Harris v. Broomfield

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 1, 2022·No. 4:21-cv-00283·Unknown

Opinion

MAURICE LYDELL HARRIS, Case No. 21-cv-00283-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER v. AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

CLERIC MUHAMMAD, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 17 Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a He also brings a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and for preliminary injunction (“PI”). ECF No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a TRO/PI. Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from denying him the ability to supplement his GMO-free (RMAP) diet, that is required by his religion, with non-Halal or non-Kosher food items from the prison canteen or vendors. Dkt. No. 17. I. Factual Background Below the Court reviews the relevant factual allegations set forth by the parties. Plaintiff practices Soka Gakkai International (SGI) Nichiren Buddhism. According to Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, his body is a temple that should not be polluted by consuming meat that contains genetically modified ingredients (“GMOs”). Dkt. No. 8 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 17 at 4, 10- SQSP’s halal/Islamic diet, also referred to as the Religious Meat Alternate Program (“RMAP”). Dkt. No. 8 at 4; Dkt. No. 17 at 4, 10-11. At the time he enrolled, Plaintiff was not required to follow Islamic law to participate in this religious diet, and was only required to follow the dietary restrictions set forth in his religion, Nichiren Buddhism. Dkt. No. 8 at 4; Dkt. No. 17 at 10. Plaintiff did not sign a Religious Diet Agreement (CDCR Form 3030-A). Dkt. No. 17 at 7. Prison officials state that SQSP does not offer a GMO-free diet and that RMAP offers inmates meat that has been certified as halal, and not meat/food that is GMO-free. Prison officials further state that Plaintiff has never been offered GMO-free meals during his incarceration at SQSP. Dkt. No. 20-1 (“Shleffar Decl.”), ¶ 27. Since enrolling in the RMAP diet, when prison meals are inadequate, either in nutrition or portion size, Plaintiff has supplemented his diet with non-Halal purchases from the canteen, such as ramen soups, oysters, and beef products. Dkt. No. 8 at 5, 9-11; Dkt. No. 17 at 5. On May 16, 2019, defendant K. Fasih (Iman Muhammad) issued Plaintiff a religious diet violation for purchasing ramen soups. Dkt. No. 8 at 7. These religious diet violations are based on a violation of the Religious Diet Agreement (Form 3030-A) which Plaintiff did not sign. Dkt. No. 17 at 7. Plaintiff had never received a religious diet violation prior to this date, despite consuming ramen soups and other non-Halal items from the canteen. Dkt. No. 17 at 4. In summer 2020, COVID impacted prison feeding procedures, reducing the portions by half. Plaintiff supplemented his diet with ramen soups to maintain his health. Dkt. No. 8 at 10-11. On October 10, 2021, defendant Jackson issued Plaintiff a religious diet violation for purchasing ramen soups during June, July, and August 2020. Dkt. No. 8 at 11. She also informed him that if he wished to avoid the violation being placed in his Central file, he could voluntarily withdraw from the program, and she handed him a withdrawal form. Dkt. No. 8 at 11. Plaintiff filed this case in January 2021, and has since received two additional religious diet violations. On July 7, 2021, Catholic chaplain Chavira, who is not a named defendant, issued a violation to Plaintiff on behalf of defendant Fasih for consuming beef steaks. Dkt. No. 17 at 6. On March 15, 2022, Chaplain Ang issued a second religious diet violation, this time for informed that, unless he voluntarily withdrew from the RMAP diet, he would be expelled from the RMAP diet if he continued to purchase non-Islamic foods. Dkt. No. 17 at 7. Plaintiff’s inability to supplement the RMAP diet with items from the prison canteen has resulted in light-headedness, lethargy, and brain fog. Dkt. No. 17 at 7. The Court has found that the operative complaint states cognizable claims against Muslim chaplain Clerk Muhammed (K. Fasih) and Christian chaplain Jackson for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment’s free exercise clause, the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and RLUIPA when they conditioned his ability to receive a GMO-free diet, which is mandated by his religion, on giving up ramen soups needed to maintain his health because of the deficiencies in the GMO-free diet provided via RMAP, yet allowed Jewish and Muslim inmates to receive meals consistent with their religious beliefs without imposing additional requirements. See generally Dkt. No. 13. Defendant Jackson has since retired. Dkt. No. 20-1 at 4. II. Legal Standard The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts the power of the court to grant prospective relief in any action involving prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). Section 3626(a)(2) permits the court to enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction “to the extent otherwise authorized by law” but requires that such an order “be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The court must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” Id. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (noting that such remedies are extraordinary, and not granted as of right). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. City of San sliding scale, such that where there are only ’serious questions going to the merits’—that is, less than a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’—a preliminary injunction may still issue so long as ’the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor’ and the other two factors are satisfied.” Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)). Even where the balance tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, however, the plaintiff must still make the threshold showing of likely success on the merits or a serious legal question. See Leyva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven certainty of irreparable harm has never entitled one to a stay.”) (emphasis in original). In addition, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is at the discretion of the district court. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co.

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