number of factors to assess the party’s interest in confidentiality.

Defendant bases its privilege on the assertion that the documents are NBAR trade secrets. The Court’s review of the materials and the briefs submitted indicates that many of the documents do pertain to the NBAR product that remains in the development stage. However, some of the documents concern products other than NBAR. Giving a broad interpretation to Remington’s privilege claim, the Court finds that defendant has demonstrated the trade secret privilege applies to the NBAR documents and to other documents included in the files.

Relevancy and Need

The next question is whether plaintiff has demonstrated that the documents are relevant and needed. Remington’s contention that the documents are irrelevant and entitled to all-encompassing protection goes too far. Although defendant hinges its privilege on the fact that the NBAR files are trade secrets, the documents are not limited to NBAR information. A few documents are copies of magazine articles, already part of the public domain even though they have added significance as part of the NBAR files. A large number of the NBAR documents include significant references to the Model 700, as well as to similar models of defendant’s products. Under Remington’s assertion, any document placed in these files is privileged as a trade secret because it is part of the “compilation of information.” Taking defendant’s argument to the “nth” degree would encourage defendants to merge research on existing/old products with development of new designs in order to avail themselves of the trade secret privilege for all documents placed in the on-going research files. The documents do not lose their relevance to plaintiff’s claims simply by their placement in the NBAR files.

In this case, plaintiff seeks discovery of information for his product defect, negligence, and other tort claims. Many of the documents relate to plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges that the Model 700 design is flawed with respect to its safety, trigger mechanism, bolt lock, and accidental firing. Plaintiff further alleges that NBAR is simply a continuation of the Model 700.

A review of the NBAR files reveals their relevance to the issues of causation, feasible alternative designs, and defendant’s knowledge at the time. Plaintiff asserts, and defendant has not refuted, that the company’s research and work on Model 700 curtailed in the early 1980’s, around the same time that the NBAR design was getting off the ground. The features addressed in the NBAR documents are relevant to Remington’s knowledge of design alternatives and of problems with Model 700.

Plaintiff also has demonstrated the need for these documents. Without the NBAR documents, plaintiff is left with a significant time gap in the evidence concerning [676]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
143 F.R.D. 673, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20611, 1992 WL 293286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hartman-v-remington-arms-co-mowd-1992.