Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance

137 S.E. 430, 193 N.C. 485, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 384

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedApril 6, 1927

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 137 S.E. 430 (Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance, 137 S.E. 430, 193 N.C. 485, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 384 (N.C. 1927).

Pincite

Opinion

Brogden, J.

The accident policy upon wbicb tbe plaintiff brings tbis suit insures tbe plaintiff against “tbe effects resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained during tbe life of tbis policy, solely through external, violent, and accidental means,” etc.

Yiewing plaintiff’s evidence in its most favorable light, as we are required to do in cases of nonsuit, tbe question to be determined is whether or not plaintiff’s injury.“resulted directly and exclusively of all other causes . . . solely through external, violent and accidental means.” Tbe rule of law governing tbe cause of action is thus summarized by Justice Walker in Penn v. Ins. Co., 160 N. C., 404:

“1. When an accident caused a diseased condition, wbicb together with tbe accident resulted in tbe injury or death complained of, tbe accident alone is to be considered tbe cause of tbe injury or death.

“2. When at tbe time of tbe accident tbe insured was suffering from some disease, but tbe disease bad no causal connection with tbe injury or death resulting from tbe accident, tbe accident is to be considered as tbe sole cause.

“3. When at the time of the accident there was an existing disease, wbicb, cooperating with tbe accident, resulted in tbe injury or death, tbe accident cannot be considered as tbe sole cause, or as tbe cause independent of all other causes.” Penn v. Ins. Co., 158 N. C., 29; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C., 593.

Tbe plaintiff asserts tbat there was no causal connection between tbe gun-sbot wound and tbe accidental injury. Upon tbe contrary, tbe defendant asseíts tbat tbe plaintiff’s injury was tbe result of tbe preexisting injury occasioned by tbe gun-sbot wound. Tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff tended to show tbat tbe gun-sbot wound was thoroughly cured at tbe time of tbe accident. Tbe evidence of tbe defendant was to tbe contrary. Conflicting testimony does not warrant a withdrawal of tbe case from tbe jury. It is for tbe jury to determine what weight shall *487 be given to the evidence. Shell v. Roseman, 155 N. C., 90; Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N. C., 5; Lee v. Brotherhood, 191 N. C., 359; Smith v. Coach Line, 191 N. C., 589.

We conclude, upon the whole record, that there was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury upon the issues arising upon the pleadings.

Reversed.

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Brogden, J.

The accident policy upon wbicb tbe plaintiff brings tbis suit insures tbe plaintiff against “tbe effects resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained during tbe life of tbis policy, solely through external, violent, and accidental means,” etc.

Yiewing plaintiff’s evidence in its most favorable light, as we are required to do in cases of nonsuit, tbe question to be determined is whether or not plaintiff’s injury.“resulted directly and exclusively of all other causes . . . solely through external, violent and accidental means.” Tbe rule of law governing tbe cause of action is thus summarized by Justice Walker in Penn v. Ins. Co., 160 N. C., 404:

“1. When an accident caused a diseased condition, wbicb together with tbe accident resulted in tbe injury or death complained of, tbe accident alone is to be considered tbe cause of tbe injury or death.

“2. When at tbe time of tbe accident tbe insured was suffering from some disease, but tbe disease bad no causal connection with tbe injury or death resulting from tbe accident, tbe accident is to be considered as tbe sole cause.

“3. When at the time of the accident there was an existing disease, wbicb, cooperating with tbe accident, resulted in tbe injury or death, tbe accident cannot be considered as tbe sole cause, or as tbe cause independent of all other causes.” Penn v. Ins. Co., 158 N. C., 29; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C., 593.

Tbe plaintiff asserts tbat there was no causal connection between tbe gun-sbot wound and tbe accidental injury. Upon tbe contrary, tbe defendant asseíts tbat tbe plaintiff’s injury was tbe result of tbe preexisting injury occasioned by tbe gun-sbot wound. Tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff tended to show tbat tbe gun-sbot wound was thoroughly cured at tbe time of tbe accident. Tbe evidence of tbe defendant was to tbe contrary. Conflicting testimony does not warrant a withdrawal of tbe case from tbe jury. It is for tbe jury to determine what weight shall *487 be given to the evidence. Shell v. Roseman, 155 N. C., 90; Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N. C., 5; Lee v. Brotherhood, 191 N. C., 359; Smith v. Coach Line, 191 N. C., 589.

We conclude, upon the whole record, that there was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury upon the issues arising upon the pleadings.

Reversed.

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137 S.E. 430, 193 N.C. 485, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-provident-life-accident-insurance-nc-1927.

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