Harshavardhan Chintala v. State

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 17, 2009

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 17, 2009.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-08-00077-CR

HARSHAVARDHAN CHINTALA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 129457

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant Harshavardhan Chintala of driving while intoxicated, and the trial court sentenced him to 180 days= confinement, probated for twelve months.  In his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.  We affirm.

I.  Background

Police officers Joseph Carter and John Burns stopped the vehicle appellant was driving between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. after Officer Carter watched appellant strike a curb, fail to maintain a single lane of traffic, speed, and follow another car too closely.  Upon approaching appellant=s vehicle, Officer Carter smelled an odor of alcohol on appellant=s breath and noticed that his eyes were red and glassy.  Officer Carter asked appellant to step out of the car.  Appellant admitted drinking three to four beers that evening, having finished the last one approximately thirty minutes before being stopped.  The officers observed that appellant was swaying, appeared unsteady on his feet, and slurred his speech.  Officer Carter also testified at trial that appellant leaned against the car during questioning.  The officers informed appellant that they suspected him of DWI and requested that he undergo sobriety testing.  Appellant refused to submit to any testing and was arrested.

The jury viewed a video of appellant=s arrest and transportation to jail.  In  the video, appellant appeared to close his eyes and slowly lean forward at one point, then close his eyes and slowly lean to the side at another.  At trial, both officers opined that appellant had passed out in those instances, which indicated to them that he was intoxicated.

Both officers testified that appellant displayed signs of intoxication indicating physical impairment, but Officer Burns also testified that appellant showed signs of mental impairment.  Although Officer Burns stated that appellant was only Apossibly intoxicated@ based on his observations, he later explained that while all the clues led him to believe appellant was intoxicated, appellant=s refusal to submit to testing made it hard for him to say how intoxicated appellant was.

Appellant now challenges his conviction, claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury=s verdict.

II.  Analysis

The jury could convict appellant of driving while intoxicated if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).  Under Texas law, the State may prove a defendant is intoxicated by proving the defendant did not have the normal use of either his mental or his physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body.  See id. ' 49.01(2)(a); Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Herrera v. State, 11 S.W.3d 412, 414B15 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d).  Appellant does not dispute that he was operating a motor vehicle in a public place.  Therefore, we will affirm appellant=s conviction if the evidence sufficiently demonstrates he was intoxicated because he did not have the normal use of either his mental or his physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body.

A.  Legal Sufficiency

In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The jury, as the trier of fact, Ais the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.@  Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the testimony.  Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).  The jury may also draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.  Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party.  Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

The jury had substantial evidence from which it could infer that appellant was intoxicated, including (1) the testimony and videotaped observations of Officers Burns and Carter that there were multiple indicatorsCspeeding, following too closely, failing to maintain a single lane of traffic, having an odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, swaying, and unsteadinessCwhich based on their experience and training indicated to them that appellant was intoxicated^[1] at the time of the traffic stop; (2) both officers= testimony that appellant displayed signs of intoxication^[2] indicating physical impairment; (3) Officer Burns=s testimony that appellant also showed signs of intoxication^[3] indicating mental impairment; (4) appellant=s refusal of sobriety testing;^[4] and (5) both officers= testimony that, based on their review of the video, appellant apparently passed out on the way to the station.^[5]  Additionally, appellant admitted consuming three to four beers, with his last drink being approximately thirty minutes before the traffic stop.

On appeal, appellant challenges the evidence described above by pointing to evidentiary conflicts, which we presume the jury resolved in favor of the State.  See Turro, 867 S.W.2d at 47.  Appellant also emphasizes evidentiary discrepancies that ultimately only call into question the officers= credibility, an issue within the sole province of the jury.  See Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271; Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not have the normal use of either his mental or his physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body.  We therefore overrule appellants legal sufficiency challenge.

B.  Factual Sufficiency

In evaluating the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and will set aside the verdict only if we are able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury=s verdict.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414B17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  We cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because we disagree with the jury=s resolution of that conflict, and we do not intrude upon the fact-finder=s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony.  See id. at 417; Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271.  The fact-finder may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented.  Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re A.B., 133 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Tex. App.CDallas 2004, no pet.).  In our review, we discuss the evidence appellant claims is most important in allegedly undermining the jury=s verdict, Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), and if we determine the evidence is factually insufficient, we must explain in exactly what way we perceive the conflicting evidence to greatly preponderate against conviction.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414B17.

