Harris v. Michigan Mutual Hail Insurance

173 N.W. 533, 207 Mich. 182, 7 A.L.R. 366, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 402
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 18, 1919
DocketDocket No. 12
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 173 N.W. 533 (Harris v. Michigan Mutual Hail Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Michigan Mutual Hail Insurance, 173 N.W. 533, 207 Mich. 182, 7 A.L.R. 366, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 402 (Mich. 1919).

Opinion

Ostrander, J.

The plaintiff made written application to defendant for membership and for—

“indemnity against damage or loss to growing grain, fruit, and other farm products * * * $1,000 on 112 acres of fruit, on Sec. 20, Lawrence Twp., Van Burén Co., Mich.”

—from noon of the 25th of May, 1915. The policy issued upon this application recites that plaintiff—

[183]*183“has this 25th day of May, 1915, become a member” of the defendant company and “has insured in said company, against loss or damage to growing grain, fruit, and other farm products by hail, to the amount of $1,000, from noon of the 25th day of May, 1915.”

The premises and specification of the insurance are as stated in the application, namely, “$1,000 on 112 acres of fruit, Sec. 20, Lawrence Twp.” * * * The undertaking of the company is—

“to make good unto the said insured * * * all such loss or damage, not exceeding the amount insured, as shall happen by hail to the property above named, and more specifically described in the application on file, * * * which is hereby made a part of this contract, from the 25th day of May, one thousand, nine hundred and fifteen, * * * the. said loss or damage to be estimated according to the actual cash value at the time the same is adjusted.” * * *

The policy was in force May 8, 1916, on which day a violent hail storm occurred at the plaintiff’s farm. Plaintiff then had, on section 20, about 2,000 bearing fruit trees from 14 to 40 years old, apple and pear trees. He notified the defendant that he had sustained a loss by the hail storm. Officers of the defendant visited the orchards, there was some correspondence. Finally, after an attempt had been made to adjust the loss, and on October 16, 1916, defendant wrote plaintiff a letter, signed by its secretary, the pertinent portions of which are:

“We will say in regard to your claim for damages by hail on May 8, 1916:
“First, that blossoms are not fruit and, hence, is not covered by the policy.
“Second, that on your pear orchard on which you claimed 50 per cent, loss, did not show to as good fruit men as are in Van Burén county, any loss by hail. So if any loss occurred to your crops,' it was from something besides the hail of May 8, 1916.”

[184]*184In September, 1917, plaintiff filed Ms declaration in tMs cause, with a bill of particulars. Defendant pleaded the general issue. The cause came on to be tried in February, 1918. Plaintiff offered, defendant did not offer, testimony. There was a motion by defendant for a directed verdict upon the grounds:

(1) That plaintiff had shown no injury to' any property covered by the policy, namely, growing fruit.

(2) That the plaintiff “has failed to show any damages that could be submitted to a jury at this time, all damages from whatever cause they may haye occurred, or whether they occurred or not, being uncertain, speculative and contingent.”

There was a verdict for plaintiff for $1,056.60, upon which judgment was entered. The grounds asserted in the motion for a directed verdict are those urged here for a reversal of the judgment. Upon the first point, defendant, appellant, presents the question in this way:

“Whether or not,” it says, “the incorporators had in mind the line of demarkation where the protection would commence, there certainly is a line somewhere and that line must be ascertained from the language they used. If we say ‘growing fruit’ includes blossoms, then it is by a hair’s breadth to the next station and include fruit buds. Horticulture teaches and the evidence shows that the fruit of this year is produced from buds grown last year. Therefore damage to this year’s fruit buds’ may have a tendency to damage next year’s fruit crop. Having gone that far it is only a very short step to the next station, by claiming that inasmuch as damage to fruit buds is proof of damage to fruit, proof of damage to leaf buds ought to be admitted as proof of damages to fruit on the theory that damage to the foliage has a tendency to damage the fruit crop, present or future. This line of reasoning could be continued like the rhyme of ‘The House that Jack Built,’ to include future damage to foliage, damage to the limbs of the trees, then to the trunk, then to the soil from which the trees draw their sustenance, etc.
[185]*185“It must be clear that these farmers intended mutually to insure another against loss or damage to some kind of growing fruit and grain, not something that might or might not develop into growing fruit and grain.
“To determine what the contract is we must resort to the language used in the writing. There is no parol testimony from which assistance may be had in the construction and whatever that construction is found to be, the parties must be held to be bound by it.”

It refers to the Century dictionary, the New International Encyclopedia, and to the opinion of a Federal court (Nix v. Hedden, 39 Fed. 109, 149 U. S. 304) for a definition of the word fruit. With respect to these definitions it is said:

“It will be observed that one element tenaciously present in all these definitions is the element of seeds. We find no comprehensive definition of the term ‘fruit’ which does not contain the element of ‘seed.’ We can then say that unless the blossoms contain seed they would not be fruit within the purview of the policy.
“There is no evidence that any of those blossoms or fruit buds contain seed resulting or contained in a pollenized ovary which develops into the core and obtains the result of proper fertilization — seed.
“Pollen is referred to by some of the witnesses as seed, but pollen is not the seed mentioned in the definitions. The stamens which contain the pollen is part of the blossom (the leaves and carpels), and is never contained in the growing or ripened fruit. The seeds of fruit have such a well known meaning that no one can be mistaken as to what is meant when it is said that one of the constituent elements of fruit is seed, contained in and covered by the juicy, pulpy product of a tree or plant.
“This would seem to be the only logical place to draw the line. The policy covers when the embryo apple is sufficiently advanced so that the presence of seed is susceptible of proof, until then five-sixths of the blossoms may not be fertilized and those not fertilized would, of course, never develop into fruit.
“To hold the other policyholders liable for damages to blossoms that would never have developed even into [186]*186a fertilized embryo apple was certainly not within the contemplation of the incorporators. It would be doing violence to their language to so hold.”

Counsel for appellee, directing attention to the fact that in the policy the words growing fruit are employed to describe the risk insured, refers to the lexicographers and to botanists for definitions of “growth,” “grow,” “growing,” and to Black’s and Bouvier’s dictionaries for a definition of “growing crop,” and they say that anything that is developing is growing and—

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Bluebook (online)
173 N.W. 533, 207 Mich. 182, 7 A.L.R. 366, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-michigan-mutual-hail-insurance-mich-1919.