Harrison v. Petroleum Surveys

80 So. 2d 153, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 1506, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 787
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 22, 1955
Docket4017
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 80 So. 2d 153 (Harrison v. Petroleum Surveys) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrison v. Petroleum Surveys, 80 So. 2d 153, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 1506, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 787 (La. Ct. App. 1955).

Opinion

80 So.2d 153 (1955)

William H. HARRISON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PETROLEUM SURVEYS, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4017.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

April 22, 1955.
Rehearing Denied May 27, 1955.

*154 Harvey Peltier, Donald L. Peltier, Thibodaux, for appellants.

Doyle, Gremillion, Doyle & Smith, New Orleans, for appellee.

TATE, Judge.

Plaintiff-landowners appealed from judgment after trial on the merits dismissing their suit for muskrats killed and damages to muskrat lands allegedly caused by the geophysical explorations conducted thereon by Petroleum Surveys, Inc., defendant-appellee.

Such geophysical exploration operations consist of recording the subterranean reactions to explosions set off about 200 feet beneath the ground at a certain predesignated *155 pattern of points situated over certain territory. The skilled interpretation of these recorded reactions may approximately indicate the presence or absence of mineral potentialities. In marshy country such as is here involved, the surveying, explosion, and recording crews are transported on "marsh buggies"—huge, heavy vehicles which churn through the marsh on two sets of two broad (4' wide each) wheels leaving tracks from 18 inches to four feet deep, depending on the softness of the marsh, and approximately twelve feet in width.

By stipulation between the parties, it is admitted that Petroleum Surveys employees did actually trespass specifically without authorization from plaintiff-landowners (hereinafter designated as "the Harrisons") on their property by operating their marsh buggies on approximately two acres of marsh land at the northwest corner of their section, and by firing the shot in question at a depth of 172 feet, after sinking a pipe 190 feet deep. It is further expressly stipulated that this trespass was unintentional and was the result of an honest surveying error.

Petroleum Surveys produced three former employees in an effort to minimize the damage done to the two-acre strip. But taking into consideration that the locationpoint in question was one of many such shots taken on the day in question and over three years before trial, their testimony as to the use of two such marsh buggies to a depth into the Harrison's land of about 200 feet, leaving two tracks each about 50 feet wide or 100 feet in all, together with the testimony of the trapper, trapping supervisor, and owner of the land convinces us, as claimed, that Petroleum Surveys' operations completely crushed the two-acre tract in question and the muskratsupporting 3-cornered grass growing thereon.

1. Admissibility of Evidence.

At the outset, based upon the Harrisons' refusal prior to trial to permit Petroleum Surveys to inspect the area of trespassing, defendant objected to introduction of any evidence whatsoever as to damages sustained by the land in question. By letter of December 15, 1951, concerning also several other matters involved in this lawsuit, counsel for defendant had included a request for permission of a surveyor and expert witness to locate the boundary line and make an estimate of the continuing nature of the damages allegedly sustained by the land. This request was refused for certain grounds not here material, and the matter was not re-urged before trial of the merits on February 11, 1952, when defendant simply objected to admission of any such evidence and did not again request permission to go upon the land. The trial continued on February 12, 1952, and was concluded on April 21, 1952.

Petroleum Survey's objection is based upon similar rulings excluding evidence in personal injury jurisprudence where plaintiffs refused to be examined by physicians selected by the defendant or appointed by the court, see Grant v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 129 La. 811, 56 So. 897; Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777; Bailey v. Fisher, 1929, 11 La.App. 187, 123 So. 166; Russell v. Celentano, 1930, 13 La.App. 708, 129 So. 182; Daste v. First National Life, Health and Accident Insurance Company, 1930, 14 La.App. 565, 130 So. 572; Ritter v. National Life and Accident Insurance Company, La.App., 198 So. 280. But the Supreme Court cases cited concern repeated refusals to submit to examination even by court-appointed physicians, and also involve the constitutional sanctity of a citizen's person. And the courts will not apply this doctrine arbitrarily to exclude evidence of damages upon simple proof of refusal to submit to examination, but have instead inquired into all the circumstances to see whether such refusal was reasonable or excusable, Holley v. Louisiana and Arkansas R. Co., La.App., 155 So. 790, Stewart v. Security Industrial Life Insurance Company, 3 La.App. 256.

In the case before us, the request to view was made once as a routine request without any indication that defendant would *156 upon refusal invoke the harsh sanction here sought, nor did the defendant seek the assistance of the court in obtaining access to such information. We do not believe that such drastic consequences as exclusion of testimony of damages should result from the refusal of an unreiterated and apparently routine request to view. The District Court admitted the evidence subject to this exception, which he did not specifically rule upon, but which we overrule.

It should be added that the doctrine referred to by defendant is no longer applicable; or, rather, has been formalized and statutorily adopted by the "Depositions and Discovery Act", 202 of 1952, LSA-R.S. 13:3741, see sections 13:3782(2) and 13:3783 making available mandatory discovery procedure to view the scene of the trespass or have examinations made of injured parties.

2. The Muskrat.

The evidence presented describes the muskrat as a small (2 lb.) fur-bearing animal, living in marshy areas. It feeds on the roots of certain grasses, which it eats from tunnels under the ground dug by itself. The muskrat lives underground in nests, and prefers areas with ground firm enough to support grass, but not so firm as to impede its digging processes. It also prefers areas upon which certain types of grass grow, such as "3-cornered" grass. The male inhabits the nest with the female. An external manifestation of this nest may be a "muskrat hill", which may also indicate four or five or more such combined nests. The muskrat breeds monthly a litter of 2-4 kittens, constructing a new chamber to its nest for each such litter.

The trapping of muskrats for their pelts on the four million marsh acres in southern Louisiana is an important economic activity of our State.

3. The Factual Consequences of the Trespass.

The Harrisons' witnesses consisted of the owner, trapping supervisor, and trapper of the 2-acre tract in question, and several other experienced trappers and trapping superintendents. They testified that the operation of marsh buggies over muskrat lands such as are here involved will kill many of the muskrats and their litters in tunnels and nests, since the muskrat upon approach of danger hides in his underground tunnels (and since the marsh buggy trails go deeper than the tunnels of the muskrat hill). These operations also destroy the rich three-cornered grass upon which they feed. Because of this destruction and of the packing of the ground, they testified that such muskrat lands would not be good for trapping for from 8 to 15 or more years thereafter.

Most of these witnesses were also familiar with the land here involved. They testified that due to the plentiful 3-cornered grass and the right softness of the soil, it was good muskrat land.

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Bluebook (online)
80 So. 2d 153, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 1506, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrison-v-petroleum-surveys-lactapp-1955.