Harris v. Market

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 9, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00314
StatusUnknown

This text of Harris v. Market (Harris v. Market) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Market, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TERRELL HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-CV-314

OFFICER MARKET, OFFICER SHOUP, and MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT DISTRICT 4,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Terrell Harris, who is currently confined at Green Bay Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) Harris also filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Harris was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On March 11, 2024, Harris filed a motion for leave to proceed without

prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.) On March 12, 2024, the court ordered that Harris shall pay $57.04 as an initial partial filing fee by April 11, 2024. (ECF No. 5.) Harris paid the fee on April 1, 2024. The court will grant Harris’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and allow him to pay the full filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT

Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must

2 contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color

of state law. D.S. v. E. Morris Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). Harris’s Allegations Harris alleges that, while he was detained at the Milwaukee Secure

Detention Facility (MSDF), defendants Officer Market and Officer Shoup, who were with the Milwaukee Police Department District 4, came to take Harris’s “formal report” because prior to his detainment he was a victim of sexual assault. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) During the interview the officers made insulting comments, stating that he was too “grown” to be a victim of sexual assault and that they did not believe him. (Id. at 2-3.) They also referenced Harris’s previous conviction for child enticement.

3 (Id. at 3.) Additionally, they walked out without taking a full report, which resulted in the district attorney not having enough evidence to move forward with prosecution. (Id.)

Analysis Harris claims that his constitutional rights were violated by Market and Shoup when they made insulting comments and did not properly investigate his allegations of sexual assault. In addition to Market and Shoup, Harris sues “Milwaukee Police Department District 4.” Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The

Milwaukee Police Department District 4 is not a person, nor is it a separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983. See Louis v. Milwaukee County Jail, No. 17-cv- 113-wed-pp, 2017 WL 3037567 at *2 (E.D. Wis. July, 18 2017) (citing Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 N.D. Ill. 1993)). Therefore, … Harris also alleges that he was verbally harassed by Market and Shoup. “Only on rare occasions does verbal harassment of a pretrial detainee or incarcerated person rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Griffin v. Garcia,

Case No. 19-cv-1070-pp, 2024 WL 1071651 at * 5 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2024) (citing Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015). Verbal harassment rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment only where it incites psychological pain, such as a guard purposely telling an inmate with a headache that the doctor told him that the inmate had terminal brain cancer. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 2019).

4 Harris does not provide details regarding the effect the verbal harassment had on him. Although he states it caused mental anguish, he does not elaborate. Harris filed a supplement to his complaint that contains more detail (ECF No. 8),

but under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Jerald Davis v. William Owens
973 F.2d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 1992)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Powell v. Cook County Jail
814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Ronald Beal v. Brian Foster
803 F.3d 356 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Steven Lisle, Jr. v. William Welborn
933 F.3d 705 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Mitchell Zimmerman v. Glenn Bornick
25 F.4th 491 (Seventh Circuit, 2022)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Harris v. Market, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-market-wied-2024.