Harrison v. City of Adairsville

560 F. Supp. 445, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18425
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 18, 1983
DocketCiv. A. No. C82-165R
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 560 F. Supp. 445 (Harrison v. City of Adairsville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrison v. City of Adairsville, 560 F. Supp. 445, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18425 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

Opinion

ORDER

HAROLD L. MURPHY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Raymond Harrison, brought this action against the City of Adairsville and several of its elected officials, contending that he was discharged from the Adairsville Police Department without due process of law. The defendants disagree and presently move for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).1 [446]*446They argue alternatively that Harrison does not have a property interest in continued employment which is protectible under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, Harrison could not have been deprived of any property right in continued employment because he voluntarily resigned, and Harrison’s action is barred because the defendants enjoy immunity from prosecution in this case. Because the Court agrees with the defendants’ first contention, it finds it unnecessary to decide the latter two issues.

1. DOES THE PLAINTIFF POSSESS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST IN EMPLOYMENT?

In order to be afforded the due process protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, a person must possess a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 2708-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); Best v. Boswell, 696 F.2d 1282 at 1288 n. 5 (11th Cir.1983). A constitutionally protected property interest in employment arises, of course, if a written contract of specified duration evidences the employment relationship. Such a property interest can also arise, however, if the employment relationship is created by statute, municipal ordinance, “mutually explicit understandings” between an employer and an employee or implied contract. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Durham v. Jones, 698 F.2d 1179 at 1181 (11th Cir.1983). To determine the constitutional sufficiency of a claimed property interest in employment, reference must be made to state law. See Bishop, supra.

Two recent cases, which involved factual situations similar to the present case, grappled with the question whether a constitutionally protected property interest in employment existed. In Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.1980), the plaintiff, a police officer, was dismissed from the La-Grange, Georgia Police Department. Glenn did not have a formal contract of employment with the city, but argued that the police department regulations which governed his conduct as an officer created a constitutionally protected property interest in employment.

The court found three of these regulations particularly important in light of Glenn’s contention. The first was Regulation 4.2. It listed twenty offenses which, if committed by an officer, would subject him to dismissal. Id. at 469 n. 2.2 The second [447]*447was Regulation 4.3. It defined the types of sanctions that could be imposed after a violation of a regulation occurred, specifically defining suspension as “the temporary removal of an employee from the [police force] for cause for a specified period of time not to exceed 30 calendar days.” Id. at 469 n. 2. (emphasis added).3 The last regulation the Court emphasized was Regulation 5.0, which provided discharged employees with an appeal procedure. Id.4

In deciding whether these regulations created a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment, the court referred to Georgia law (as mandated by Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). It noted that in Georgia “civil employment which allows termination only ‘for cause’ creates an expectation of continued employment that is constitutionally protected.” Glenn, supra, at 471 (citing Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359 (1975)). The court then read “the regulations in their entirety to glean the expectations of the parties involved,” and held that the regulations, in effect, established a for cause termination requirement. Id. at 471.

The court held that Regulation 4.3— which listed twenty offenses that might warrant an officer’s dismissal — was “meant [448]*448to be analogous to allowing termination only for ‘cause’ ” because an officer could reasonably expect to remain employed unless he violated one of these offenses. Id. at 471-72. The court also noted that the regulation defining suspension explicitly stated that an officer could only be suspended for cause. Id. at 472. Additionally, it stated that “the review procedure provided by the city [in Regulation 5.0] indicates the mutual understanding that an employee may be discharged only for ‘cause’ and has a right to challenge that ‘cause.’” Id. Thus, the court concluded that “Glenn has demonstrated a property interest in continued employment sufficient to invoke minimum due process protection.” Id.

Another recent case, Ogletree v. Chester, 682 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir.1982), involved the dismissal of a police officer from the Fulton County Police Department. Although the Ogletree court’s main holding — that a constitutionally protected expectation of continued employment did not arise from oral representations made by a county official— is not relevant to the present case, its discussion of whether the Fulton County Police Department regulations created a constitutionally protected property interest in employment is pertinent. The court’s discussion, which is stated in footnote eight, is lengthy, but will be quoted in full because of the light it sheds on the present issue:

The district court found that the [police department] Regulations approved by the Fulton County Commissioners did not provide a property interest since they were not explicit enough concerning conduct and disciplinary procedures to fall within the decision in Glenn v. Newman. We believe that conclusion is supported by sound reasoning.
Here, scattered through the Fulton County Police Department’s “Policies, Objections, Rules and Regulations,” there are a few types of activity for which specific sanctions are mentioned: indictment for or conviction of any criminal offense (Rule 2.5: “it shall be deemed grounds for dismissal....

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Bluebook (online)
560 F. Supp. 445, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrison-v-city-of-adairsville-gand-1983.