Harry v. Wedbush Securities Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-4755
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIGHT HARRY; RONALD STEPHEN No. 24-4755 DRAPER, D.C. No. 4:24-cv-00484-HSG Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

WEDBUSH SECURITIES INC.; KCG AMERICAS LLC; ION TRADING, INC.; MAIN STREET TRADING, INC.; DANIEL B. COLEMAN; GREG HOSTETLER; GARY L. WEDBUSH; PATRICK J. FLYNN; COMPUTER VOICE SYSTEMS, INC.; ANDREA PIGNATARO; ROBERT SYLVERNE; PAUL STURM; SCOTT WILLIAM BENZ,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Bright Harry and Ronald Stephen Draper appeal pro se from the district

court’s judgment remanding in part and dismissing in part their action alleging

various federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 651 F.3d 1039,

1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (denial of a motion to remand); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297

F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based on

claim preclusion). We affirm.

The district court properly refused to remand plaintiffs’ entire action to state

court because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Draper’s

claims. See Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that because the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide “only some,

but not all,” of the plaintiff’s claims, the court “could not have remanded [the]

entire case”); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1988)

(explaining that a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”) claim falls within the district court’s original jurisdiction and is

removable under § 1441(a)). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, the district court

did not err by “accepting” the notice of removal. See Libhart v. Santa Monica

Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that removal does

not require a court order and is effected by a defendant satisfying the procedural

2 24-4755 requirements for removal).

The district court properly dismissed Draper’s RICO claim with prejudice as

barred by claim preclusion because Draper raised or could have raised this claim in

his prior federal actions between the same parties or their privies that resulted in

final judgments on the merits. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d

985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of claim preclusion under federal

law). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, the district court’s preclusion

determination was not jurisdictional. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (stating that preclusion “is not a jurisdictional

matter”).

We do not consider plaintiffs’ contentions about district court orders in their

prior actions because they are outside the scope of this appeal and have been

rejected by this court in prior appeals.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-4755