Harris, Patricia v. NASHVILLE CENTER FOR REHABILITATION AND HEALING

2020 TN WC 100
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedSeptember 28, 2020
Docket2019-06-1008
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 100 (Harris, Patricia v. NASHVILLE CENTER FOR REHABILITATION AND HEALING) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris, Patricia v. NASHVILLE CENTER FOR REHABILITATION AND HEALING, 2020 TN WC 100 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

FILED Sep 28, 2020 09:44 AM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

PATRICIA HARRIS, ) Employee, ) Docket No. 2019-06-1008 ) v. ) ) NASHVILLE CENTER FOR ) REHABILITATION AND HEALING, ) Employer, ) State File No. 31940-2019 ) and ) PENNSYLVANIA ) MANUFACTURERS INDEMNITY, ) CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker Carrier. )

COMPENSATION ORDER

Ms. Harris became injured at work while dodging a flying cockroach. Nashville Center for Rehabilitation and Healing (NCRH) denied the claim, asserting her injury was not compensable, as it did not arise primarily out of her employment. The Court held a compensation hearing on June 25, 2020, and reconvened for an attorney's fee hearing on August 10. Ms. Harris requested temporary and permanent disability benefits, past medical expenses, fees and discretionary costs. The Court holds Ms. Harris suffered a compensable injury that arose primarily out of her employment and orders NCRH to pay Ms. Harris temporary and permanent disability benefits and past medical expenses. The Court grants in part and denies in part her request for an attorney's fee and costs.

Factual Background

This case concerns a fall at work complicated by an aggressive cockroach. Patricia Harris worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at NCRH. During rounds on April 25, 2019, a large cockroach flew into her face as she walked down the hall. Taken by surprise,

1 Ms. Harris tried to deflect and dodge the offending insect and slipped and fell, breaking her right wrist. She went to the emergency room and received stabilizing treatment. The discharge records returned her to regular duty while wearing a splint.

After NCRH denied the claim, Ms. Harris, using her private insurance, began treating on her own with Dr. Jane Siegel. She first saw Dr. Siegel on May 3. Dr. Siegel confirmed a fractured wrist. She placed Ms. Harris in another splint, instructed her not to use the arm at work, and scheduled a return visit in two weeks.

When Ms. Harris returned, Dr. Siegel decided to surgically repair the wrist. She scheduled the surgery for May 21 and ordered Ms. Harris to remain off work until seen post-operatively. Ms. Harris returned for her post-operative appointment on May 31, and Dr. Siegel noted normal healing. Later, she released Ms. Harris with a one percent impairment rating to the body as a whole.

While NCRH disputed the compensability of Ms. Harris's mJury, the parties stipulated to many pertinent facts and legal conclusions. These included medical causation, the one percent impairment rating, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical treatment, and Ms. Harris' s weekly compensation rate of $450.77. Therefore, three legal issues remained: compensability, temporary disability benefits, and the request for an attorney's fee and discretionary costs.

NCRH denied the compensability of Ms. Harris's claim based on the argument that her injury did not arise primarily out of her employment because the flying cockroach was not a workplace hazard.

While no evidence suggested that the hospital had a cockroach infestation, Ms. Harris, the only testifying witness, said she saw roaches often in the hospital, including crawling in patients' beds. Further, she said that employees could file maintenance requests about roach or insect problems, but she produced no requests.

On the issue of temporary disability benefits, NCRH denied owing any benefits based on the asserted non-compensability of the claim. However, it alternatively argued for limiting these benefits because Ms. Harris was not totally incapacitated from working for the entire period she alleged.

Ms. Harris requested payment of temporary disability benefits from May 17 to September 6, 2019. At her deposition, Dr. Siegel said Ms. Harris could not do her "regular job" over this period. However, Dr. Siegel said she would have placed Ms. Harris on "one- handed duty" if she were a workers' compensation patient and allowed NCRH to decide whether to offer work under the restriction. She further stated that she normally kept patients with similar symptoms off work from the date of the surgery until the post- operative visit.

2 For her part, Ms. Harris said Dr. Siegel took her off work initially, then placed her on light duty. However, Ms. Harris said that NCRH had no light duty and tried to "make up" a position for her. According to Ms. Harris, Dr. Siegel took her off work completely when she learned ofNCRH's actions. When asked whether Dr. Siegel took her off work completely from "May to September," she said yes.

The medical records also addressed work restrictions and Ms. Harris' s work status. A medical record from May 17 ordered that Ms. Harris remain off work from that date until her post-operative appointment on May 31. The May 31 medical note made no mention of work restrictions. An office note from August 2, however, provided that Ms. Harris should continue therapy and was "still not ready to return to work." A September 6 office note stated Ms. Harris may return to full duty on September 10.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Ms. Harris requested temporary and permanent partial disability benefits as well as continuing medical care for her wrist. To prevail in this request, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her wrist injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2019); Panzarella v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. E2017-01135-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 244, at *8 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel May 16, 2018).

An injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment only if the employee shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(B)-(D). An injury occurs "in the course of' employment if it takes place while the employee was performing a duty he or she was employed to perform. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. 1993). The "in the course of employment" requirement focuses on the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg. Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). As Ms. Harris was making rounds by walking the hall during her shift, the course and scope requirement is easily satisfied. The dispute turns on whether her injury arose primarily out of her employment.

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that "[a]n accidental injury arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between the working conditions and the resulting injury." Fritts v. Safety Nat'! Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Phillips v. A&H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tenn. 2004)). This causal connection is based in rationality, so Ms. Harris must prove a rational link between the accident and the conditions of her work to establish liability. See Hill, at 487 (citing Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991)).

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Related

Wilhelm v. Krogers
235 S.W.3d 122 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2007)
Fritts v. Safety National Casualty Corp.
163 S.W.3d 673 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2005)
Phillips v. A&H Const. Co., Inc.
134 S.W.3d 145 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2004)
Fink v. Caudle
856 S.W.2d 952 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
Hill v. Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc.
942 S.W.2d 483 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1997)
Langford v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
854 S.W.2d 100 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc.
803 S.W.2d 672 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1991)
Wilkes v. Resource Authority of Sumner County
932 S.W.2d 458 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1996)
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519 S.W.2d 395 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-patricia-v-nashville-center-for-rehabilitation-and-healing-tennworkcompcl-2020.