IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
REGINALD HARRIS, § § No. 87, 2022 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below- Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID. No. 0402010364A(N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: September 13, 2023 Decided: September 26, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
On this 26th day of September, 2023, after consideration of the briefs and the
record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In 2004, a Superior Court jury convicted Reginald Harris of multiple
drug and weapon offenses. The court granted the State’s motion to declare Harris an
habitual offender and sentenced Harris to eighty years and three months of Level 5
incarceration. We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal1 and affirmed the
denials of postconviction relief.2
1 Harris v. State, 2005 WL 2219212 (Del. Aug. 15, 2005). 2 Harris v. State, 2008 WL 313773 (Del. Jan. 31, 2008); 2014 WL 3883433 (Del. July 29, 2014). (2) In 2019, Governor John C. Carney, Jr. commuted Harris’s sentence to
25 years of Level 5 incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.3
Harris then filed a pro se motion for a certificate of eligibility and sought the
modification or reduction of his sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). Although the
State initially supported the motion, it changed its position and opposed the motion
after the Court questioned whether Harris met the statutory eligibility requirements.
(3) After Harris secured counsel, his attorney filed an omnibus motion
requesting (a) a certificate of eligibility; (b) correction of an illegal sentence under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35; and (c) a sentence modification for early release
due to medical issues. Harris also argued that the State was judicially estopped from
changing its prior position that he met the statutory requirements for a certificate of
eligibility.
(4) The Superior Court denied the omnibus motion.4 First, it held that
Harris failed to meet all the elements of judicial estoppel. Thus, the State could
argue that Harris did not qualify for a certificate of eligibility. Next, the court found
that, among other reasons, Harris did not meet Section 4214(f)’s type of sentence
requirement because Harris was no longer serving an habitual offender sentence due
to the Governor’s commutation. It also held that Harris did not meet the statute’s
3 App. to Opening Br. at A0101. 4 State v. Harris, 2022 WL 472518 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022). 2 time-served requirement because he had not served the required minimum sentence.
Finally, the Superior Court found that his sentence was not illegal and refused to
modify it because Harris’s medical concerns could be addressed by other means.
(5) Harris makes four arguments on appeal: (a) the State was judicially
estopped from contesting his sentence modification; (b) he was eligible for sentence
modification; (c) his original sentence was illegal; and (d) his medical condition
should have been sufficient for sentence modification and early release. “This Court
reviews sentence modifications for abuse of discretion” which occurs when “the trial
judge has ‘ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”5
Whether judicial estoppel applies is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.6 The
legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo.7
(6) We are unpersuaded by Harris’s arguments and affirm the Superior
Court’s judgment. First, Harris concedes on appeal that he failed to satisfy the
elements of judicial estoppel.8 Second, under Section 4214(f), a person sentenced
“to a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent
5 Longford-Myers v. State, 213 A.3d 556, 558 (Del. 2019). 6 Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859 (Del. 2008) (citing B.F. Rich & Co. v. Gray, 933 A.2d 1231, 1241 (Del. 2007)). 7 Jones v. State, 298 A.3d 667 (Del. 2023) (“We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for abuse of discretion. To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the claim de novo.”) (citing Fountain v. State, WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 8 Opening Br. at 18 (“The trial court correctly held that Appellant did not satisfy all of the element of judicial estoppel….”). See also Banther v. State, 977 A.2d 870, 884-85 (Del. 2009) (judicial estoppel “is narrowly construed and is rarely applied against the government in criminal prosecutions.”). 3 felony pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or a life sentence pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section” may petition the Superior Court for sentence
modification after he has “served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable
mandatory sentence.”9 In other words, petitioners must satisfy two requirements to
be eligible for sentence modification. The first requirement, the type of sentence
served, limits Section 4214(f) relief to defendants serving an habitual offender
sentence as defined under Section 4214(f) and the amended Special Rule 2017-1.10
The second requirement, the time served, requires petitioners to show that they
served the minimum sentence.
(7) For the first requirement, Harris’s sentence was commuted by the
Governor. He is no longer an habitual offender serving an habitual-offender
sentence. The second requirement – time served – is calculated by applying the
current version of Section 4214(a)(b)(c) or (d) to Harris’s conviction history.
