Hart Ex Rel. Hart v. Ronspies

Nebraska Supreme Court

Hart Ex Rel. Hart v. Ronspies

146 N.W.2d 795, 181 Neb. 38, 1966 Neb. LEXIS 462

CourtNebraska Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 2, 1966

Docket36502

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 146 N.W.2d 795 (Hart Ex Rel. Hart v. Ronspies) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hart Ex Rel. Hart v. Ronspies, 146 N.W.2d 795, 181 Neb. 38, 1966 Neb. LEXIS 462 (Neb. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Smith, J.

The district court rendered a summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of defendant’s negligence. It reserved for trial, however, issues of contributory negligence under the comparative negligence statute, proximate cause, and damages. Defendant has appealed, but plaintiff challenges appealability.

There is no jurisdiction unless the judgment affected a substantial right. See, § 25-1902, R. R. S. 1943; Otte *39 man v. Interstate Eire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N. W. 2d 583. The district court possesses authority to render a summary judgment, interlocutory in character, on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue of damages. See § 25-1332, R. R. S. 1943. Such a judgment is simply an interlocutory summary adjudication. If a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, a hearing analogous to a pretrial conference for formulation of issues may be held. At the hearing the court may specify the facts that appear without substantial controversy, and such facts are established for the trial. See, § 25-1333, R. R. S. 1943; Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wash. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 878; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.), § 56.20 [3.-2], p. 2751.

If there were no provision for appeal from an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, a litigant frequently would have an inadequate remedy. We think that the appeal provision was designed chiefly to prevent such a situation. See, Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N. W. 104; Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 11 N. W. 300. That purpose is compatible with the interlocutory summary adjudication which prevents vexatious delay in the trial process.

Ordinary burdens of trial do not affect a substantial right, and the remedy by appeal after a trial and a final judgment is adequate in the present case. See, Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N. W. 2d 614; Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., Inc., 136 F. 2d 621, 147 A. L. R. 574; Maybury v. City of Seattle, supra. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

Appeal dismissed:

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Smith, J.

The district court rendered a summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of defendant’s negligence. It reserved for trial, however, issues of contributory negligence under the comparative negligence statute, proximate cause, and damages. Defendant has appealed, but plaintiff challenges appealability.

There is no jurisdiction unless the judgment affected a substantial right. See, § 25-1902, R. R. S. 1943; Otte *39 man v. Interstate Eire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N. W. 2d 583. The district court possesses authority to render a summary judgment, interlocutory in character, on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue of damages. See § 25-1332, R. R. S. 1943. Such a judgment is simply an interlocutory summary adjudication. If a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, a hearing analogous to a pretrial conference for formulation of issues may be held. At the hearing the court may specify the facts that appear without substantial controversy, and such facts are established for the trial. See, § 25-1333, R. R. S. 1943; Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wash. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 878; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.), § 56.20 [3.-2], p. 2751.

If there were no provision for appeal from an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, a litigant frequently would have an inadequate remedy. We think that the appeal provision was designed chiefly to prevent such a situation. See, Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N. W. 104; Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 11 N. W. 300. That purpose is compatible with the interlocutory summary adjudication which prevents vexatious delay in the trial process.

Ordinary burdens of trial do not affect a substantial right, and the remedy by appeal after a trial and a final judgment is adequate in the present case. See, Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N. W. 2d 614; Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., Inc., 136 F. 2d 621, 147 A. L. R. 574; Maybury v. City of Seattle, supra. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

Appeal dismissed:

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146 N.W.2d 795, 181 Neb. 38, 1966 Neb. LEXIS 462, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hart-ex-rel-hart-v-ronspies-neb-1966.

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