Appellant contends the following evidence contradicts the inculpatory evidence described above and allegedly undermines the jury=s verdict:

(1) the lack of evidence that appellant was mentally impaired,

(2) the lack of evidence supporting Officer Carter=s observation that appellant was unsteady,

(3) Officer Burns=s testimony that appellant was only Apossibly intoxicated@ in light of his experience, which was more extensive than Officer Carter=s,^[6]

(4) the officers= failure to include in their offense report or driver=s license revocation hearing testimony that appellant had passed out,

(5) the officers= failure to give appellant more than one reason for stopping him, despite the numerous reasons cited at trial, and their failure to record any of the other reasons mentioned,

(6) the discrepancy between Officer Carter=s administrative hearing testimony and trial testimony regarding whether appellant had an accent, as opposed to slurred speech, and

(7) evidence suggesting the officers were acting with bias or improper motive.

First, the lack of evidence that appellant was mentally impaired does not undermine the verdict, given that the State presented sufficient evidence of appellant=s physical impairment, as discussed above.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 49.01(2)(a); Kitchens, 823 S.W.2d at 25; Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 414B15.  Second, although Officer Carter admitted that appellant did not hold onto his car for support, the jury was still free to infer appellant=s unsteadiness from Officer Carter=s testimony that appellant leaned against a car during questioning.  See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133.  Third, regardless of their different experience levels, both officers testified they believed appellant was intoxicated^[7] and physically impaired.  See Gilbert v. State, No. 14‑05‑01244‑CR, 2007 WL 704981, at *3 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] Mar. 8, 2007, pet. ref=d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding appellant=s focus on officer=s testimony that appellant was only Apossibly intoxicated@ to the exclusion of officer=s testimony that appellant had lost normal use of his mental and physical faculties unpersuasive in sufficiency analysis).  Officer Carter explained that he first mentioned at trial that appellant passed out because he first noticed it during a pretrial review of the tape.  Though the officers only gave appellant one reason for the stop, they mentioned all but one of the other reasons given at trial on the video, and they explained at trial that the reasons not memorialized on the video tape had occurred before the camcorder began recording.  The remainder of appellant=s contradictory evidence only challenges the officers= credibility, an issue within the sole province of the jury.  See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417; Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271.

Based on the evidence before it, the jury chose to believe the officers.  Having neutrally reviewed the entire record, we hold that it contains no objective basis for saying that appellant=s conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury=s verdict.  We therefore overrule appellant=s factual sufficiency challenge.

Having determined that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury=s verdict, we overrule appellant=s sole issue and affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/      Leslie B. Yates

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Seymore, and Boyce.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  See State v. Houth, 845 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (implying that failure to maintain a single lane of traffic can be an indicator of intoxication); Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142B43 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (enumerating a nonexclusive list of signs recognized as evidence of intoxication, including odor of alcohol on person or breath, unsteady balance, staggered gait, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes); Adams v. State, 156 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 2005, no pet.) (considering speeding as evidence of DWI); Banks v. State, No. 06‑00‑00152‑CR, 2002 WL 91343, at *1 (Tex. App.CTexarkana Jan. 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (considering  following too closely as evidence of intoxication).

^[2]  Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d) (Athe testimony of a police officer that an individual is intoxicated is probative evidence of intoxication@).

^[3]  Id.

^[4]  See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ' 724.061 (Vernon 1999) (refusal of testing may be brought up at trial); Finley v. State, 809 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref=d) (holding jury may consider refusal to provide breath or blood sample as evidence of guilt).

^[5]  See Cotton, 686 S.W.2d at 142 (recognizing drowsiness as evidence of intoxication); Sandvig v. State, No. 03‑04‑00345‑CR, 2006 WL 431379, at *3 (Tex. App.CAustin Feb. 24, 2006, pet. dism=d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that evidence showing appellant apparently passed out allowed inference of intoxication).

^[6]  On the evening of the stop, Officer Carter was a Probationary Police Officer, and Officer Burns was his Field Training Officer.

^[7]   To explain his testimony that appellant was only Apossibly intoxicated,@ Officer Burns testified that while all the clues led him to believe appellant was intoxicated, appellant=s refusal of testing made it hard for him to say how intoxicated appellant was.  Thus, Officer Burns=s doubts apparently applied only to the level of appellant=s intoxication, rather than to the question of whether appellant was intoxicated.