Harris v. Bourgeois

272 So. 2d 44
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 15, 1973
Docket5110
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 272 So. 2d 44 (Harris v. Bourgeois) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Bourgeois, 272 So. 2d 44 (La. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

272 So.2d 44 (1973)

Mrs. Bessie Fox HARRIS
v.
Clyde BOURGEOIS, Jr.

No. 5110.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

January 15, 1973.

*45 Craig J. Cimo, Gretna, for plaintiff-appellant.

Perrin C. Butler, N. Buckner Barkley, Jr., New Orleans, and Louis H. Marrero, IV, Marrero, for third party defendant-appellee.

Midlo & Lehmann, Rene Lehmann, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before REGAN, BOUTALL, and BAILES, JJ.

BOUTALL, Judge.

Plaintiff brought a possessory action seeking damages for the disturbance of her possession of a certain strip of land and further praying for judgment ordering defendant to assert any adverse claim of *46 ownership he may have in accordance with article 3662 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant filed an answer admitting the disturbance of possession complained of but asserted that he was the owner of the property in question by virtue of an acquisition from Marrero Land and Improvement Association, Ltd. He later filed a supplemental answer, reconventional demand and third party demand in which he reasserted the allegations of the original answer, set up his chain of title to the property in question and asked for judgment in reconvention against plaintiff decreeing defendant to be the sole owner of the property. Additionally, in a third party demand, he avers that he expended $36,000.00 in expenses, and called his predecessor in title in warranty in the alternative seeking damages against it to that extent. Thereafter plaintiff filed an answer to the reconventional demand in which she set up her chain of title to the property in question. The third party defendant, Marrero Land and Improvement Association, Ltd., answered averring that it transferred good title to the original defendant, and that additionally, he accepted and approved the encroachments on the property, if any there were. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, recognizing her to be the owner of the property, and awarding damages in the amount of $1,000.00 against the defendant. The court further rendered judgment dismissing the third party demand. The defendant appeals from the adverse judgment.

The record shows that there is no dispute as to the titles involved; that plaintiff, Mrs. Bassie Fox Harris, is the owner of lot 7 of Robinson Avenue Subdivision, and that defendant, Clyde V. Bourgeois, Jr., is the owner of lot 8 of Robinson Avenue Subdivision. The basic dispute is as to the location or placement of these lots, which are 45 feet in width and adjoin each other. There is a 12 foot strip in the area of the common property line which is claimed by each of the parties to be a portion of his respective lot. This strip of ground actually measures 11 and 2/10ths feet front and 12 and 8/10ths feet in the rear. In addition to her claim of title ownership of the property in question, Mrs. Harris claims ownership by virtue of the acquisitive prescription of 30 years.

The area in question is an old subdivision, apparently created around 1902. Plaintiff's uncle, Irvin Wallace, acquired lot 7 in 1904 and shortly thereafter constructed a house which still stands upon the premises. At this time the Marrero Land and Improvement Association, Ltd., (hereinafter called Marrero Land) owned the adjoining lot 8 and at some later date, constructed a rental house upon the premises. This house remained in existence for many years until the property was acquired by Mr. Bourgeois, the present owner of lot 8. The present conflict did not come into being until sometime during 1965 when Mr. Bourgeois sought to purchase the property from Marrero Land and a survey was made which showed the existing fence belonging to lot 7 to be some 12 feet upon lot 8. The issue as presented to the trial court, and to us on appeal, is whether the dividing line between lot 7 and lot 8 is correctly placed on the survey by Gilbert & Kelly, dated September 27, 1960 (as proposed by Mrs. Harris) or whether the line is correctly placed on the survey of J. J. Perret, dated May 10, 1965 (as proposed by Mr. Bourgeois).

All of the surveyors testified that this was an extremely difficult area within which to make a survey, both because of the lack of reference points, and because of some confusion arising out of older surveys. However, the basic difference between them is that in locating the property in question, both used the railroad tracks within the Southern Pacific Railroad right-of-way as a reference point, the difference being that one surveyor considered the center line of the southernmost tracks to be the proper starting point and the other considered the center line of the northernmost tracks, some 12½ feet away, to be the proper starting point. *47 This distance between the center line of the two railroads tracks accounts for the major difference in their survey.

The plaintiff's surveyor, Mr. Kelly, testified that he used 3 old base surveys of Zander dated 1902, 1909 and 1915, in conducting his survey. Although he was not able to determine from the surveys exactly which track was used by Mr. Zander, he did manage to locate an iron pipe which was located on the boundary line between lot 10 and lot 11. The importance of this pipe is that all of the lots from 10 downward comprise what is called Old Robinson Subdivision comprised of 45 foot lots, and all of the lots from 11 upward, are the new Robinson Subdivision comprised of 40 foot lots. Using this pipe as his starting point he measured back towards the railroad track and determined that the proper track to use was the center line of the southernmost track. He surveyed and placed plaintiff's lot 7 in accordance with this method of computation.

As opposed to this, Mr. Perret testified that the method he used was to attempt to discover any old pipes or markers that had previously been used, and that he eventually discovered a monument which apparently marked the southern line of the right-of-way of the Southern Pacific Railroad where it intersected the northeastern boundary line of the Justice Tract, which point should be coincident with the intersection of the northwest line of the Old Robinson Subdivision. Using this monument as a starting point, he determined that the northernmost track was the proper track to use, and hence started his survey from the northernmost track, and placed lot 8 accordingly.

It is important to note that none of the experts could testify exactly as to the width of the right-of-way of the Southern Pacific Railroad, nor could it be determined whether there were one or two tracks in existence at the time of the Zander survey, or which track, for that matter, that Zander may have used some 50 years before.

The trial judge was impressed with the explanation of surveyor Kelly, and so found. We cannot disturb his findings unless there is manifest error, and we find none here. In fact, it appears to us that the houses in this subdivision were probably all built upon the same premise as Mr. Kelly, used inasmuch as there would be only one house, that is, the first from the railroad track, which would encroach upon a neighboring lot if we accept his survey as correct. On the other hand, if we accept the survey of Mr. Perret, there would be four other houses, in addition to the first house, which would be encroaching upon other lots. We feel that this condition comes within the principles announced in the case of Provosty v. Clark, 11 La.App. 147, 119 So. 763 (La.App.Orl., 1929), and we consider this to be an additional reason to establish the correctness of the judgment below. That case contains the following language:

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272 So. 2d 44, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-bourgeois-lactapp-1973.