Harrison v. Nelson

District Court, W.D. New York·Decided October 6, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-00151·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ______________________________________

STONEY HARRISON, REPORT Plaintiff, and v. RECOMMENDATION ----------------------------- BISHME NELSON, DECISION B.J. GABEL, and KEVIN BROWN, ORDER AHMED MUHAMMAD, and STEWART ECKART, 19-CV-151Si(F)

Defendants. ______________________________________

APPEARANCES: STONEY HARRISON, Pro se 88T1745 Wende Correctional Facility P.O. Box 1187 Alden, New York 14004-1187

LETITIA A. JAMES ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW YORK Attorney for Respondents KATHLEEN M. KACZOR Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel 350 Main Street Suite 300A Buffalo, New York 14202

JURISDICTION

This case was referred to the undersigned by Honorable John L. Sinatra, Jr. on April 13, 2020, for all pretrial matters including preparation of a report and recommendation on dispositive motions. The matter is presently before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed April 10, 2020.1

BACKGROUND and FACTS2

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), filed a complaint (Dkt. 1) commencing this action on January 28, 2019, and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. 2). By Order filed November 14, 2019 (Dkt. 3), Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP was granted, and Plaintiff’s claims for money damages asserted against Defendants in their official capacities were dismissed with Plaintiff given 45 days to file an amended complaint, which Plaintiff filed on December 30, 2019 (Dkt. 4) (“Amended Complaint”). Plaintiff asserts against Defendants, employees of DOCCS, claims for violations of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion and free speech, Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and rights under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. On April 10, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) (“Defendants’ Motion”), attaching the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s IFP Status, Dismiss Certain Claims, and Stay the Proceedings (Dkt. 8-1) (“Defendants’ Memorandum”), and the Declaration of Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) Kathleen M. Kaczor (“AAG Kaczor”) (Dkt. 8-2), with exhibits A through H. On May 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Response (Dkt. 11) (“Plaintiff’s Response”). On June 3,

1 Although Defendants motion to dismiss is dispositive, because the undersigned is dismissing as moot that portion of the motion seeking revocation of Plaintiff’s pro se status, see Discussion, infra, at 4, the court addresses the motion in this combined Report and Recommendation and Decision and Order. 2 The Facts are taken from the pleadings and motion papers filed in this action. 2020, Defendants filed the Memorandum of Law in Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s IFP Status and Dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claim Seeking Money Damages (Dkt. 12) (“Defendants’ Reply”). On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff paid the court’s filing fee.

Based on the following, Defendants’ Motion is DISMISSED as moot as to the request to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, and should be GRANTED insofar as Defendants seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim for lack of jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

1. IFP Status

On November 14, 2019, Plaintiff’s motion for permission to proceed IFP (Dkt. 2), was granted. Defendants’ Motion seeks, in pertinent part, to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status based on Plaintiff’s filing of filing three or more lawsuits, as a prisoner, that were dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“§ 1915(g)”). See Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Prisoner-plaintiffs who have accumulated three strikes are prohibited by the PLRA from bringing further actions or appeals in forma pauperis.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). In support of revoking Plaintiff’s IFP status, Defendants list four prior actions Plaintiff commenced that were dismissed as frivolous or for failing to state a claim. Defendants’ Memorandum at 5-8, and maintains Plaintiff cannot meet the “imminent danger” exception to dismissal which allows an inmate plaintiff to avoid the “three-strikes rule” where such plaintiff “is in ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury.’” Id. at 8-9 (quoting Lewis v. Miller, 2019 WL 1557267, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019). In opposing Defendants’ Motion on this ground, Plaintiff urges the court not to revoke his IFP status and dismiss the instant action because Plaintiff’s earlier cases that were dismissed as without merit should not count against Plaintiff because the cases were filed without the assistance of legal counsel such that Plaintiff did not understand what he was doing, Plaintiff’s Response

¶¶ 3-8, 12, and the instant action is meritorious. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 13. In reply, Defendants reiterate that Plaintiff had more than three cases stricken as frivolous or without legal merit prior to filing the instant action, Defendants’ Reply at 2-6, Plaintiff’s argument that he is a lay person without legal training is irrelevant, id. at 6-7, whether the instant action is meritorious is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff previously filed at least three cases that were dismissed as frivolous, id. at 7-8, and that Plaintiff offers no excuse for failing to disclose his litigation history which would have established the dismissal of Plaintiff’s earlier cases satisfies the requirements of § 1915(g), prohibiting Plaintiff from proceeding IFP and requiring dismissal of the instant action. Id. at 8. On February 12, 2021, however, Plaintiff paid the court’s filing fee. Accordingly,

insofar as Defendants’ Motion seeks to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion is DISMISSED as moot. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stack, 2018 WL 6068176, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2018) (dismissing defendants’ motion to revoke the plaintiff’s IFP status as moot after the plaintiff paid the court’s filing fee), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1261176 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019). Nevertheless, Defendants’ alternative argument urging the court to dismiss the Amended Complaint because Plaintiff’s answers on the form complaint misrepresented Plaintiff’s litigation history which would have revealed Plaintiff was not eligible for IFP status, Defendants’ Reply at 8, is without merit. In support of this argument, Defendants reference Flemming v. Santamore, 2016 WL 3221844, at * 2 (N.D.N.Y. June 9, 2016) (“Flemming”), for the proposition that Plaintiff’s dishonest answers on the form complaint were a material misrepresentation to the court requiring dismissal of the Amended

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