Hart v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJune 5, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00022
StatusUnknown

This text of Hart v. Social Security Administration (Hart v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hart v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Ark. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

BILLY RAY HART PLAINTIFF

V. No. 3:24-CV-00022-ERE

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT

ORDER1

Plaintiff Billy Ray Hart appeals the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for disability benefits. For the reasons set out below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. I. Background On April 5, 2021, Mr. Billy Ray Hart protectively filed an application for benefits due to a learning disability, illiteracy, poor memory, a bad knee, and depression. Tr. 10, 222. Mr. Hart’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. At Mr. Hart’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing on October 4, 2022, where Mr. Hart appeared with his lawyer, and the ALJ heard testimony from Mr. Hart and a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. 39-64. The ALJ issued a decision on February 16, 2023, finding that Mr. Hart was not disabled. Tr.

1The parties consented in writing to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 4. 7-30. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Hart’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 1-6.

Mr. Hart, who was fifty years old at the time of the hearing, completed tenth grade and has past relevant work experience as an apartment maintenance man. Tr. 44, 58.

II. The ALJ’s Decision2 The ALJ found that Mr. Hart had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. Tr. 12. The ALJ also concluded that Mr. Hart had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder,

borderline intellectual functioning, generalized anxiety disorder, obesity, and remote right knee anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction. Id. However, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hart did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 13. According to the ALJ, Mr. Hart had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with the following limitations: (1) only occasional climbing

of ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) occasional kneeling, crouching,

2 The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g). and crawling; (3) no right lower extremity foot-control-operation duties; (4) only simple, but not complex, instructions for work that requires no more than

occasional changes to the workplace setting; and (5) no more than occasional interaction with the general public. Tr. 17. In response to hypothetical questions incorporating the above limitations, the

VE testified that a substantial number of potential jobs were available in the national economy, including poultry dresser and poultry killer. Tr. 25, 60-61. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Mr. Hart was not disabled. III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review In this appeal, the Court must review the Commissioner’s decision for legal error and determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on

the record as a whole. Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Substantial evidence” in this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find [the evidence] adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must consider not only evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision, but also evidence that supports a contrary outcome. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983

(8th Cir. 2015). The Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision, however, “merely because substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

B. Mr. Hart’s Arguments for Reversal. Mr. Hart contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ erred by: (1) finding an RFC that is not

supported by the record; and (2) presenting hypotheticals that did not account for all of Mr. Hart’s limitations. Doc. 7 at 23, 27. After carefully reviewing the record as a whole, the undersigned affirms the Commissioner. C. Analysis

1. The RFC Finding is Supported by the Record as a Whole. Mr. Hart contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by the record. Doc. 7 at 23. Specifically, Mr. Hart points out that light work requires him

to be able to stand and walk for long periods of time, but he has had knee problems since, at least, 2014. Id. Yet, ten months after his ACL surgery he complained about only climbing and squatting without a brace; but he, reportedly, “did great in his brace.” Tr. 336. The ALJ properly noted that Mr. Hart consistently had “normal

gait, no swelling in his right knee, and no other significant musculoskeletal or physical abnormalities or complaints and his symptoms appear to have resolved with conservative treatment.” Tr. 19, 23. Also rebutting the severity of his alleged inability to perform the walking required for light work, Mr. Hart was “not interested in formal therapy” and “not

interested in an injection for his inflammation . . . .” Tr. 337. Rather, he chose only home exercises and a steroid pack. Additionally, although he repeatedly has complained of knee pain over the years, it has been conservatively treated with

ibuprofen, Voltaren gel, and Biofreeze, and he has not required an assistive device for mobility. Tr. 13, 19-23, 401, 417, 421, 424, 426, 484. On June 28, 2022, Mr. Hart reported that his right knee pain is worse on his more active days but “refus[ed] any medications for pain relief.” Tr. 484. Mr. Hart’s conservative

treatment is inconsistent with disabling knee pain. Swarthout v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2022) (“The ALJ also properly cited Swarthout’s conservative treatment plan and resistance to treatment as factors that undermined her claim of

severe disabling conditions.”). Mr. Hart bears the burden of proving his RFC, which represents the most he can do despite the combined effects of his credible limitations. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). “It is the ALJ’s responsibility to

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Halverson v. Astrue
600 F.3d 922 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Buckner v. Astrue
646 F.3d 549 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
Slusser v. Astrue
557 F.3d 923 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Tracy Milam v. Carolyn W. Colvin
794 F.3d 978 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Timothy Brown v. Carolyn W. Colvin
825 F.3d 936 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Marcus Hensley v. Carolyn W. Colvin
829 F.3d 926 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Deborah Swarthout v. Kilolo Kijakazi
35 F.4th 608 (Eighth Circuit, 2022)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Hart v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hart-v-social-security-administration-ared-2024.