Although Harris argues that he met the time served requirement because he had
served the minimum sentence for all of the felonies listed in the State’s habitual
offender motion (twelve and a half years), the court was required to consider his
9 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). 10 Order Amending Special Rule of Criminal Procedure 2017-1 For Review of A Request To Modify A Habitual Offender Sentence (Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(3)) (“The remedy afforded by this rule may not be sought to further reduce or modify any sentence that was previously altered, reduced, or modified by pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, remission, or any other act of executive clemency.”). 4 complete criminal history.11 Harris’s 1986 Assault Second Degree conviction
resulted in a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence.12 His fifteen and a half
years of time-served was insufficient.
(8) Harris also argues that his habitual offender sentence was illegal
because one of his prior convictions, assault second degree, occurred after he was
convicted, but before he was sentenced on the first Possession With Intent To
Deliver conviction. He relies on State v. Hicks, where the Superior Court explained
that “[i]n order to be sentenced as an habitual offender, a defendant must have prior
separate qualifying convictions to serve as the predicate offenses, with some chance
for rehabilitation after each sentencing.”13 But the State did not rely on the assault
second degree conviction in its habitual offender motion. At least for the habitual
offender sentence Harris received, he had some chance of rehabilitation between
each sentence and each conviction listed in the habitual offender motion.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
REGINALD HARRIS, § § No. 87, 2022 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below- Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID. No. 0402010364A(N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: September 13, 2023 Decided: September 26, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
On this 26th day of September, 2023, after consideration of the briefs and the
record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In 2004, a Superior Court jury convicted Reginald Harris of multiple
drug and weapon offenses. The court granted the State’s motion to declare Harris an
habitual offender and sentenced Harris to eighty years and three months of Level 5
incarceration. We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal1 and affirmed the
denials of postconviction relief.2
1 Harris v. State, 2005 WL 2219212 (Del. Aug. 15, 2005). 2 Harris v. State, 2008 WL 313773 (Del. Jan. 31, 2008); 2014 WL 3883433 (Del. July 29, 2014). (2) In 2019, Governor John C. Carney, Jr. commuted Harris’s sentence to
25 years of Level 5 incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.3
Harris then filed a pro se motion for a certificate of eligibility and sought the
modification or reduction of his sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). Although the
State initially supported the motion, it changed its position and opposed the motion
after the Court questioned whether Harris met the statutory eligibility requirements.
(3) After Harris secured counsel, his attorney filed an omnibus motion
requesting (a) a certificate of eligibility; (b) correction of an illegal sentence under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35; and (c) a sentence modification for early release
due to medical issues. Harris also argued that the State was judicially estopped from
changing its prior position that he met the statutory requirements for a certificate of
eligibility.
(4) The Superior Court denied the omnibus motion.4 First, it held that
Harris failed to meet all the elements of judicial estoppel. Thus, the State could
argue that Harris did not qualify for a certificate of eligibility. Next, the court found
that, among other reasons, Harris did not meet Section 4214(f)’s type of sentence
requirement because Harris was no longer serving an habitual offender sentence due
to the Governor’s commutation. It also held that Harris did not meet the statute’s
3 App. to Opening Br. at A0101. 4 State v. Harris, 2022 WL 472518 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022). 2 time-served requirement because he had not served the required minimum sentence.
Finally, the Superior Court found that his sentence was not illegal and refused to
modify it because Harris’s medical concerns could be addressed by other means.
