Harrod v. Union Finance Co.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Harrod v. Union Finance Co.

420 So. 2d 108, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20928

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedAugust 17, 1982

DocketNo. 82-955

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 420 So. 2d 108 (Harrod v. Union Finance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harrod v. Union Finance Co., 420 So. 2d 108, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20928 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s order which, for the purpose of permitting the Marreros to intervene in the reopened foreclosure action, vacated both a final judgment of foreclosure and a clerk’s sale to Harrod made pursuant thereto. The Marreros’ asserted interest in the foreclosed property derives from a deed ostensibly executed in September 1981, but not recorded until De[109]*109cember 22, 1981, eight days after the lis pendens accompanying the foreclosure action was filed and recorded. The concern that to allow purchasers pendente lite to intervene would unnecessarily protract litigation, Peninsular Naval Stores Company v. Cox, 57 Fla. 505, 49 So. 191 (1909), which gave rise to the rule precluding intervention in a mortgage foreclosure action by a person who acquires an interest in the subject property after the recording of a lis pendens, see Andresix Corporation v. Peoples Downtown National Bank, 419 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and cases cited therein, is equally applicable where the prospective intervenor’s interest, although acquired beforehand, is not recorded until after the recording of the lis pendens. In our view, the rule must be the same in either case.

Reversed with directions to reinstate the final judgment of foreclosure and the clerk’s sale to Harrod.

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s order which, for the purpose of permitting the Marreros to intervene in the reopened foreclosure action, vacated both a final judgment of foreclosure and a clerk’s sale to Harrod made pursuant thereto. The Marreros’ asserted interest in the foreclosed property derives from a deed ostensibly executed in September 1981, but not recorded until De[109]*109cember 22, 1981, eight days after the lis pendens accompanying the foreclosure action was filed and recorded. The concern that to allow purchasers pendente lite to intervene would unnecessarily protract litigation, Peninsular Naval Stores Company v. Cox, 57 Fla. 505, 49 So. 191 (1909), which gave rise to the rule precluding intervention in a mortgage foreclosure action by a person who acquires an interest in the subject property after the recording of a lis pendens, see Andresix Corporation v. Peoples Downtown National Bank, 419 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and cases cited therein, is equally applicable where the prospective intervenor’s interest, although acquired beforehand, is not recorded until after the recording of the lis pendens. In our view, the rule must be the same in either case.

Reversed with directions to reinstate the final judgment of foreclosure and the clerk’s sale to Harrod.

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Bluebook (online)

420 So. 2d 108, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20928, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrod-v-union-finance-co-fladistctapp-1982.

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