Hart v. Lowe's Home Centers
Opinion
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 19, 2022
No. 21-30689
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Ora L. Hart,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C.,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:21-CV-408
Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Ora Hart sued Lowe’s Home Centers after being injured when she tripped and fell. The district court entered summary judgment for Lowe’s. We AFFIRM, though for slightly different reasons than those given by the district court.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
No. 21-30689
I
Hart was shopping at a Lowe’s store in Shreveport. She alleges, and security camera footage confirms, that she was walking down an aisle next to the store’s row of checkout counters when she tripped over a piece of lumber that was protruding from another customer’s shopping cart and extending into the aisle. Footage from another angle shows that the other customer was standing in line at the register when the accident occurred. Hart suffered a fractured kneecap.
Hart sued Lowe’s in Louisiana state court. Lowe’s removed the action to federal district court. After both sides had conducted discovery, the district court granted Lowe’s motion for summary judgment. The district court reasoned that although Louisiana law requires a merchant to make “reasonable effort[s] to keep the premises free of . . . hazardous conditions,” Lowe’s did not “owe[] a duty to Hart to keep her from tripping over a piece of lumber protruding from the bottom of an unknown customer’s shopping cart” because “Lowe’s did not have control of the customer’s cart, did not load the piece of lumber, and had no part in causing Hart to fall.” Hart v. Lowe’s Home Centers LLC, No. 5:21-CV-00408, 2021 WL 4694729, at *3–4 (W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2021).
II
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255
No. 21-30689
F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001). We apply Louisiana law, which the parties agree supplies the substantive rule of decision in this diversity case.
III
Hart first argues the district court erred by failing to properly apply Louisiana negligence principles. She further contends that her claim against Lowe’s is not governed by the provision of the Louisiana Merchant Liability Act (LMLA) that deals specifically with “negligence claim[s] brought against . . . merchant[s] . . . for damages as a result of an injury . . . sustained because of a fall due to a condition . . . on a merchant’s premises.” La. Stat. § 9:2800.6(B).
We disagree. To be sure, “the law of merchant liability found in [Section] 9:2800.6 is not the exclusive remedy of a plaintiff who is injured in an accident on a merchant’s premises”; when “the accident is allegedly the result of a specific act on the part of [the defendant],” ordinary “principles of negligence are applicable.” Crooks v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 620 So. 2d 421, 424 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993). But when a claim against a merchant is “solely the result of a condition found on [its] premises,” such as a plaintiff’s “trip and fall . . . caused by spilled liquid or an item such as a box temporarily present in an aisle,” “[Section] 9:2800.6 applies to th[e] case[] and provides instruction as to the burden of proof.” Id.; accord Toney v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 207 F. App’x 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2006); Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 747 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999); Riolo v. Nat’l Tea Co., 726 So. 2d 515, 518 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999) (fall caused by tripping over empty grocery bag near store entrance governed by § 9:2800.6).
Here, Hart’s injuries did not result from “a specific act on the part”
of Lowe’s, but rather from a “trip and fall . . . caused by . . . an item . . . temporarily present in an aisle” due to another customer’s actions. Hart’s negligence claim thus falls squarely within the ambit of La. Stat.
No. 21-30689
§ 9:2800.6. She accordingly “ha[s] the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of [a negligence claim],” each of the following:
(1) The condition [that caused her injury] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition . . . , prior to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care.
La. Stat. § 9:2800.6(B). “‘Constructive notice,’” the statute further specifies, “means . . . that the condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised reasonable care. The presence of an employee of the merchant in the vicinity” of a condition “does not, alone, constitute constructive notice.” Id. § 9:2800.6(C)(1). Section 9:2800.6(B) “requires the claimant to prove each of its three subsections” and does not allow for “shifting . . . the burden” to the defendant. White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 699 So. 2d 1081, 1085 (La. 1997).
The most straightforward basis for deciding this appeal is that Hart has failed to make the showing required by Section 9:2800.6(B)(2): that Lowe’s “either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition” that caused her injuries. Hart does not argue that Lowe’s or its agents had actual knowledge of the lumber extending into the aisle where she was walking. Nor does Hart identify any evidence that the lumber was in that position long enough to put Lowe’s on constructive notice of the condition. “Though the time period need not be specific in minutes or hours, constructive notice requires that . . . the condition [have] existed for some time period prior to the fall.” White, 699 So. 2d at 1084–85. Here, given that the customer on whose cart the lumber sat was waiting in the checkout line
Case: 21-30689 Document: 00516325475 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/19/2022
No. 21-30689
when Hart fell, the risky condition—that is, the lumber extending into the aisle—very well may have only existed for a few minutes. Because Hart has “simply show[n] that the condition existed without [making] an additional showing that the condition existed for some time before [her] fall,” she “has not carried the burden of proving constructive notice.” Id. at 1084. 1 Hart, attempting to pivot from the notice issue, argues that “[b]ecause Lowe’s essentially created the condition, . . . she need not prove actual or constructive notice.” “In providing this particular cart to another customer and permitting the use of the cart to load with lumber for purchase without assistance of any kind,” Hart explains, “it was foreseeable that patrons . . . could trip and fall over lumber when navigating the aisles and passageways.” But merely offering merchandise for sale that customers could conceivably use to create a tripping hazard does not amount to “creat[ion]” of a dangerous condition within the meaning of La. Stat. § 9:2800.6(B)(2). Louisiana courts have uniformly rejected the contention that “a merchant’s failure to exercise reasonable care is the equivalent of a merchant creating a
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