(5) Harris makes four arguments on appeal: (a) the State was judicially
estopped from contesting his sentence modification; (b) he was eligible for sentence
modification; (c) his original sentence was illegal; and (d) his medical condition
should have been sufficient for sentence modification and early release. “This Court
reviews sentence modifications for abuse of discretion” which occurs when “the trial
judge has ‘ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”5
Whether judicial estoppel applies is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.6 The
legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo.7
(6) We are unpersuaded by Harris’s arguments and affirm the Superior
Court’s judgment. First, Harris concedes on appeal that he failed to satisfy the
elements of judicial estoppel.8 Second, under Section 4214(f), a person sentenced
“to a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent
5 Longford-Myers v. State, 213 A.3d 556, 558 (Del. 2019). 6 Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859 (Del. 2008) (citing B.F. Rich & Co. v. Gray, 933 A.2d 1231, 1241 (Del. 2007)). 7 Jones v. State, 298 A.3d 667 (Del. 2023) (“We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for abuse of discretion. To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the claim de novo.”) (citing Fountain v. State, WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 8 Opening Br. at 18 (“The trial court correctly held that Appellant did not satisfy all of the element of judicial estoppel….”). See also Banther v. State, 977 A.2d 870, 884-85 (Del. 2009) (judicial estoppel “is narrowly construed and is rarely applied against the government in criminal prosecutions.”). 3 felony pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or a life sentence pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section” may petition the Superior Court for sentence
modification after he has “served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable
mandatory sentence.”9 In other words, petitioners must satisfy two requirements to
be eligible for sentence modification. The first requirement, the type of sentence
served, limits Section 4214(f) relief to defendants serving an habitual offender
sentence as defined under Section 4214(f) and the amended Special Rule 2017-1.10
The second requirement, the time served, requires petitioners to show that they
served the minimum sentence.
(7) For the first requirement, Harris’s sentence was commuted by the
Governor. He is no longer an habitual offender serving an habitual-offender
sentence. The second requirement – time served – is calculated by applying the
current version of Section 4214(a)(b)(c) or (d) to Harris’s conviction history.
Although Harris argues that he met the time served requirement because he had
served the minimum sentence for all of the felonies listed in the State’s habitual
offender motion (twelve and a half years), the court was required to consider his
9 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). 10 Order Amending Special Rule of Criminal Procedure 2017-1 For Review of A Request To Modify A Habitual Offender Sentence (Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(3)) (“The remedy afforded by this rule may not be sought to further reduce or modify any sentence that was previously altered, reduced, or modified by pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, remission, or any other act of executive clemency.”). 4 complete criminal history.11 Harris’s 1986 Assault Second Degree conviction
resulted in a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence.12 His fifteen and a half
years of time-served was insufficient.
(8) Harris also argues that his habitual offender sentence was illegal
because one of his prior convictions, assault second degree, occurred after he was
convicted, but before he was sentenced on the first Possession With Intent To
Deliver conviction. He relies on State v. Hicks, where the Superior Court explained
that “[i]n order to be sentenced as an habitual offender, a defendant must have prior
separate qualifying convictions to serve as the predicate offenses, with some chance
for rehabilitation after each sentencing.”13 But the State did not rely on the assault
second degree conviction in its habitual offender motion. At least for the habitual
offender sentence Harris received, he had some chance of rehabilitation between
each sentence and each conviction listed in the habitual offender motion.
(9) Finally, Harris points to his health concerns and claims that they
warrant a sentence modification and his release from prison. Under Superior Court
11 State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), aff’d, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019) (stating that a court sometimes must look outside the original habitual offender motion “because statutory tiering under the revised Habitual Criminal Act” requires the court to determine whether “prior convictions [] will justify enhanced punishment”). 12 The Superior Court concluded that “it is undisputed that Mr. Harris was convicted of three separate and successive felonies before his current PFDCF conviction: Burglary Third Degree (1984), Assault Second Degree (1986), and Maintaining a Vehicle (1994).” Harris, 2022 WL 472518 at *4. Under Section 4214(c), Harris is required to serve a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence for the three felony convictions. 13 2010 WL 3398470 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2010), aff'd, 15 A.3d 217 (Del. 2011). 5 Criminal Rule 35(b), the court may consider a motion to reduce a sentence only if
such modification is made within ninety days after the sentence is imposed, or after
ninety days only upon either a showing of extraordinary circumstances or through
11 Del. C. § 4217.14 A petitioner has ninety days to file a sentence modification
motion. After that, the petitioner must show extraordinary circumstances to warrant
relief. Extraordinary circumstances are “those which specifically justify a delay; are
entirely beyond a petitioner’s control; and have prevented the applicant from seeking
the remedy on a timely basis.”15 Harris’s motion was filed outside of the ninety-day
window, and the circumstances are not so extraordinary to justify modification. As
the Superior Court correctly pointed out, 11 Del. C. § 4217, rather than Rule 35, is
the proper vehicle to seek modification based on medical reasons.16
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice
14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 15 State v. Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 16 Johnson v. State, 2020 WL 5626231, at *2 (Del. Sept. 18, 2020). 6