Harris v. Planning Commission

193 A.2d 499, 151 Conn. 95, 1963 Conn. LEXIS 312
Supreme Court of Connecticut·Decided July 25, 1963·Published·Cited by 20 cases

Opinion

Comley, J.

On January 5, 1961, the planning commission of Ridgefield gave its approval to a final plan for the subdivision of property owned by Thomas Baggott. One of the lots on this plan had an area of 1.001 acres. The zoning commission, which in Ridgefield is independent of the planning commission, changed the zone of certain property, of which the property in question was a part, from residence R1 to residence RAA. This change became effective November 11, 1960, and resulted in the increase of the minimum area of lots from one to two acres. See Ridgefield Zoning Regs. § 4 (B) (1961). Claiming that the planning commission *97 acted illegally in approving a subdivision containing a lot of less than two acres, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which upheld their contention and set aside the commission’s approval. Wildwood Eidge at Eidgefield, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the defendant, having purchased the lot in question and erected a dwelling thereon, has appealed to us, seeking a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and a reinstatement of the ruling by the planning commission.

It is the defendant’s position that the regulation of November 11, 1960, increasing the minimum size of lots does not affect this subdivision because the application for approval had been filed before the change was made. The defendant maintains that this protection or insulation of a proposed subdivision against changes in zoning between the date of the original application and the date of final approval is conferred by General Statutes § 8-28a. 1

It appears that the original application, dated September 1, 1960, was for tentative approval of a preliminary plan. A hearing was held on the application, and, on November 3, 1960, tentative ap *98 proval, to terminate on November 1,1961, was given by the planning commission. On December 1, 1960, the developer filed his final plan of subdivision, and this plan was approved on January 5, 1961. All these steps, viz., the original application, the preliminary plan, the tentative approval, the final plan and the final approval, come within the provisions of the regulations adopted by the planning commission for the subdivision of land. 2

The issue in the case is one of statutory construction. There can be no doubt that § 8-28a does provide a period of protection for a developer against changes in zoning between the time of his “application, petition or request for approval of a subdivision plan” and the time of final approval. The es *99 sential qnestion is whether, under the regulations in Ridgefield, an application for tentative approval of a preliminary plan is an “application, petition or request for approval of a subdivision plan.” We think that if is. Under those regulations, when such an application is made, no further application need be made. It is true that the preliminary plan must be supplanted by a final plan before final approval may be given. But the statute does not provide that the effective date for protection against changes in zoning is the date of a plan. It is the date of an application, and, in this case, only one application was made and only one was necessary. That was the application of September 1, 1960, and it was accompanied by a subdivision plan and by such other *100 documents as were required by the regulations of the planning commission.

Our construction of the statute is fortified by its legislative history. When introduced in the house of representatives, the purpose of the bill was stated as follows: “To provide that a subdivision plan shall be governed by the subdivision regulations in effect at the time of submission to the planning commission.” Sub. for H.B. 2752, 1959 Sess. In bringing the bill before the house, the member reporting it explained that it covered “the period between the time of the preliminary application and the final approval.” 8 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1959 Sess., p. 3243. Approximately the same statement was made when the bill was reported to the senate. 8 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1959 Sess., p. 2681. We may take judicial notice of the discussion on the floor of the General Assembly. Lee v. Lee, 145 Conn. 355, 358, 143 A.2d 154; Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 284, 121 A.2d 630.

It should be noted that the preliminary plan which may be filed under the regulations of the planning commission must set forth substantially all of the information concerning the subdivision which is required in the final plan. It is not a mere, meaningless sketch. Although it may be somewhat rough in form and although it need not be done with meticulous accuracy of angle and distance, it must contain essentially all the information which the planning commission needs in deciding the question of final approval.

Finally, it should be noted that the filing of an application for tentative approval of a preliminary plan does not, in and of itself, afford protection against changes in zoning. It is only when there has been final approval of a final plan that the pro *101 lection relates back to the filing of the application. See Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 314, 170 A.2d 267.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the appeal.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Harris v. Planning Commission, 193 A.2d 499, 151 Conn. 95, 1963 Conn. LEXIS 312 (Colo. 1963).

193 A.2d 499 (Harris v. Planning Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission
646 A.2d 277 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1994)
Paige v. Plan Zon. Com'n of Fairfield, No. Cv91-0289197 (Jan. 27, 1993)
1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 502 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1993)
Paige v. Plan Zon. Com'n of Fairfield, No. Cv91-0289197 (Jan. 14, 1993)
1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 1147 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1993)
American Universal Insurance v. DelGreco
530 A.2d 171 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1987)
Verrastro v. Sivertsen
448 A.2d 1344 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Nationwide Insurance v. Gode
446 A.2d 1059 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Seals v. Hickey
441 A.2d 604 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
East Lands, Inc. v. Floyd County
262 S.E.2d 51 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1979)
Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell
377 A.2d 305 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1977)
Wiegand v. Heffernan
368 A.2d 103 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1976)
State v. Anonymous (1974-4)
31 Conn. Supp. 130 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1974)
Miller v. Board of Education
348 A.2d 584 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Petela v. Administrator
365 A.2d 635 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1974)
City of New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission
345 A.2d 563 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Vicino v. Vicino
298 A.2d 241 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1972)
Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission
291 A.2d 721 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1971)
Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission
244 A.2d 391 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1968)
Hubbard v. Planning Commission
224 A.2d 556 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1966)