IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-3787
EDMUND COLLINS HARRIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
HIGHLANDS UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervenor-Appellant,
VERSUS
MURPHY OIL, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(December 29, 1992)
Before SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and RAINEY,1 District Judge.
JOHN D. RAINEY, District Judge:
Edmond Collins Harris, Jr. ("Harris") appeals an adverse
summary judgment in his personal injury action against Murphy Oil,
U.S.A., Inc. ("Murphy"). Finding no error, we affirm.
I
In March of 1990, Murphy contracted with VIP International
Inc. ("VIP") to provide crews and equipment for a "turnaround." A
"turnaround" is the scheduled maintenance and refurbishing of the
1 District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. operating units within a refinery. The turnaround involves
vacuuming catalyst out of a reactor, screening the catalyst, and
then reinstalling it. In 1990, VIP performed this procedure on
abouve five catalyst reactors at Murphy's Meraux, Louisiana,
Refinery. VIP also conducted this same turnaround of the catalyst
reactors for Murphy in 1985.
The turnaround maintenance, though predictable, occurs only
every three to five years and is required for the on-going
operation of the refinery. It is undisputed that Murphy's refinery
would not function in an economical and profitable fashion without
periodic refurbishment, and in fact, without the refurbishment,
would eventually completely cease to function.
The 1990 refurbishment was of monumental scale. The Meraux
Refinery generally operated with a staff of approximately 280
personnel. Yet, on May 15, 1990, the day of Harris' injury,
between 400 and 600 individuals were working at the refinery.
Murphy hired VIP to refurbish its operating units, including the
Platformer Unit, because Murphy had neither the equipment nor
enough trained staff for this type of work. Murphy did, however,
provide supervisory personnel to monitor VIP's employees.
On May 15, 1990, Harris slipped and fell in an accumulation of
sludge on the pavement at the refinery while reloading catalyst
into the Platformer Reactor Unit. At the time of Harris' injury,
Murphy employees were directly involved, along with VIP employees,
in the catalyst reloading operation.
Harris filed suit in Louisiana state court, and Murphy timely
removed the suit to federal district court. Murphy then moved for summary judgment against Harris, arguing that it enjoyed statutory
employer status toward Harris and was thus immune from tort
liability. .
The district court agreed, finding that Harris was engaged in
work that was a part of Murphy's trade, business or occupation at
the time of the accident. Accordingly, the district court granted
Murphy's motion for summary judgment.
II
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In
reviewing the summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the
district court. See Waltman v. Int'l Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); Moore v. Mississippi Valley State
Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and answers to
interrogatories, together with affidavits, must demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). To that
end, we must "review the facts drawing all inferences most
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)
3 (citation omitted).
Under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act, an employee's
exclusive remedy for injury is worker's compensation benefits; an
employee may not sue his employer or any "principal" in tort. La.
Rev. Stat. section 23:1032 (West 1985). Louisiana's worker's
compensation law makes certain principal contractors potentially
liable for compensation claims from employees of their independent
contractors or subcontractors. Employers' do, however, enjoy
traditional tort immunity for work-related injuries that occur to
their employees.
The La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 23:1061(A) (West 1985 & Supp.
1992) states when the principal contracts with another to perform
work for him that is a part of "his trade, business, or
occupation," a principal is liable to any employee for any
compensation, pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Law, for which
the principal would have been liable if the employee had been
immediately employed by him. This provision provides employers
with tort immunity for the work-related injuries suffered by the
employees of the employer's contractors and subcontractors.
Prior to January 1, 1990, Louisiana used the three part test
outlined in Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc., 488 So. 2d 934
(La. 1986), to determine whether a principal was a statutory
employer. The Berry decision marked the Louisiana Supreme Court's
abandonment of the "integral relation" test established in
Thibodaux v. Sun Oil, 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852, 854 (1950).
In 1989, however, the Louisiana legislature amended section
4 23:1061(A), adding the following sentence:
The fact that work is specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or unpredictable, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being considered part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation, regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower capable of performing the work.
The 1989 amendment legislatively revised the Berry test and
effectively directed the courts back to the previously discarded
"integral relation" test found in Thibodaux. See Saavedra v.
Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1108 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991);
Savant v. James River Paper Co., Inc., 780 F.Supp. 393, 397 (M.D.
La. 1992); Brock v. Chevron Chem. Co., 750 F.Supp. 779,. 781 (E.D.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-3787
EDMUND COLLINS HARRIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
HIGHLANDS UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervenor-Appellant,
VERSUS
MURPHY OIL, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(December 29, 1992)
Before SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and RAINEY,1 District Judge.
JOHN D. RAINEY, District Judge:
Edmond Collins Harris, Jr. ("Harris") appeals an adverse
summary judgment in his personal injury action against Murphy Oil,
U.S.A., Inc. ("Murphy"). Finding no error, we affirm.
