Harris v. Banks (In Re Banks)

443 B.R. 708, 2011 WL 379457
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJanuary 25, 2011
Docket14-50957
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 443 B.R. 708 (Harris v. Banks (In Re Banks)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris v. Banks (In Re Banks), 443 B.R. 708, 2011 WL 379457 (Va. 2011).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

ROSS W. KRUMM, Bankruptcy Judge.

A hearing was held on January 11, 2011 to consider Robert M. Harris’s (hereafter the “Movant”) Motion for Entry of Order for a Notice of Assets (hereafter the “Motion”). Both the Debtor and Mr. Harris appeared pro se. The Chapter 7 Trustee did not appear. After considering the Motion and the statements of the Movant and the Debtor in court, the Court finds that the Motion constitutes an Objection to Debtor’s Claim of Exemption which is governed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b). The Motion challenges *710 the homestead exemption in garnished wages and the Debtor’s 2010 Federal Tax Return. Having considered the pleadings, exhibits, and statements of the parties the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Facts

Facts Pertaining to the Garnished Wages

On August 3, 2010 the Movant filed a garnishment summons in which he sought to garnish the Debtor’s wages to satisfy a judgment awarded to him by the City of Roanoke General District Court. The garnishment summons was served upon the Debtor’s employer, Wachovia Bank. Wachovia Bank, through its agent ADP Garnishment Services (hereafter “ADP”), began garnishing the Debtor’s wages in accordance with the garnishment summons. The return date for the garnishment summons was November 30, 2010.

ADP withheld two payments pursuant to the August 3, 2010 garnishment summons. The first was for. $208.90 and shows a payment date of November 15, 2010. The second withholding was for $303.29. Both withholdings were made by ADP. 1 Although the Debtor lists November 26, 2010, in her Statement of Financial Affairs as the date of payment of the $303.29 check, said check was not introduced into evidence. 2

After her filing, the Debtor filed a homestead deed under Virginia law and listed the $303.29 check. 3 The Movant asserts that this exemption was improperly taken. The Movant also asserts that the $208.90 check is his property.

Discussion

The Garnished Wages

The two issues for decision with respect to the Debtor’s garnished wages are (1) whether the Debtor is entitled to an exemption in either the $208.90 garnishment withholding or the $303.29 garnishment withholding; and (2) if the Debtor is not entitled to an exemption in, either, whether they constitute property of the estate for administration by the Chapter 7 Trustee.

I. Debtors’ Exemption in the Garnished Wages

Wilson v. Virginia National Bank, 214 Va. 14, 15, 196 S.E.2d 920, 921 (1973) holds that Va.Code § 34-17(B) allows a debtor to file a homestead deed exempting garnished funds from claims of creditors so long as the homestead deed is filed before a court “orders the payment of money by the garnishees to the judgment creditor at a hearing of the garnishment proceedings.” This has been interpreted to mean that Va.Code § 34-17(B) allows a debtor to file a homestead deed exempting garnished funds so long as the homestead deed is filed before the return date. In re Smith, 45 B.R. 100 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1984). *711 Upon the return date, however, any non-exempted funds are no longer the property of the debtor and therefore, are subject to execution by the creditor. In re Partridge, 263 B.R. 755 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2001) and Wilson, 214 Va. at 15, 196 S.E.2d 920.

Generally, courts are to interpret statutes creating debtor’s exemptions liberally in favor of the debtor. Mayer v. Quy Van Nguyen, 211 F.3d 105 (4th Cir.2000). However, there are certain statutes pertaining to exemptions which must be accorded strict interpretation. Homeowner’s Fin. Corp. v. Pennington, 47 B.R. 322 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1985). Among those statutes accorded strict interpretation is Va.Code § 34-17(A). Id. In the context of bankruptcy, should the Debtor fail to comply with the time limitations of Va. Code § 34-17(A) the Debtor’s property remains property of the estate and subject to administration by the Chapter 7 Trustee for the benefit of the creditors. 4 In the case at bar, the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition on November 24, 2010, preceded the November 30, 2010, the state court return date of the garnishment summons. November 30, 2010 arrived and the Debtor had not filed a homestead deed pursuant to Va.Code § 34-17(B). However, the debtor filed her homestead deed on December 13, 2010 claiming an exemption in the $303.29 withholding. When she filed her homestead deed the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 was in place due to the Debtor’s filing of her petition for relief on November 24, 2010. As a result of the automatic stay the City of Roanoke General District Court did not enter an order of pay over of either the $208.90 or the $303.29 garnished funds (collectively the “Garnished Funds”) on the return date, November 30, 2010. Thus, at the time of filing the Debtor’s Chapter 7, the Garnished Funds became property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541. See Footnote 7 infra.

The language of Va.Code § 34-17(B) addresses a non-bankruptcy claim of exemption in garnished wages and requires that the debtor file a “claim of homestead exemption ... after the garnishment summons is served on the employer but prior to or upon the return date of the garnishment summons ...” Thus, according to Va.Code § 34-17(B) there is a window of opportunity “to protect garnished wages” by “a claim of homestead exemption.” After the window closes the debtor loses the opportunity to protect the garnished wages. In this case, the return date terminating the debtors’ ability to protect garnished wages was scheduled to occur on November 30, 2010. However, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) was imposed on November 24, 2010 when the Debtor filed her petition. The filing stayed the “continuation ... of a judicial ... action ... against the debtor ... to recover a claim against the debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (West, 2010). On November 24, 2010, the operative effect of Va.Code § 34-17(B) was stayed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
443 B.R. 708, 2011 WL 379457, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-v-banks-in-re-banks-vawb-2011.