Harter v. Franklin County Department of Sanitary Engineers

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided September 11, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-02995·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

KATHLEEN HARTER,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-2995 Judge Edmund A. Sargus Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMISSIONERS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Second Joint Motion to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. STANDARD Courts distinguish between limiting public disclosure of information during discovery versus the adjudicative stage of a case. See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016). “The line between these two stages, discovery and adjudicative, is crossed when the parties place material in the court record.” Id. (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002)). “Unlike information merely exchanged between the parties, ‘[t]he public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.’” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). For this reason, the moving party has a “heavy” burden of overcoming a “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to court records.” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179); see also id. (“Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” (quotation omitted)). “[I]n civil litigation, only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in

confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is typically enough to overcome the presumption of access.” Id. at 308 (citation and quotations omitted). “[T]he seal itself must be narrowly tailored to serve” the reason for sealing, which requires the moving party to “analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.” Id. at 305–06 (quotation omitted). Ultimately, the movant must show that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury . . . And in delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential.” Id. at 307–08 (internal citations and quotations omitted). If there is a compelling reason, “the party must then show why those reasons outweigh the public interest in access to those records.” Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Shane Grp. Inc., 825 F.3d at 305). The court “that chooses to seal court records must set

forth specific findings and conclusions ‘which justify nondisclosure to the public.’” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 306 (citing Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1176). In sum, to overcome “the strong presumption in favor of openness,” parties who move to seal documents must demonstrate: “(1) a compelling interest in sealing the records; (2) that the interest in sealing outweighs the public’s interest in accessing the records; and (3) that the request is narrowly tailored.” Kondash, 767 F. App’x at 637. II. DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her because of her disability, failed to accommodate her, and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Ohio state law. (Doc. 8 at 1, 4–10). Relevant here, on August 28, 2024, in anticipation of their dispositive motion deadline, the parties filed a joint request to seal Plaintiff’s deposition transcript and several accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 17). Because the motion did not comply with the requirements of Shane Group, the Court denied it

without prejudice and ordered the parties to re-file their motion within seven days. (Doc. 18). On August 30, the parties filed their dispositive motions, and the Court extended “the deadline to submit evidence supporting [the] motions . . . until the Court has resolved the question of whether [Plaintiff’s] deposition transcript and exhibits may be filed under seal.” (Doc. 23). Now, in their revised motion, the parties move to redact portions of Plaintiff’s deposition, as well as Exhibits 13 and 16 of that deposition. (Doc. 16 at 2–3). They also ask to seal Exhibits 3, 17, and 18 of the deposition entirely. (Id.). The Court addresses each group of materials in turn. A. Plaintiff’s Deposition The parties wish to redact parts of the following pages of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript: 51, 52, 57, 69, 70, 73, 74, 113, 114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 126, 127, and 172. (Doc. 26 at 3). The

parties assert the proposed redactions are needed to protect Plaintiff’s privacy because these pages of the transcript “refer to [Plaintiff’s medical] diagnoses or discuss her medical records.” (Id.). But many of these redactions are unnecessary. Put simply, Plaintiff filed much of the information contained in the redactions in her Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 22). For instance, on pages 51 and 52, the parties redact Plaintiff’s diagnoses and her accompanying symptoms. But Plaintiff cites these pages, lists her diagnoses, and discusses her symptoms in her unsealed motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 22 at 3 (listing diagnoses of migraines, fibromyalgia, and chronic fatigue syndrome), 15–16 (describing symptoms)). The same is true for the information provided on pages 57, 69, 70, 73, 74, 113, 114, 116, 117, and 172. (See, e.g., id. at 3 (listing diagnoses also discussed at deposition pages 69, 73, and 113), 8 (discussing information included in Exhibit 16 and on pages 116 and 117 of Plaintiff’s deposition), 15–16 (summarizing information also included on pages 57, 69, 70, 73, 74, 113, 114, and 172 of the deposition)). At base, Plaintiff has “no compelling interest” in redacting information that is “already publicly available.” S.R.X. v.

Fleming, No. 3:20-cv-126, 2020 WL 12991127, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2020). As a result, the Court DENIES the parties’ request to redact pages 51, 52, 57, 69, 70, 73, 74, 113, 114, 116, 117, and 172. Yet the Undersigned finds the proposed redactions on pages 124, 125, 126, and 127 require a different result. These portions discuss details from medical records that the parties also move to seal in their entirety. (See generally Docs. 21, 22). Sealing medical records “is in accordance with the strong public policy of HIPAA and Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.02(B) of protecting patient information.” Harrison v. Scott, 2:18-cv-1023, 2021 WL 2438858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2021). And “[c]ourts have recognized a person’s interest in the privacy of their health information as a legitimate basis for sealing.” Hines v. Humana Ins. Co., No. 1:21-cv-409, 2023

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Harter v. Franklin County Department of Sanitary Engineers, (S.D. Ohio 2024).

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