Harris v. Crenshaw County Board of Education

259 F. Supp. 167, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedSeptember 23, 1966
DocketCiv. A. 2455-N
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 259 F. Supp. 167 (Harris v. Crenshaw County Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Crenshaw County Board of Education, 259 F. Supp. 167, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396 (M.D. Ala. 1966).

Opinion

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

The motion of the plaintiffs, joined in by the United States of America as plaintiff-intervenor, for a preliminary injunction was heard by the Court on September 22, 1966, after due notice to the parties, and is now submitted upon the pleadings, the testimony and exhibits thereto presented September 12, September 19 and September 22, 1966.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1983.

The United States of America, by leave of this Court, intervenes as a plaintiff in this action pursuant to § 902 of of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S. C.A. § 2000h-2) and Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Negro citizens and their minor children residing in Crenshaw County, Alabama, bring this action pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated.

Generally, the plaintiffs request this Court to enjoin the defendants, the Cren-shaw County Board of Education, its members, and the County Superintendent of Education, from continuing their policy of operating a dual school system in Crenshaw County, Alabama, based upon race or color. More specifically, plaintiffs request this Court to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting these defendants from refusing to admit Negro children to the various schools in Cren-shaw County which these children have indicated they desire to attend for the school year 1966-67.

In 1965 the Crenshaw County Board of Education determined that the operation of their dual school system was in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the several cases since Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), which declare the duties, obligations and rights in this particular area of constitutional law. The Crenshaw County Board determined that it would desegregate its school system beginning with the school year 1965-66, adopted a “freedom of choice” plan for the purpose of effectuating the desegregation of the school system, and duly published the plan in the local newspaper. Generally, *169 the plan adopted was designed to afford every student in the public schools of Crenshaw County, Alabama, a freedom of choice to attend any school in the system regardless of the race or color of the student. In the event there was overcrowding at any particular school as a result of the choices made, assignments were to be based solely on proximity, without regard to racial considerations. Where choices were rejected because of overcrowding, the parents were to be notified in time to make an effective choice of any other school. The plan for the 1965-66 school year resulted in 21 Negro students applying for admission to and being accepted in the formerly all white schools of Highland Home and Luverne High.

The freedom of choice plan continued as the method the Crenshaw County Board of Education selected for the desegregation of its school system for the 1966-67 school year. Again, the school board gave adequate publication of its plan, and within the time provided by the plan 143 Negro students who formerly attended Helicon School, an all Negro school in the county, applied for admission to Highland Home School; 41 Negro students who had previously attended Woodford Avenue School, a Negro school in the county, applied for admission to Luverne High School, and 18 Negro students who formerly attended Dozier Junior High School, a Negro school in said county, applied for admission to Dozier High School, formerly an all white school in said county. Notices dated August 29,1966, were mailed to the Negro parents by the Crenshaw County Board, advising all but 9 of the 143 Negro students who had applied for admission to Highland Home School that their choice had been rejected because of overcrowded conditions in said school. Only 12 of the Negro students who selected Luverne High School through the exercise of their choice were accepted, and only 2 of the Negro students who selected Dozier High School through the exercise of their choice were accepted. In this connection, the evidence reflects that all white students throughout the county who applied to attend white schools through the exercise of their choice were permitted to do so. All Negro students who applied through the exercise of their choice to attend Negro schools were permitted to do so. The only rejections were instances where Negroes exercised their choice to attend white schools. The evidence is clear, and indeed the Superintendent of Education of Crenshaw County, Alabama, while testifying in this case, quite candidly admitted that where Negro students exercised their choice to attend white schools, the Board of Education considered the “freedom of choice” applications merely as applications to transfer. In accepting the choice of white students to attend white schools and in rejecting the choice of Negro students to attend white schools, the Board of Education did not consider proximity — only race. This, of course, violates the plan as adopted and published by the Board and served only to perpetuate the dual school system. Clearly, if a freedom of choice plan is to be sustained as a reasonable means by which schools are to be desegregated in accordance with the principles of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, supra, all students must be accorded the same opportunity to apply to any school whether they previously attended that particular school or not. It follows, therefore, that the Board’s contention that certain of the white schools selected by the Negro students, as indicated by their choice applications, are overcrowded, is totally unacceptable as a justification for the denial of such applications.

Another major factor that has prevented the plan as adopted by the Cren-shaw County Board of Education from achieving its announced purpose, that is, the desegregation of the county school system, is the fact that a large majority of the students attending the various schools throughout the county are taken to those schools through the medium of school buses that regularly transport children from or near their residences to *170 their schools. With very few exceptions, the school bus transportation system in Crenshaw County, including the routes traveled by the buses, has not been changed for many years. The school bus transportation system in Crenshaw County was designed to transport children from or near their residences to schools that were then being operated on a segregated basis by reason of race or color of the students. The system continues at the present time to operate in a manner that is designed to service a dual school system based upon race or color. Therefore, the Negro students in Crenshaw County find themselves with transportation reasonably available only to schools formerly attended solely by Negroes.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Whitfield v. Oliver
399 F. Supp. 348 (M.D. Alabama, 1975)
Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education
377 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D. Alabama, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
259 F. Supp. 167, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-crenshaw-county-board-of-education-almd-1966.