Harris v. Vanderveer's

21 N.J. Eq. 561
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 21 N.J. Eq. 561 (Harris v. Vanderveer's) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Vanderveer's, 21 N.J. Eq. 561 (N.J. 1870).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Van Syckel, J.

The several appeals in this case submit to review the right of the respondent to have probate of a paper bearing •date August 23d, 1865, purporting to have been executed by Dr. Henry Vanderveer, late of the county of Somerset -as his last will and testament.

The rights of the next of kin and the lioir-at-law, upon the death of the ancestor intestate, to such worldly estate as he may leave, is securely guarded by our laws, and can bo -divested only by a testament executed in strict- conformity [562]*562with law. While the courts of this state have ever guarded' with exacting jealousy the right of testamentary disposition,, the burden has always been cast upon the proponent, of' establishing a strict compliance with every essential to the-validity of a will.

The will in this case has been assailed upon three principal grounds. 1. Want of testamentary capacity. 2. Undue influence on the part of Dr. Cornell. 3. Imposition of the instrument upon the testator without a full lmowledgeon his part of its contents.

The evidence presents the testator, both before and after-the execution of this paper, as a man of vigorous intellect,, a gentleman of the old school, of much culture and refinement, and exempt in a rare degree from physical and men■tal infirmity, at the advanced age of more than four score-years; and although at the date of the disputed will his eyesight and hearing were much affected and his general health impaired, there is no sufficient evidence which denies to the-testator the possession of testamentary capacity. There is, also, an absence of evidence to show that Dr. Cornell, however much he niay have urged his good offices on the testator, or whatever may have been his desire to secure for himself or his son a place in his testamentary disposition,, had acquired such influence as would have enabled him unduly to induce the testator to execute, with full knowledge-of its contents, any paper which did not express his own purposes with regard to his estate.

The case of the appellants must stand, if at all, upon their third ground of objection.

Is the evidence of such a character that it satisfies the-mind and judgment of the court, that the will of August 23d, 1865, was executed by the testator with full knowledge-on his part of its contents ? While the intellect of the testator was somewhat clouded by a temporary illness, it is. clearly shown that his hearing was seriously affected, and his eye-sight almost gone, at the time his signature to the-instrument in question was procured. The testamentary [563]*563witnesses substantially state this fact, and it is put beyond question by Brown, Vanarsdale, J. F. Vanderveer, Amos, and others, so that it must be regarded as a conceded fact in the case. A blind and deaf person may make a will, but it must be shown by the proponent to the satisfaction of the court, that he knew its contents and was not imposed upon in its execution. This introduces a new element into the consideration of this controversy, and starts the inquiry, not only whether he signed and pronounced it to be his true last will and testament, in the usual form of execution, but whether he fully understood its contents. Naylor, the first testamentary witness, says that the will was not read in his presence, nor did the testator say that he knew what it contained. Wight, the other subscribing witness, says he read the will as a wdiole to the testator in the presence of Dr. Cornell, but does not say that the testator acknowledged, or in any way signified that he understood what was read to him; and Dr. Cornell in his examination in chief says, that after the will was written, he came into the room, and the will was read to him, Dr. Cornell.

The evidence then strictly is, that Wight says he read the will to testator in presence of Dr. Cornell, and Dr. Cornell says it was read to him; neither asserting anywhere that the testator admitted at the time, or afterwards, that he understood its contents. Neither Wight nor Dr. Cornell pretends that the testator asked the legal effect of any provision made, or expressed the least desire to have any passage read a second time, or suggested the slightest change in the disposition made. Giving full credit to this evidence, does it fully discharge the proponent from the burden which the law imposes upon him ?

A simple examination of this will shows the difficulty the testator in his then condition, would have had in comprehending its provisions upon a single reading. There is a volume of other evidence in the cause which must have an important bearing on this issue. William Vanarsdale testifies that a day or two after this will was executed, the [564]*564testator asked him if he knew Wight; that Dr. Cornell and Wight had been making his will, and he didn’t know whether it was right or. not; that Wight was a stranger, and he didn’t know whether he would do i b right. In 1867, the testator told Dr. Henry Vanderveer that he wished him to urge his boys up to get married, as there was a large-estate coming to them. There is no pretence of the existence of an executed will subsequent to that of August 23d, 1865/ and therefore the testator must have been speaking of that will, and could not have understood its contents.

In this disputation we must keep in perpetual view that the will in question crushes the cherished purposes of the testator’s life, intentions declared in his own writing through years, and attested by various witnesses in this cause, but by none more emphatically than by Wight, on the very day he prepared the will. Ho states that the testator, in giving his- instructions for the disposal of his estate, said: “I wish to leave it in the Vanderveer name; I wish it called Vanderstadt, and I wish a trustee to hold it forever if he could.” Hold it forever, how? Manifestly in the Vanderveer name. Even Dr. Cornell, himself, says, that the testator, shortly before this will was executed, told him, that he was very anxious to transmit his property to “three successive generations.” What three successive generations could this mean? generations of Cornells, or generations of Vanderveers ? Nothing but utter imbecility of intellect could have extinguished his pride in the Vanderveer name. This testimony should close the controversy as to the cherished purposes of the testator to perpetuate this name by a testamentary disposition, up to, and at the time the will of August 23d was being drawn; did not Dr. Cornell attempt to prove that Dr. Vanderveer subsequently declared another purpose in a memorandum in his own hand, from which the Conover will was drawn, December 7th, 1866, and ask the court to infer from this that the testator’s mind had undergone a change since he drafted his earlier wills ?

[565]*565Simply referring to the fact that no offer or attempt was over made to execute the Conover will, that no subsequent declaration appears that it embodied his wishes, there can be little doubt that his mind, if ever changed, could not long have withstood his original and long cherished wish to perpetuate the name of Vanderveer through Vanderstadt. Indeed this is not left merely to inference; in Exhibit L, dated May 5th, 1868, found among testator's papers after his decease, ho declares a desire, “ to dispose of his estate so as to perpetuate it undivided, and transmit his name therewith in perpetuity.” Thus it is shown, that as he advanced in life, the desire grew upon him that his name should ever be preserved in the uses to which Vanderstadt was devoted.

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34 A.2d 291 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1943)

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Bluebook (online)
21 N.J. Eq. 561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-vanderveers-nj-1870.