Harrison, Frazier & Co. v. Mora, Ona & Co.

24 A. 705, 150 Pa. 481, 1892 Pa. LEXIS 1347
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided July 13, 1892·No. Appeal, No. 412·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Mb.. Justice Green,

As we understand the contentions and concessions of the parties, it is to be considered that if the plaintiffs had accepted the draft for the sugars shipped by the Sagua the proceeds would have been received by Perkins & Welsh, and would have been placed by them to the credit of Mora, Ona & Co., on their general account with Perkins & Welsh. This would have been in accordance with the general arrangement or mode of business between Perkins & Welsh and Mora, Ona & Co. The proceeds of the accepted draft would not have gone to Mora, Ona & Co. at all, and there was nothing, as we understand, in the letter of August, 1889, from Mora, Ona & Co., to Perkins & Welsh, taking the cargo of the Sagua out of the operation of the contracts for the (about) 1500 tons and 1000 tons respectively so far as tlie subject of the present contention is concerned. The seventy tons shipped by the Sagua were. [489] as Mora, Ona & Co. claimed, the whole of the remainder of the sugar they were bound to deliver under the original contracts. The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled not only to the seventy tons but to damages for non-delivery of the full amount of the 2500 tons. The mode, of settlement and payment for the whole quantity of sugar to be shipped was to be the same for all. At the conclusion of the letter of March 2, 1889, from Perkins & Welsh to Harrison, Frazier & Co., which contained the terms of the contract for the 1000 tons, it was stipulated as follows: “ payment to be made against documents as heretofore in similar cases.” We can see nothing in any of the letters which changes, as to the cargo of the Sagua, the terms of the contract or the usual course of dealing between Perkins & Welsh and Mora, Ona & Co. The language of the letter of August, 1889, from Mora, Ona & Co. to Perkins & Welsh, to wit: “The Muscos per Brig Sagua complete our contract with Harrison, Frazier & Co.,” was the mere announcement of the fact as they understood, and clearly did not indicate, either directly or inferentially, any change in the course of dealing between them. The remainder of the letter related to another subject. It is argued for the appellants that this letter and the one of July 17th, from and to the same parties, show that there was an intention on the part of Mora, Ona & Co. to give a lien only on the price and therefore there could be no lien on the goods. We fail to perceive the force of the contention. The letter of July 17th was, first, a confirmation of previous letters, second, a declaration that the writers would stand by the previous assertion of their right, that is, that they were only bound to ship the additional seventy tons under their contract, and, lastly, that Perkins & Welsh should place the bill of lading when the sugar was delivered with a draft which would include the balance due on the Wylo’s cargo. We cannot possibly see in this any proof of an intention to deprive Perkins & Welsh of the right to their customary lien upon the goods. Certainly there is nothing in the correspondence showing, or tending to show, that a new contract was intended to be created between Mora, Ona & Co. and Perkins & Welsh. The right to their general lien to protect their advances was too important a matter to be frittered away by an inference from a correspondence which gave no intimation of such a purpose on the part of either.

[490] All the other considerations affecting the question are clearly with Perkins & Welsh. The bill of lading was to be given, and was actually given, to them as usual, and upon all the authorities this operates to transfer the title to the goods: Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2. Term Rep. 68, per Ashurst, J". “ But as between the vendor and third persons the delivery of a bill of lading is the delivery of the goods themselves : ” 1 Sm. Lead. Cases, 1159, eighth edition and notes, 1227 and 1230 ; Benj. on Sales, 813; Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 4 L. 325 ; Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. 335 ; Holmes v. Bailey, 92 Pa. 57; Holmes v. Germ. Security Bank, 87 Pa. 525. In Schmertz v. Dwyer, supra, Thompson, J., said: “It is very clear that the consignment and bill forwarded fully invested the plaintiff with title to the property and that therefore the goods were to be at his risk.”

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Harrison, Frazier & Co. v. Mora, Ona & Co., 24 A. 705, 150 Pa. 481, 1892 Pa. LEXIS 1347 (Pa. 1892).

24 A. 705 (Harrison, Frazier & Co. v. Mora, Ona & Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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