Hart v. State of Maine

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 9, 2006
DocketPENcr-03-482
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hart v. State of Maine (Hart v. State of Maine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hart v. State of Maine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2006).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss DOCKET NO. CR-03-482

THOMAS J. HART ) Petitioner ) 1 1 VS. ) DECISION ON PETITION ) FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1 "----.- I 1FILED & EFJTEZEG STATE OF MAINE ) 1 SUPERIOR C f i U R T fI Respondent 1 l FEB 1 0 2006 i 8 i : f l Q S , " f \ T CaLi@3'9/ 1 i P F-!ha; ,&,-.

i --. Pending before the court is the Petitioner's Petition for Post-conviction ~ z i e f .

The Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and he

seeks a aew tria!. For the reascas set firth herein, the ccurt deaies the Petif en.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In order to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, the

Petitioner must prove two things. First, he must demonstrate that the performance of his

attorney was below that of an ordinary fallible attorney and second, he must demonstrate

that his attorney's performance was prejudicial in that it deprived the Petitioner of a

substantial ground of defense or likely affected the outcome of :he trial, sentencing or

appeal. See State v. Brewer, 1997 NIE 177, gg 19-20,699 A.2d 1139, 1144.

In this case, the Petitioner was charged with Gross Sexual Assault (Class A)

(Count 1) and Sexual Exploitation of a Minor (Class B) (Count 3). Before January 31,

2003, a person was guilty of gross sexual assault

"if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and: .... B. The other person, not the actor's spouse, has not in fact attained the age of 14 years. 17-A M.R.S.A. 5 253(1)(B) (1983) amended by P.L. 2003, c. 7 1 1 , s B- 2 (effective January 3 1,2003).

Before January 3 1,2003, a person was guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor if:

Knowing or intending that the conduct will be photographed, he intentionally or knowingly employs, solicits, entices, persuades, uses or compels another person, not his spouse, who is in fact a minor, to engage in sexually explicit conduct . . . .17 M.R.S.A. § 2922(A) (1983), repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 711, 5 B-1 (effective January 31,2003).

At trial of this matter, the State introduced four photographs of the Petitioner engaging in

sexual acts with the victim. At least one of these clearly showed the Petitioner with the

penis of a young boy in his mouth. The State called a young man to the stand who

testified that he had taken the pictures and that the Petitioner had threatened to hit him

with a hammer if he did not do so. Evidence at trial also clearly established that the

victim was under the age of fourteen at the time the pictures were taken. The state

introduced additional evidence establishing that the pictures came from the Petitioner's

camera; that the Petitioner delivered the film for development at a local photo

development business.' The same witness testified that the Petitioner had offered him and

the victim money, alcohol and cigarettes in exchange for sexual acts. Furthermore, the

Petitioner elected to testify and while on the witness stand, admitted to engaging in the

sexual acts. He claimed that the two minors were "male prostitutes" and drug-dealers,

that they had drugged him. He also testified that he believed that pictures of other sex

acts were missing from the State's evidence in an apparent attempt to argue that those

pictures were from another roll of film.

' The store clerk whose job it was to develop prints called police upon discovery of the contents of Petitioner's camera. The clerk turned the photos and the negatives over to police. The Petitioner's trial counsel had attempted to demonstrate that the Petitioner was

incompetent to stand trial. After hearing, court determined that the Defendant met at

least minimal standards of competency. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both

counts.

11. Pre-trial

In his amended petition, the Petitioner alleges a variety of reasons why his

attorney was ineffective. All of his contentions are without merit as the Petitioner has

failed to satisfy one or both of the prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsei

standard.

1. Failure to Conduct Adequate Pretrial Investigation, Interview Witnesses or Utilize Court Funds

At hearicg cf the pedticn, ns evidence :vas presented ccncerfiicg the a!!egaticn

that his trial counsel did not use court funds, so the court determines that this ground is

abandoned except as addressed herein. The Petitioner also argues that his attorney failed

to call witnesses that would have boistered his claims that the victims were actually male

prostitutes and drug dealers. He argues that a properly utilized private investigator would

have uncovered facts consistent with the Petitioner's version of events. Trial counsel

testified that he made the best efforts that he could to find the witnesses that Petitioner

wanted at his trial but that he was largely hampered in this effort by the Petitioner's

refusal to tell him who those witnesses were.2 Trial counsel acknowledged that he had a

difficult relationship'with the Petitioner who would wax and wane in his desire to be

represented by trial counsel or not. Sometimes the relationship was good; sometimes it

'The Petitioner was held for his inability to make bail prior to trial and made several attempts to persuade the court to release him on lesser bail so that he might find his own witnesses. He maintained that he was the only one who would be able to go the places in Bangor where it was likely that these people could be found. A t the bail hearing, this court rejected that suggestion. was not.3 At the time of trial, this court was satisfied that the lawyerlclient relationship

was sufficient to permit trial counsel to perform his professional responsibilities.

Irrespective of whether trial counsel's performance was deficient, if he had

somehow managed to succeed in locating the "missing witnesses" and determined that

they were in fact male prostitutes, such evidence would not have been admissible at trial.

Engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of 14 is a crime whether that person

is a male prostitute or not. Accordingly, attacking the character of the victims in this

manner would not constitutz a valid defense to Gross Sexual Assauit or Exploitation of a

Minor. For this reason, the Petitioner cannot establish the "prejudice" prong for this

c!a;m.

2. Failure to Pursue Motion to S~ippress

A reading of the docket reveals that a motion to suppress was filed by one of the

Petitioner's first attorney's and withdrawn by a subsequent attorney on January 3 1,2002.

Trial counsel entered his appearance on the Petitioner's behalf after that date and

therefore, he could not be charged with a failure to pursue the motion to suppress.

In any event, the Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged failure in this

regard. The Petitioner's argument at the evidentiary hearing was that the motion to

suppress revolved around the Petitioner's interview with police. H e argues that when the

Petitioner stated "Ok, let's go then'' that that was an exercise of his right to remain silent

and that any subsequent statements should have been suppressed in accordance with

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U . S . 436 (1966). This court finds that the motion was without

legal merit in that this statement was not equivocal enough for the police to have been

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Related

State v. Brewer
1997 ME 177 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
State v. King
1998 ME 60 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
State v. Robinson
2002 ME 136 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2002)

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