Harris v. Esperanza Mining Co.

109 A. 826, 91 N.J. Eq. 163, 6 Stock. 163, 1919 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 14
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedOctober 11, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 109 A. 826 (Harris v. Esperanza Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Esperanza Mining Co., 109 A. 826, 91 N.J. Eq. 163, 6 Stock. 163, 1919 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 14 (N.J. Ct. App. 1919).

Opinion

Stevenson, V. C.

This suit is -brought to recover commissions amounting to over $200,000, alleged to- have been earned by one Brad Barnar, the complainant’s assignor, by procuring the sale of a Mexican mining property. The owner of this property was a Mexican corporation which has since been dissolved. The theory of the bill is, that having established the- fact of the indebtedness of this Mexican corporation to Mr. Barnar, this suit may be maintained in the court of chancery of New Jersey for the recovery of the amount of the debt from the defendants the Esperanza Mining Company and the Guggenheim Exploration Company, two New Jersey corporations, on the ground that these defendants took over by assignment from the Mexican corporation all its assets and thereby became liable to pay its debts to the extent of the value of the assigned assets. It is conceded that the Mexican corporation in fact conveyed its mines and practically all its other assets to the defendant the Esperanza Mining Company of New Jersey, a corporation organized under the direction of the Guggenheim Exploration Company, to- receive and manage such assets. After this conveyance of assets the Mexican corporation was dissolved. Fo objection was made to the non-joinder of the Mexican corporation or its liquidator as a party defendant. The bill alleges that there was no consideration for this transfer of assets “except the issuing of stock by the said Esperanza Mining Company of New Jersey.” Eor all that appears in the bill the stock of this New Jersey corporation may have amounted to over $2,000,000 par value, and may have been actually worth that sum.

[165]*165A number of interesting questions, which were the subject of extensive oral argument and elaborate briefs may, I think, be left unconsidered, in view of the narrow ground upon which I shall rest the decision of this cause.

To sustain the jurisdiction of the court for the enforcement of what originally was a purely legal liability against the Mexican corporation, the famous “trust fund theory” has been invoked. This theoretical basis for the .suit, although not set forth in the. bill, may properly be deemed to- be presented to the court by the allegations of fact therein contained, although those allegations appear to have been made in order to sustain a charge of actual fraud which was abandoned at the hearing. The applicability of the “trust fund theory” has been urged on behalf of the complainant without objection in an elaborate oral argument and a voluminous brief. The specific complaint which the bill makes against the transfer of these assets from the Mexican company to the defendants is, that the complainant and his assignor, Mr. Barnar, by such transfer “were prevented from collecting from” the Mexican corporation the said “sum of $202,500, the commission” earned on the sale.

No question in regard to the jurisdiction of the court is raised in either answer, and the parties went to final hearing upon the issues raised in those pleadings. The bill asserts, and the answers deny, that Mr. Barnar and the Mexican corporation entered into an agreement by which Mr. Barnar was to have a commission of ten per cent, in case he effected a sale. The answers deny that the complainant or his assignor was “the procuring cause of any sale” of the property in question. The answers also deny that, by reason of the transfer of the assets of the Mexican corporation to the defendant Esperanza Mining Company of New Jersey, Barnar, or the complainant, his assignee, was prevented from collecting any sum due them from the Mexican corporation. The answer of the defendant Guggenheim Exploration Company alleges that it never purchased the mines, &c., of the Mexican company, but that a syndicate composed of the said defendant, an English corporation known as the Venture Company, Limited, and a firm1 of brokers of London, England, known as L. Hirsch & Company, as the transferees of an option held by one E. A. [166]*166Wiltsee, purchased from various individuals a majority of the capital stock of the Mexican corporation; that said purchase was made in good faith and for a. valuable consideration, viz., $3,000 in Mexican currency for each share of stock, and that the price of the shares was duly paid in good faith and without the knowledge that the complainant or his alleged assignor, Brad Barnar, had any claim for commissions.

When the case came to final hearing the bill distinctly presented a legal liability on the part of the Mexican company originally to Barnar, the complainant’s assignor, and alleged that the two defendants, the Esperanza Mining Company of New Jersey and Guggenheim Exploration Company, were liable to pay this debt of the Mexican corporation because of their fraud in preventing its collection- from that company, and also, because, apart from actual fraud, the defendants received practically all the assets of the Mexican corporation constructively in trust for the payment of the debts of that corporation.

Before-any proofs were taken at the final hearing counsel for the defendants made a motion that the bill be dismissed, first, on the ground that it did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against either defendant, and second, on the ground that the complainant had not exhausted his remedy against his alleged debtor, the Mexican company, which motion was denied.

The parties went to final hearing upon the bill alleging a strictly legal indebtedness from this former Mexican company to the complainant’s assignor, Mr. Barnar, and further alleging a strictly equitable liability on the part of the defendants, or one of them, to discharge this legal liability. The equitable liability was based upon a charge of actual fraud and of the equitable obligation cast by law upon the assignee of all the assets of a corporation to apply those assets to the payment of the debts of the corporation.’ Thus, these alleged equities were presented distinctly to the court for' determination and the3r could not be determined in any other court.

In addition to the basis- of jurisdiction above stated, it should be borne in mind that this- was a "suit brought by an assignee of a chose in action, this "legal debt from a Mexican company to Mr. [167]*167Bamar. Anciently, the- assignee of such a chose in action -had no standing in a court of law so as to he able to bring an action in his own name; he was.obliged to sue in equity and the assignor was a necessary party to the suit. 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. 197, 198. Thus we have, even as against the Mexican corporation if it were in existence to-day and had been brought into this suit, a ease which comes within an old-established head of equity. It is true that the extension of the jurisdiction of courts of law over suits brought by assignees of ehoses in action in their own name, has largely diminished the number of instances or classes of cases in which a court of equity will exercise its ancient jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction still remains and in a proper case where the remedy at law is not adequate will be exercised. Hayes v. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eq. 461; affirmed, 47 N. J. Eq. 567.

The same practical limitation of the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of equity by the expansion of the jurisdiction of law courts by their own action or by the effect of legislation, is seen in the case of bills to- recover damages for fraud, bills for an accounting and bills for new trials. See Streeter v. Braman, 76 N. J. Eq. 371, and cases cited on p. 375.

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Bluebook (online)
109 A. 826, 91 N.J. Eq. 163, 6 Stock. 163, 1919 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 14, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-esperanza-mining-co-njch-1919.