Harris v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

District Court, W.D. Arkansas·Decided October 5, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-02177·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FORT SMITH DIVISION

MICHAEL HARRIS PLAINTIFF

V. Civil No. 2:21-cv-02177-PKH-MEF

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Michael Harris, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on May 1, 2019, alleging disability since July 31, 2018, due to post-traumatic stress headaches, cognitive and memory problems, and high blood pressure. (ECF No. 12, pp. 66, 159-160, 180). After his claim was denied on initial review and on reconsideration, and administrative hearing was held on November 25, 2020. (Id. at 37-65). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. Born in 1982, the Plaintiff was 36 years old on his alleged onset date and possessed a high school education. (ECF No. 12, p. 31). He had past relevant work (“PRW”) experience as a fence installer, welder, and lead machine operator. (Id. at 30, 181, 188-195, 214-224). On December 24, 2020, the Hon. Scot Gulick, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), identified Plaintiff’s cervical disk disease, post-concussion syndrome, traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), and neurocognitive disorder as severe impairments. (ECF No. 12, p. 22). He concluded Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and that he retained the RFC to perform medium work with occasional climbing of ladders/scaffolds, and frequent climbing of ramps/stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (Id. at

23, 25). From a mental perspective, the ALJ found the Plaintiff capable of performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, involving occasional interaction with the public and simple work- related decisions. (Id. at 26). Further, he noted the Plaintiff would not be able to perform at a production rate pace. (Id.). With the assistance of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ then determined he could perform work as a kitchen helper, laundry worker, and housekeeper. (Id. at 31-32). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 27, 2021. (ECF No. 12, pp. 5-10). Plaintiff subsequently filed this action on December 8, 2021. (ECF No. 3). Both parties have filed appeal briefs (ECF Nos. 16, 17), and the matter is ready for Report and

Recommendation. II. Applicable Law This Court’s role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.

A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The fact finder only considers Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in the light of his RFC if the final stage of the analysis is reached. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). III. Discussion In a single issue on appeal, the Plaintiff insists that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the Court agrees. RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. While a claimant’s RFC must be based on some medical evidence of his ability to function in the

workplace, there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007); Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013). It is “ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cox, 495 F.3d at 619-20).

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