NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260216-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/28/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0216 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
J.D. HARRIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 25-MR-245 ) CITY OF MADISON BOARD of FIRE and POLICE ) COMMISSIONERS, ) ) and ) ) JEFFREY S. BRIDICK, Madison City Police Chief, ) Honorable ) Ronald J. Foster Jr., Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction was error where the board of fire and police commissioner failed to hold a hearing on charges filed against the plaintiff within 30 days as required by statute, and thereby lost jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on identical charges that were refiled.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The Plaintiff, J.D. Harris (Harris) is a police officer employed by the City of Madison
Police Department. The defendants are the City of Madison Board of Fire and Police
1 Commissioners (Board) and Jeffrey S. Bridick, the Chief of the Madison Police Department
(Bridick).
¶4 On May 27, 2025, Bridick mailed written disciplinary charges to the Board seeking
Harris’s removal from the police department for cause. The mailing was postmarked May 29,
2025, and the parties do not dispute that the charges were filed, at the latest, on that date. The
charges alleged that Harris fraudulently documented time spent patrolling an area known as
Chouteau Island.
¶5 On July 3, 2025, the Board convened a proceeding concerning the disciplinary charges
against Harris. During that proceeding, the hearing officer addressed procedural and jurisdictional
matters. No witnesses testified, no evidence was presented concerning the merits of the charges,
and the Board continued the matter on its own motion.
¶6 On July 23, 2025, Harris filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the Board had failed to commence a hearing within the time required by section 10-
2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 (West 2024)) and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the pending disciplinary charges. Bridick filed a motion to
dismiss Harris’s complaint on August 28, 2025, which the Board joined on September 3, 2025.
¶7 On October 9, 2025, the circuit court entered an order denying Bridick’s motion to dismiss
Harris’s complaint, stating, inter alia:
“The proceeding on July 3, 2025, did not constitute a substantive hearing on the
charges. The hearing addressed only procedural matters and did not engage with the merits
of the case, failing to meet statutory can case law requirements as outlined in Riggins v.
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Peoria and Board of Fire and Police
2 Commissioners of the City of Zion. *** [N]o discussion of the merits occurred, and the
Board’s hearing officer explicitly limited the scope to jurisdictional issues.
The delay in commencing a substantive hearing was not attributable to the Plaintiff.
There is no evidence of Plaintiff’s agreement to or causation of any continuance. The
Defendants have not produced any documentation showing that Plaintiff agreed to delay
the hearing beyond the statutory period. The Board continued the hearing on its own
motion, and there is no indication that Plaintiff’s actions contributed to the delay.”
¶8 On November 6, 2025, Bridick filed a second statement of disciplinary charges against
Harris. The second statement of disciplinary charges was identical to the charges filed against
Harris in May 2025. The Board accepted the filing under its original Board Case No. 2025-1.
¶9 On November 7, 2025, Harris filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
prohibit the Board from conducting a hearing on the November 2025 charges. Harris argued that
because the Board had already lost jurisdiction over the original charges, the filing of a second
statement of identical charges did not revest the Board with jurisdiction to proceed on the identical
charges. On November 20, 2025, Bridick filed a response to Harris’s motion. Bridick responded
that the November filing constituted a new disciplinary action subject to its own statutory
timetable. On February 6, 2026, the circuit court held a hearing on Harris’s motion for preliminary
injunction, after which the matter was taken under advisement.
¶ 10 On March 9, 2026, the trial court entered a written order which reaffirmed its earlier
determination that the Board had failed to timely commence a hearing on the May 2025 charges.
However, the court concluded that the November 2025 filing initiated a new disciplinary action
with an independent 30-day period for commencing a hearing. In reaching that conclusion, the
court relied principally on Cesario v. Board of Fire, Police, and Public Safety Commissioners of
3 the Town of Cicero, 368 Ill. App. 3d 70 (2006). Harris filed a timely notice of interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Although this appeal arises from the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, the
material facts are not disputed. Rather, the parties disagree about the legal effect of those facts.
Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Kalbfleisch ex rel. Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Community
Unit School District No. 4, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1112 (2009).
