Harrison v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol

D.C. Circuit

Harrison v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol

793 F.3d 119, 417 App. D.C. 119, 417 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11896, 2015 WL 4153883

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJuly 10, 2015

Docket14-5282

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 793 F.3d 119 (Harrison v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Harrison v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 793 F.3d 119, 417 App. D.C. 119, 417 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11896, 2015 WL 4153883 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam). As this court recently explained, see Swann v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 598 Fed.Appx. 13, 14 (D.C.Cir.2015); Newton v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 598 Fed.Appx. 12, 13 (D.C.Cir.2015); the Congressional Accountability Act (“Act”) incorporates Title VII’s substantive discrimination provisions by reference. -See 2 U.S.C. § 1311; see also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C.Cir. 2008). Therefore, contrary to appellant’s argument, the district court correctly applied Title VII case law in analyzing her claim of discrimination under the Act.

Appellant also argues that the district court should not have used Title VII case law in analyzing her retaliation claims under the Act, but she has made no effort to show how application of a different standard would have changed the outcome. The court therefore declines to address the issue. To the extent appellant argues the district court committed error under Title VII standards in analyzing her hostile work environment claims, she has failed to show that her employer’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to constitute a hostile work environment. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Clerk is, directed to publish this order. The Clerk is further directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam). As this court recently explained, see Swann v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 598 Fed.Appx. 13, 14 (D.C.Cir.2015); Newton v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 598 Fed.Appx. 12, 13 (D.C.Cir.2015); the Congressional Accountability Act (“Act”) incorporates Title VII’s substantive discrimination provisions by reference. -See 2 U.S.C. § 1311; see also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C.Cir. 2008). Therefore, contrary to appellant’s argument, the district court correctly applied Title VII case law in analyzing her claim of discrimination under the Act.

Appellant also argues that the district court should not have used Title VII case law in analyzing her retaliation claims under the Act, but she has made no effort to show how application of a different standard would have changed the outcome. The court therefore declines to address the issue. To the extent appellant argues the district court committed error under Title VII standards in analyzing her hostile work environment claims, she has failed to show that her employer’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to constitute a hostile work environment. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Clerk is, directed to publish this order. The Clerk is further directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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793 F.3d 119, 417 App. D.C. 119, 417 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11896, 2015 WL 4153883, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrison-v-office-of-the-architect-of-the-capitol-cadc-2015.

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