Harris v. Vanderbilt

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 21, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00185
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Alexandra Lee Harris, et al., No. CV-23-00185-PHX-ROS

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Valentino Satoshi Vanderbilt, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Alexandra Lee Harris alleges Defendant Valentino Satoshi Vanderbilt 16 (“Vanderbilt”)1 sexually assaulted her on September 17, 2022, in Chandler, Arizona, after 17 providing her a ride as a driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”). After Alexandra and her 18 spouse James Leo Harris filed their complaint in state court, Defendant Lyft removed this 19 case to federal court by alleging diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs now seek remand, arguing 20 diversity of citizenship does not exist. (Doc. 12). For the reasons below, the case will be 21 remanded to state court. 22 I. Legal Standard 23 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 24 Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Accordingly, “the presumption is that it is without 25 jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Fifty Assocs. V. Prudential Ins. Co. 26 of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing Grace v. Am. Central Ins. Co., 109 27 U.S. 278 (1883)).

28 1 The complaint alleges two possible names for this Defendant, the other being Jeddidiah Schulz; for the sake of clarity, the Court will refer to him as Vanderbilt. 1 Diversity jurisdiction requires (1) all plaintiffs have different citizenship than all 2 defendants, and (2) the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A 3 natural person’s citizenship is determined by his state of domicile, not his state of 4 residence. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). A domicile 5 is a “permanent home,” where someone “resides with the intention to remain or to which 6 [he] intends to return.” Id. 7 Diversity should “generally be determined from the face of the complaint.” Miller 8 v. Grgurich, 763 F.2d 372, 372 (9th Cir. 1985). A federal court’s jurisdiction on the basis 9 of diversity is determined by the citizenship of the parties at the time of filing the complaint 10 or at the time of removing the case to federal court. See Miller, 763 F.2d at 372; Strotek 11 Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). In the Ninth 12 Circuit, jurisdiction may generally be pleaded upon information and belief where the 13 parties’ citizenship is not readily ascertainable. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 14 741 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014); Thorsen v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix, LLC, 2020 15 WL 8812769, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2020). However, the party invoking federal 16 jurisdiction always “has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, 17 Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The removing party must demonstrate jurisdiction 18 “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Sundve v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2019 WL 19 2515967, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2019). There is a presumption against removal 20 jurisdiction. See id. 21 II. Background 22 Plaintiffs allege Vanderbilt picked Alexandra Harris (“Harris”) up as a driver for 23 Lyft, but instead of driving her to her home as requested, he drove her to a different 24 residence and sexually assaulted her while she was unconscious. (Doc. 1-3 at 13-15). This 25 incident allegedly occurred on the evening of September 17, 2022. (Doc. 1-3 at 11). 26 The present motion concerns the citizenship of Vanderbilt, who allegedly 27 perpetrated the assault. Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, Defendant Vanderbilt 28 is a “resident of Arizona.” Because Plaintiffs are domiciled in Arizona, complete diversity 1 would be destroyed if Vanderbilt was a citizen of Arizona at the time of removal. See 2 Miller, 763 F.2d at 372. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court on December 21, 2022, and Lyft 3 removed the case to federal court on January 27, 2023. (Doc. 1-3 at 37; Doc. 1). Lyft 4 asserted diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and alleged “[u]pon 5 information and belief” that Vanderbilt was not an Arizona citizen at the time of filing the 6 complaint. (Doc. 1 at 4). Lyft did not affirmatively allege Vanderbilt’s citizenship. 7 Plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand the case to state court, challenging only the 8 citizenship of Vanderbilt.2 9 Neither party can affirmatively declare with certainty which state Vanderbilt was a 10 citizen of at the time of filing the lawsuit. (See Doc. 15 at 4). Indeed, Vanderbilt has not 11 yet appeared as a defendant in this case, nor has he been served. However, each party offers 12 various facts about Vanderbilt to support their arguments. A brief recitation of these facts, 13 in chronological order, asserted by both parties will guide the Court’s analysis. 14 On May 21, 2022, Vanderbilt was arrested for child cruelty after authorities 15 responded to a disturbance at what seems to have been his home in Apple Valley, 16 California. While there, authorities discovered a child apparently living with over 50 other 17 animals, sleeping in a closet on bedding soaked with cat urine. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. B, at 41-43) 18 (May 25, 2022 news article attached to Plaintiffs’ complaint). 19 On June 13, 2022, Vanderbilt pleaded no contest and was sentenced in California to 20 probation for Willful Cruelty to Child. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. E, at 58-60). 21 On June 17, 2022, Vanderbilt posted an online fundraiser saying he was “homeless” 22 and that he “need[ed] cash to retain a legal team and get another home.” (Doc. 1-3, Ex. D, 23 at 47-57). That fundraiser referred to the Apple Valley, California house as his previous 24 home. (Id.) 25 On August 4, 2022, Vanderbilt obtained an Arizona Driver’s License, listing an 26 address in Scottsdale, Arizona. 27 On September 17, 2022, the alleged assault took place. The police report

28 2 Plaintiffs make no argument about the citizenship of the other defendants or about the amount in controversy. 1 summarizing the investigation into the assault lists Vanderbilt’s address in Chandler, 2 Arizona. (Doc. 17-3 at 2). The police report further reads: 3 “I went to [the address in Chandler] and contacted Jana Treglown who 4 informed me that Valentino [Vanderbilt] left Arizona and may possibly be in 5 San Antonio, Texas. Jana stated Valentino [Vanderbilt] could also be in Colorado or California. Jana further informed me that Valentino [Vanderbilt] 6 had only been in town for a few days and was not their roommate as he stated. 7 Jana described Valentino [Vanderbilt] as a ‘compulsive liar.’”