¶ 13 Section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code provides that no police officer may be
discharged except for cause, upon written charges, and after an opportunity to be heard. 65 ILCS
5/10-2.1-17 (West 2024). The statute further requires that the board “shall conduct a fair and
impartial hearing of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which
hearing may be continued from time to time.” Id. Illinois courts have consistently recognized that
the Board’s authority is wholly statutory and that its failure to comply with the statute’s
jurisdictional requirements deprives it of authority to proceed. Sherman v. Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners of the City of Highland, 111 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007 (1982); Riggins v.
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Peoria, 107 Ill. App. 3d 126, 130 (1982).
¶ 14 The parties devote much of their briefing to whether Sherman or Cesario governs this
appeal. We do not disagree with the reasoning of Cesario. Rather, we conclude that Cesario
addressed a materially different procedural posture than the one presented here.
¶ 15 In Sherman, this court held that a board of fire and police commissioners loses jurisdiction
when it fails to commence the statutorily required hearing within 30 days after charges are filed,
absent delay attributable to the officer. Sherman, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. There, the complainants
argued that amended charges restarted the statutory period.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260216-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/28/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0216 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
J.D. HARRIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 25-MR-245 ) CITY OF MADISON BOARD of FIRE and POLICE ) COMMISSIONERS, ) ) and ) ) JEFFREY S. BRIDICK, Madison City Police Chief, ) Honorable ) Ronald J. Foster Jr., Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction was error where the board of fire and police commissioner failed to hold a hearing on charges filed against the plaintiff within 30 days as required by statute, and thereby lost jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on identical charges that were refiled.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The Plaintiff, J.D. Harris (Harris) is a police officer employed by the City of Madison
Police Department. The defendants are the City of Madison Board of Fire and Police
1 Commissioners (Board) and Jeffrey S. Bridick, the Chief of the Madison Police Department
(Bridick).
¶4 On May 27, 2025, Bridick mailed written disciplinary charges to the Board seeking
Harris’s removal from the police department for cause. The mailing was postmarked May 29,
2025, and the parties do not dispute that the charges were filed, at the latest, on that date. The
charges alleged that Harris fraudulently documented time spent patrolling an area known as
Chouteau Island.
¶5 On July 3, 2025, the Board convened a proceeding concerning the disciplinary charges
against Harris. During that proceeding, the hearing officer addressed procedural and jurisdictional
matters. No witnesses testified, no evidence was presented concerning the merits of the charges,
and the Board continued the matter on its own motion.
¶6 On July 23, 2025, Harris filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the Board had failed to commence a hearing within the time required by section 10-
2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 (West 2024)) and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the pending disciplinary charges. Bridick filed a motion to
dismiss Harris’s complaint on August 28, 2025, which the Board joined on September 3, 2025.
¶7 On October 9, 2025, the circuit court entered an order denying Bridick’s motion to dismiss
Harris’s complaint, stating, inter alia:
“The proceeding on July 3, 2025, did not constitute a substantive hearing on the
charges. The hearing addressed only procedural matters and did not engage with the merits
of the case, failing to meet statutory can case law requirements as outlined in Riggins v.
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Peoria and Board of Fire and Police
2 Commissioners of the City of Zion. *** [N]o discussion of the merits occurred, and the
Board’s hearing officer explicitly limited the scope to jurisdictional issues.
The delay in commencing a substantive hearing was not attributable to the Plaintiff.
There is no evidence of Plaintiff’s agreement to or causation of any continuance. The
Defendants have not produced any documentation showing that Plaintiff agreed to delay
the hearing beyond the statutory period. The Board continued the hearing on its own
motion, and there is no indication that Plaintiff’s actions contributed to the delay.”
¶8 On November 6, 2025, Bridick filed a second statement of disciplinary charges against
Harris. The second statement of disciplinary charges was identical to the charges filed against
Harris in May 2025. The Board accepted the filing under its original Board Case No. 2025-1.
¶9 On November 7, 2025, Harris filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
prohibit the Board from conducting a hearing on the November 2025 charges. Harris argued that
because the Board had already lost jurisdiction over the original charges, the filing of a second
statement of identical charges did not revest the Board with jurisdiction to proceed on the identical
charges. On November 20, 2025, Bridick filed a response to Harris’s motion. Bridick responded
that the November filing constituted a new disciplinary action subject to its own statutory
timetable. On February 6, 2026, the circuit court held a hearing on Harris’s motion for preliminary
injunction, after which the matter was taken under advisement.
¶ 10 On March 9, 2026, the trial court entered a written order which reaffirmed its earlier
determination that the Board had failed to timely commence a hearing on the May 2025 charges.