I
In March of 1990, Murphy contracted with VIP International
Inc. ("VIP") to provide crews and equipment for a "turnaround." A
"turnaround" is the scheduled maintenance and refurbishing of the
1 District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. operating units within a refinery. The turnaround involves
vacuuming catalyst out of a reactor, screening the catalyst, and
then reinstalling it. In 1990, VIP performed this procedure on
abouve five catalyst reactors at Murphy's Meraux, Louisiana,
Refinery. VIP also conducted this same turnaround of the catalyst
reactors for Murphy in 1985.
The turnaround maintenance, though predictable, occurs only
every three to five years and is required for the on-going
operation of the refinery. It is undisputed that Murphy's refinery
would not function in an economical and profitable fashion without
periodic refurbishment, and in fact, without the refurbishment,
would eventually completely cease to function.
The 1990 refurbishment was of monumental scale. The Meraux
Refinery generally operated with a staff of approximately 280
personnel. Yet, on May 15, 1990, the day of Harris' injury,
between 400 and 600 individuals were working at the refinery.
Murphy hired VIP to refurbish its operating units, including the
Platformer Unit, because Murphy had neither the equipment nor
enough trained staff for this type of work. Murphy did, however,
provide supervisory personnel to monitor VIP's employees.
On May 15, 1990, Harris slipped and fell in an accumulation of
sludge on the pavement at the refinery while reloading catalyst
into the Platformer Reactor Unit. At the time of Harris' injury,
Murphy employees were directly involved, along with VIP employees,
in the catalyst reloading operation.
Harris filed suit in Louisiana state court, and Murphy timely
removed the suit to federal district court. Murphy then moved for summary judgment against Harris, arguing that it enjoyed statutory
employer status toward Harris and was thus immune from tort
liability. .
The district court agreed, finding that Harris was engaged in
work that was a part of Murphy's trade, business or occupation at
the time of the accident. Accordingly, the district court granted
Murphy's motion for summary judgment.
II
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In
reviewing the summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the
district court. See Waltman v. Int'l Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); Moore v. Mississippi Valley State
Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and answers to
interrogatories, together with affidavits, must demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). To that
end, we must "review the facts drawing all inferences most
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)
3 (citation omitted).
Under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act, an employee's
exclusive remedy for injury is worker's compensation benefits; an
employee may not sue his employer or any "principal" in tort. La.
Rev. Stat. section 23:1032 (West 1985). Louisiana's worker's
compensation law makes certain principal contractors potentially
liable for compensation claims from employees of their independent
contractors or subcontractors. Employers' do, however, enjoy
traditional tort immunity for work-related injuries that occur to
their employees.
The La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 23:1061(A) (West 1985 & Supp.
1992) states when the principal contracts with another to perform
work for him that is a part of "his trade, business, or
occupation," a principal is liable to any employee for any
compensation, pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Law, for which
the principal would have been liable if the employee had been
immediately employed by him. This provision provides employers
with tort immunity for the work-related injuries suffered by the
employees of the employer's contractors and subcontractors.
Prior to January 1, 1990, Louisiana used the three part test
outlined in Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc., 488 So. 2d 934
(La. 1986), to determine whether a principal was a statutory
employer. The Berry decision marked the Louisiana Supreme Court's
abandonment of the "integral relation" test established in
Thibodaux v. Sun Oil, 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852, 854 (1950).
In 1989, however, the Louisiana legislature amended section
4 23:1061(A), adding the following sentence:
The fact that work is specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or unpredictable, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being considered part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation, regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower capable of performing the work.
The 1989 amendment legislatively revised the Berry test and
effectively directed the courts back to the previously discarded
"integral relation" test found in Thibodaux. See Saavedra v.
Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1108 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991);
Savant v. James River Paper Co., Inc., 780 F.Supp. 393, 397 (M.D.
La. 1992); Brock v. Chevron Chem. Co., 750 F.Supp. 779,. 781 (E.D.
La. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1991);
Sawyer v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., No. 89-2734, 1991 WL 28986
(E.D.La. Feb. 25, 1991). Consequently, the Legislature broadened
the reach of the statutory employment language and dramatically
curtailed the right of a subcontrator's employee to sue a principal
in tort for a work-related injury.
The amendment became effective January 1, 1990. Because the
accident in this case occurred on or about May 15, 1990, the
amendment applies in defining Harris' legal relationship to Murphy.
Accordingly, this Court will consider only whether the injured
party's work, i.e.'s Harris' work, was an integral, related part of
Murphy's "trade, business, or occupation" in determining whether
Murphy has statutory employer status.
At the time of his injury, Harris was performing turnaround
maintenance work on a Platformer Unit at the Murphy refinery. The
5 record shows that regular turnaround maintenance of the Platformer
Unit was part of Murphy's trade, business or occupation as an oil
refinery and was integral to the continued efficient functioning of
the operating units. Without it, the unit would cease to function.
Although all inferences are resolved in Harris' favor on
summary judgment, the record, taken as a whole, does not reveal a
genuine dispute over the material fact that Harris' turnaround
work was part of Murphy's trade, business or occupation.
Consequently, the district court correctly granted summary judgment
in Murphy's favor.
III.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.