8 (Doc. 12-3 at 3). This interview seemingly took place on October 4, 2022. (Id. at 2-3). 9 From September 2018 through September 2024, Vanderbilt’s Tesla has been and 10 currently is registered in the state of Arizona. (Doc. 17-4). Plaintiffs note Lyft does not 11 provide any additional data, records, or evidence presumably in their possession about 12 Vanderbilt, including, e.g., his application to be a driver, any addresses it has on file, 13 Vanderbilt’s trip history and ride locations while working on the application, or banking 14 information. (Doc. 17 at 3-4). 15 On December 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court. 16 III. Discussion 17 “Absent unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction 18 should be able to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter, 19 265 F.3d at 857. See also Robichaux v. Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 356902, at *2 (D. 20 Ariz. Jan. 29, 2013) (remanding case where defendants failed to affirmatively allege 21 citizenship of other defendants); Ortega v. Zones. Inc., 2021 WL 2646903, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 22 June 25, 2021) (same). Defendant Lyft cannot do so. (Doc. 15 at 4). Instead, Lyft argues 23 this case presents “unusual circumstances,” as contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in Kanter, 24 which renders it unnecessary for them to affirmatively allege Vanderbilt’s citizenship. But 25 in Kanter itself, the defendants’ removal did not affirmatively allege the citizenship of 26 some of the defendants, which the district court held and the Ninth Circuit agreed “was 27 fatal to Defendants’ assertion of diversity jurisdiction.” 265 F.3d at 858. 28 And the cases Lyft cites do not help its argument that this case presents “unusual 1 circumstances” allowing an exception to the general rule. For example, Lyft cites a Ninth 2 Circuit case for the proposition that “unusual circumstances” included a situation where 3 the plaintiff could not determine the defendants’ citizenship based on public information, 4 so it was sufficient to plead diversity on information and belief. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 5 741 F.3d at 1087. But in that case, the plaintiff did not have access to the “information 6 necessary to establish the diversity of the parties’ citizenship,” because it was “within the 7 defendants’ control.” Id. That situation is distinguishable from here, where neither 8 Plaintiffs nor Lyft are able to affirmatively allege Vanderbilt’s citizenship, and where Lyft 9 bears the burden to so demonstrate. Lyft also cites to a Third Circuit case relied on by the 10 Carolina court. In that case, the Third Circuit affirmed removal where the defendants 11 alleged that another defendant, who had not yet appeared in the matter, was “not a citizen” 12 of the relevant state upon information and belief, as opposed to affirmatively alleging his 13 state citizenship. Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68-69 (3rd Cir. 1985). However, in that 14 case, the information relied upon in the removal notice was gathered from the missing 15 defendant himself; the Third Circuit held that “[t]he effectiveness of the removal petition 16 was not vitiated by the fact that in an abundance of caution it characterized the information 17 about [the defendant’s] citizenship as being based on information and belief.” Id. at 69. 18 That is fundamentally different from the situation here. 19 As already stated, Lyft bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the 20 evidence, that diversity exists. Lyft did not meet its burden. Lyft argues there is evidence 21 that Vanderbilt was domiciled in California through summer 2022, and that the 22 “presumption of continuing domicile” means that once established, Vanderbilt’s domicile 23 continues “until it is shown to have been changed.” Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350, 24 353 (1874). It is true that a domicile exists until a new one is acquired. See Miss. Band of 25 Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). However, Lyft’s evidence of 26 “domicile” is quite weak. Lyft argues Vanderbilt was arrested in California in May 2022. 27 Also, in June 2022, Vanderbilt described California as his “home.” That evidence may 28 establish residence but does not necessarily establish “domicile.” 1 Even accepting Lyft’s evidence, there is evidence Vanderbilt changed his domicile 2 from California to Arizona in late summer 2022. In June 2022, Vanderbilt indicated online 3 that he was “homeless,” he got a driver’s license in Arizona in August 2022, and he 4 physically resided for at least some period of time in Arizona in September 2022. While 5 that may not be enough, standing alone, to definitively prove Vanderbilt’s domicile is 6 Arizona, it is enough to undermine Lyft’s argument that Vanderbilt remains a citizen of 7 California. Accordingly, Lyft has not met its burden to demonstrate complete diversity of 8 citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence. The motion to remand will be granted. 9 IV. Costs and Fees 10 Plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An award of fees under that statute is available only where “the removing 12 party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin 13 Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Removal is “not objectively unreasonable solely 14 because the removing party’s argument slack merit.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 15 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). To determine whether an objectively reasonable basis 16 for seeking removal exists, the Court considers whether the basis for removal asserted was 17 “clearly foreclosed.” Id. at 1066. 18 The Court will not award costs and attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). While 19 the Court ultimately disagreed with Lyft’s arguments, Lyft’s assertion of diversity was not 20 “clearly foreclosed,” as Vanderbilt’s citizenship is unknown and unclear. Both parties’ 21 arguments were legitimate and based in applicable law. 22 Accordingly, 23 … 24 … 25 … 26 … 27 … 28 … 1 IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Remand (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ request for costs and fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is denied. 3 Dated this 21st day of March, 2023. 4 fo _ 5 — .

7 Senior United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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