However, the court concluded that the November 2025 filing initiated a new disciplinary action
with an independent 30-day period for commencing a hearing. In reaching that conclusion, the
court relied principally on Cesario v. Board of Fire, Police, and Public Safety Commissioners of
3 the Town of Cicero, 368 Ill. App. 3d 70 (2006). Harris filed a timely notice of interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Although this appeal arises from the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, the
material facts are not disputed. Rather, the parties disagree about the legal effect of those facts.
Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Kalbfleisch ex rel. Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Community
Unit School District No. 4, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1112 (2009).
¶ 13 Section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code provides that no police officer may be
discharged except for cause, upon written charges, and after an opportunity to be heard. 65 ILCS
5/10-2.1-17 (West 2024). The statute further requires that the board “shall conduct a fair and
impartial hearing of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which
hearing may be continued from time to time.” Id. Illinois courts have consistently recognized that
the Board’s authority is wholly statutory and that its failure to comply with the statute’s
jurisdictional requirements deprives it of authority to proceed. Sherman v. Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners of the City of Highland, 111 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007 (1982); Riggins v.
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Peoria, 107 Ill. App. 3d 126, 130 (1982).
¶ 14 The parties devote much of their briefing to whether Sherman or Cesario governs this
appeal. We do not disagree with the reasoning of Cesario. Rather, we conclude that Cesario
addressed a materially different procedural posture than the one presented here.
¶ 15 In Sherman, this court held that a board of fire and police commissioners loses jurisdiction
when it fails to commence the statutorily required hearing within 30 days after charges are filed,
absent delay attributable to the officer. Sherman, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. There, the complainants
argued that amended charges restarted the statutory period. We rejected that contention and
4 measured the Board’s jurisdiction from the date of the filing of the original charges. Id. at 1006-
08. Moreover, we recognized that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent a board from
proceeding after it has lost jurisdiction because, under those circumstances, the board “would be
acting without jurisdiction.” Id. at 1007.
¶ 16 Cesario presented a different procedural posture. There, the municipality voluntarily
dismissed the original disciplinary charges and later refiled them. Cesario, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 72-
74. The First District concluded that the refiled charges commenced a new proceeding and
therefore carried their own independent jurisdictional timetable. Id. at 74-76. In reaching that
conclusion, the court expressly stated that proceedings occurring before the voluntary dismissal
“have no bearing on the jurisdictional requirements for proceedings on the refiled charges.” Id. at
76.
¶ 17 This appeal presents a different question. Unlike Cesario, the original disciplinary charges
against Harris were never voluntarily dismissed. Nothing in the record establishes that the Board
terminated the original proceeding, that Harris agreed to dismiss the original charges, or that he
otherwise waived the statutory requirement that a hearing commence within 30 days. Instead, after
the circuit court determined that the July 3 proceeding did not constitute a hearing under section
10-2.1-17 of the Code and that the delay was not attributable to Harris, Bridick filed a second
statement of charges which were identical to the original matter remained pending.
¶ 18 The dispositive issue before us is whether the filing of identical disciplinary charges
restarted the statutory 30-day period where the original charges remained pending and had never
been dismissed. We conclude that it did not.
¶ 19 The defendants argue that the November 2025 charges initiated an entirely new
disciplinary action with independent jurisdictional requirements. That argument necessarily
5 assumes the filing of the second charges created a new proceeding. The record, however,
demonstrates that the Board continued treating the matter as Board Case No. 2025-1 and that the
November filing alleged the same misconduct as the May charges. More importantly, the original
charges had never been dismissed. Under these circumstances, the Board’s jurisdiction remained
tied to the filing of the original charges, not the filing date of the duplicative charging document.
¶ 20 We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in relying upon Cesario to deny Harris’s
request for injunctive relief. Cesario did not address whether duplicative charges restore
jurisdiction where the original charges remain pending. Instead, it considered the effect of a
voluntary dismissal followed by the commencement of a new proceeding. Accordingly, Cesario
does not alter the result compelled by Sherman. Once the Board failed to timely commence a
hearing on the original charges, and the delay was not attributable to Harris, the Board lacked
authority to proceed on those charges. The subsequent filing of identical charges did not restore
that lost jurisdiction.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying Harris’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.
¶ 23 Reversed.