Harris v. Williams

679 So. 2d 990, 1996 WL 481398
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 23, 1996
Docket28512-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 679 So. 2d 990 (Harris v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Williams, 679 So. 2d 990, 1996 WL 481398 (La. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

679 So.2d 990 (1996)

Jesse C. HARRIS, et ux, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Josiah C. WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants-Appellees,
Robert A. Turner, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

No. 28512-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 23, 1996.

*991 Stephen A. Glassell, Shreveport, for Jesse C. Harris and Alice Cleveland Harris.

Richie & Richie by C. Vernon Richie, for Josiah C. Williams, Jr. and Sula Slaughter Williams.

Robert A. Jahnke, Shreveport, for Robert A. Turner.

Charles W. Strickland, Shreveport, for McDaniel-Sewell Engineers & Contractors, Inc.

Before MARVIN, C.J., and SEXTON and STEWART, JJ.

MARVIN, Chief Judge.

This multi-party redhibition action, tried over a 12-day period, arose from the sale of a home south of Shreveport by Williams to Harris in 1990, after the third party defendant, Turner, a contractor-subdivision developer, built the home for Williams in 1986. La.C.C. arts. 2520, 2762. The amended judgment in favor of Harris rescinded the 1990 sale and awarded a net amount of $85,000 for the return of the purchase price against Williams. A money judgment in the same amount was rendered in favor of Williams on his third party demand against the builder, Turner, who in turn had hired another third party defendant, McDaniel, a civil engineer, to verify the soil conditions on the lot and to design the foundation for the home.

Shortly after the amended judgment was rendered Harris and Williams compromised and settled the main demand. The sole appellant is Turner, the builder, who essentially contends on appeal that the evidence does not show any breach of his 1986 building contract with Williams; that he neither knew nor should have known of the defective soil condition, and in the alternative, that if the judgment is affirmed, he should be awarded a judgment on his third party demand against McDaniel.

We reverse and render judgment in favor of Turner, the builder.

SUMMARY

The court found that Turner had the ultimate responsibility for the hidden defects in the soil that caused excessive moisture retention in one section of the yard, as well as interior and exterior cracks and separations in the walls, the brick veneer and mortar, and the concrete foundation or slab of the home. Turner's third party demands against McDaniel, with whom he contracted to verify the soil conditions and design the foundation of the home, were rejected.

According to this record, neither Turner nor McDaniel took a soil boring on the Williams lot. The trial court, on the one hand, found that Turner breached his contract with Williams by not taking a soil boring on the lot. On the other hand, the court found that McDaniel's performance was not substandard, apparently because no expert testimony was offered to show or suggest a defect in the design or construction of the foundation of the home on the lot in the particular subdivision.

The court heard opinion testimony by two civil engineers: McDaniel, the third party defendant, and James Mohr, whom Harris hired within a few months after he purchased the home in 1990 and discovered the wet condition of the soil near one part of the home. Mohr agreed that if one or more soil borings had been made in the subdivision on similarly situated and nearby lots or streets, it would be "sound engineering practice" to *992 visibly observe the trenches for foundation footings on the Williams lot and "assume that all the soil in that area [was] similar."

McDaniel had designed and inspected foundations for residences on five lots in this subdivision over an 18-month period before Turner contracted with Williams in 1986 to build the home in question on Lot 4 of the subdivision. Two of the five lots (Lots 33 and 41) were immediately across the street from the Williams lot. The other three lots (Lots 1, 42 and 43) were on the same street, within 500 feet or less of the Williams lot. The street, originally called Maxine Drive and later renamed Oakfield Drive, is 60 feet wide and about 1250 feet long. See subdivision plat reproduced below.

Before the street was paved, two test borings were made on the street, one being taken "right in front" of the Williams lot, according to McDaniel. The color, texture and other observable characteristics of the soil on the Williams lot when trenches were dug for footings and utility connections were identical to the characteristics of the other five lots and of the soil underlying the street. Soil borings made on the Williams lot after the action was instituted also generally corresponded to soil borings earlier made before 1986 in two places along the relatively short street, according to McDaniel. This plat showing the street, the lot in question and the other five lots mentioned is reproduced:

*993

Noting that the design and construction of the home and its foundation were not otherwise defective, the trial court specifically found that the home was built "on defective soil which was totally unsuitable for building purposes" because it contained a "pit" of excessively moist "gray material" which did not adequately support the concrete slab. We agree with the trial court's determination of cause in fact.

The more critical issue is whether either or both the builder and the civil engineer are legally liable for the soil defect where soil testings and borings had been made in two locations in the street on which the lot fronts; the engineer had designed and inspected foundations for the builder on five other similarly situated and nearby lots in the subdivision; and no one observed any difference in *994 the trenches dug for foundation footings in the soil of the lot in question. The building contract formalized the standard building practice or requirement that the foundation footings extend at least six inches into "undisturbed natural soil."

Under C.C. art. 2762 a builder is not responsible for defects of the soil unless the factual circumstances allow the conclusion that he knew or should have known of the defect when he constructed the home. Wurst v. Pruyn, 250 La. 1109, 202 So.2d 268 (1967). This record is devoid of any evidence that suggests or allows the conclusion that the foundation footings or beams extended to or into the "gray foreign material" in 1986, which material was found to have caused the cracks in the home in and after 1991.

APPLICABLE LAW

The building contract was executed before the effective date of the New Home Warranty Act, La.R.S. 9:3141 et seq., which now provides "the exclusive remedies [and] warranties... as between builder and owner relative to home construction[.]" § 3150. The trial court declined to apply the Act retroactively.

Notwithstanding that Turner owned the lot upon which he contracted to build the home for Williams, selling the property to Williams after construction was completed, the trial court correctly addressed Turner's liability to Williams under C.C. art. 2762, the building contracts article, rather than under C.C. art. 2520 et seq., the redhibition articles applicable to contracts of sale. See Wurst v. Pruyn, supra and Degeneres v. Burgess, 486 So.2d 769 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986).

Turner's appeal does not question the trial court's choice of law, but only the court's application of the law to the evidence presented at trial. Before discussing the evidence, including Turner's specific and express obligations under the building contract, we summarize the builder's general or implied obligations to the owner for whom he constructs a building.

C.C. art.

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