Harris Hospital v. Pope

520 S.W.2d 813, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 2488
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 7, 1975
Docket17584
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 520 S.W.2d 813 (Harris Hospital v. Pope) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris Hospital v. Pope, 520 S.W.2d 813, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 2488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION

BREWSTER, Justice.

Harris Hospital initiated this litigation by suing James L. Pope and wife, Barbara Pope, for a hospital bill of $6,179.45.

Barbara Pope and husband, James L. Pope, filed an answer and a counter claim against Harris Hospital seeking damages for personal injuries that Mrs. Pope sustained while a patient in the intensive care unit of the hospital. The Popes’ contention was that the negligence of hospital employees proximately caused Mrs. Pope’s injuries.

In their amended counter claim the Popes admitted that the charges as alleged by Harris Hospital in the sum of $6,179.45 were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Popes in the treatment of injuries that Mrs. Pope sustained, and that they owed the hospital that sum for the treatment of her injuries and that the hospital would be entitled to an offset of that sum on the damages that they contended the hospital owed the Popes.

In view of this admission, the Popes were treated throughout the trial as the plaintiffs and Harris Hospital as the defendant. At the conclusion of a jury trial judgment was rendered for the Popes for $242,023.30 in damages, and Harris Hospital has appealed.

We reverse and render.

Mrs. Pope’s injuries were self-inflicted in that the undisputed evidence shows that she opened a window and screen in the intensive care unit on the second floor of the hospital and crawled out onto the narrow window ledge and either fell or jumped from there to the ground, and thus sustained her injuries.

The only two grounds of negligence of the hospital employees that were found by the jury to have proximately caused Mrs. Pope’s injuries were: (1) Harris Hospital, acting through its employees and nurses on duty in its Intensive Care Unit, failed to exercise ordinary care to keep a lookout for the care and safety of Barbara Pope (Special Issue No. 1); and (2) Harris Hospital, acting through its employees and nurses on duty in its Intensive Care Unit, failed to report to Dr. Coers, as Barbara *815 Pope’s attending physician, her elevated pulse rate prior to the occasion when she fell (Special Issue No. 3).

Defendant’s first point of error is that the trial court erred in this case in overruling its motion for a directed verdict and its motion for judgment non obstante vere-dicto.

Defendant argues its first ten points of error together. It therein contends that as a matter of law it is not liable to the plaintiffs under the undisputed facts of this case. Defendant under those points of error also contends that there was no evidence and insufficient evidence to support the submission of the negligence and proximate cause issues above referred to and the jury’s answers thereto. Defendant in those points further contends that each of the jury’s answers to those four issues (negligence and proximate cause) are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

We sustain all of those contentions.

The law in Texas that is applicable to and controls the disposition of this case is set out in the case of Bornmann v. Great Southwest General Hospital, Inc., 453 F.2d 616 (5th Circuit, 1971) as follows at page 621: “Simply stated, a hospital is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard the patient from any known or reasonably apprehensible danger from himself and to exercise such reasonable care for his safety as his mental and physical condition, if known, may require. Liability exists only if the suicide proximately results from the negligence of the hospital or its employees. The most important single factor in determining the liability of a hospital for failing to prevent the suicide of a patient is whether the hospital authorities in the circumstances, could reasonably have anticipated, that the patient might harm himself." (Emphasis supplied.)

We hold that the rule just referred to controls the disposition of this case regardless of whether Mrs. Pope’s conduct that caused harm to herself was done knowingly or unknowingly. In other words, even if Mrs. Pope crawled out the window and fell or jumped to her injury at a time when her mind was in a state of confusion, or at a time when she was having hallucinations, or at a time when she was having a temporary fit of insanity that had not been previously displayed, the defendant’s liability in the case would still be determined by an application of the rule referred to. See Harris v. Woman’s Hospital, 14 N.Y.S. 881 (Ct. of Com.Pleas, 1891); Edwards v. Grace Hospital Soc., 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944); Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 196 S.W. 104 (Ct. of App., Mo., 1917); and Breeze v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 264 Mo. 258, 174 S.W. 409 (1915).

The Bornmann case, supra, also announced that the following instruction is a correct pronouncement of the law that is involved in a case such as this: “ ‘You are instructed that a hospital which undertakes to care for a paying patient, and to supervise and look after him, is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill ordinarily used by a hospital of the same general type in the same or a similar community in which such hospital is located at the time in question under the same or similar circumstances, in caring for and attending the patient as the patient’s condition, as it is known to be, may require. You are instructed that this duty extends to safeguarding and protecting the patient from any known or reasonably apparent danger from himself, which may arise from his known mental or physical incapacity,

The undisputed evidence in this case showed that the assignment of one nurse to care for every two patients in an intensive care unit is consistent with good nursing care.

The undisputed evidence established the following facts: on the evening of January 3, 1970, Mrs. Pope and her husband were involved in an automobile wreck;

*816 Mrs. Pope sustained therein a badly fractured jaw; her jawbone and teeth were broken into several pieces which were pushed back and down in her neck; she was knocked unconscious for a period of time; a tracheotomy was performed on her in Cleburne, Texas, that evening; by 11 P.M. on January 3, 1970, Mrs. Pope had been transferred to and ádmitted as a patient in the defendant’s hospital in Fort Worth; she was placed in the intensive care unit of the hospital; Dr. Carl Richard Coers, III, a plastic surgeon, was the doctor in charge of her case; she was scheduled for an operation to repair her jawbone on the morning of January 8, 1970; that operation had been delayed by the doctors until then to permit the face swelling to subside; during her stay in the hospital Mrs. Pope’s doctor had not ordered her to be restrained in any way; at regular intervals during her stay she had been given by order of her doctor medicines to relieve her pain as well as antibiotics ; at 12:45 A.M. on the morning of January 8, 1970, Mrs.

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520 S.W.2d 813, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 2488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-hospital-v-pope-texapp-1975.