Harris, Charles v. General Motors

2015 TN WC 162
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 6, 2015
Docket2015-06-0603
StatusPublished

This text of 2015 TN WC 162 (Harris, Charles v. General Motors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harris, Charles v. General Motors, 2015 TN WC 162 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

Charles Harris ) Docket No.: 2015-06-0603 Employee, ) v. ) State File No.: 62440-2014 General Motors ) Employer, ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker And ) Sedgwick CMS ) Carrier/TPA. )

________________________________________________________________________

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND MEDICAL BENEFITS

THIS CAUSE came to be heard before the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge upon the Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Charles Harris, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. Harris seeks medical care and temporary disability benefits related to a right-ankle injury. The employer, General Motors, LLC, disputes whether Mr. Harris’ ankle injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. Based on the evidence before it at this time, the Court finds Mr. Harris is unlikely to succeed in proving causation at a Compensation Hearing and denies his request for temporary disability and medical benefits.

History of Claim

Mr. Harris is a fifty-eight-year-old resident of Williamson County, Tennessee, and employed by General Motors, LLC (GM) for more than thirty years. He suffers from a hereditary condition called pes cavus. He also suffered an ankle sprain on April 23, 2013. (Ex. 4.) Dr. Arthur, whose first name is not contained in the record, diagnosed peroneal tendonitis. Id. An MRI of his ankle revealed minimal degenerative change; he last treated for the condition on July 17, 2013. Id.

Mr. Harris claimed an injury to his right ankle while participating in post-surgery physical therapy for a work-related, right-knee injury. (Ex. 1.) Dr. Randall Davidson, Mr. Harris’ authorized treating physician for his right-knee injury, released him from further treatment for his knee on October 29, 2014. (Ex. 3.) The treatment note from October 29 also stated the following:

His right ankle needs to be treated. I have placed him in an ASO brace. He will speak with workman’s comp about getting an appointment and decide if it needs to be billed under his old injury or this new one. His ankle was doing well until it flared up during physical therapy. I do not have his old records but will arrange to have them sent to me. I suspect this is a new injury.

On November 19, 2014, Dr. Davidson assessed peroneal tendinitis and pes cavus. He opined Mr. Harris suffered an ankle strain during physical therapy that caused his previously diagnosed peroneal tendonitis to flare up. (Ex. 4.) In a January 9, 2015 letter, Dr. Davidson noted that Mr. Harris had an MRI following his 2013 ankle injury and characterized the results as “unremarkable.” Id. He went on to state, “But, he gives me no other history of injury other than what happened in physical therapy that would suggests [sic] another etiology of his present symptoms.” Id.

Mr. Harris underwent another MRI on January 9, 2015. (Ex. 12.) The MRI results revealed a small effusion and “focal grade 3 to 4 chondromalacia involving the medial tibial plafond. Findings suggest an old injury at this location.” Id. The MRI revealed “no acute fracture or unstable osteochondral lesions.” Id.

Initially, GM accepted the ankle injury claim because Dr. Davidson opined Mr. Harris injured his right ankle during physical therapy for his knee. (Ex. 4.) On May 13, 2015, Dr. Davidson recommended surgery under workers’ compensation to correct the right-ankle condition. However, GM’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier denied the surgery request. Mr. Harris proceeded with surgery under his personal insurance.

In his operation report, Dr. Davidson noted that Mr. Harris’ peroneal longus tendon was severely diseased and had ruptured requiring a tendon transfer. (Ex. 7.) Dr. Davidson’s medical record of July 8, 2015, stated, “WC DOI: 07/23/2014 Patient was doing ankle raises during PT and ruptured a tendon.” (Ex. 8.)

GM denied Mr. Harris’ physical therapy caused his right-ankle injury. A Star Physical Therapy record dated October 2, 2014, indicated that Mr. Harris reported his lateral ankle hurt from “walking different.” (Ex. 10.) Additionally, Mr. Harris filed forms with the Bureau alleging a right-ankle injury occurred on April 23, 2013, when he stepped in a hole at work. (Ex. 11.)

Mr. Harris’ MRI of January 9, 2015, showed only a small ankle effusion, which

2 suggested an old injury with no evidence of a fracture or unstable osteochondral lesion. (Ex. 12.) GM argued this MRI supported its contention that Mr. Harris’ tendon rupture occurred after January 9, 2015, and not during physical therapy in October 2014 as he alleged.

Mr. Harris filed a Petition for Benefit Determination seeking temporary disability benefits and medical benefits. (T.R. 1.) The parties did not resolve the disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediation Specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice. (T.R. 2.) The Court conducted an Expedited Hearing on October 20, 2015.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

I. GM’s Motion to Exclude Medical Records

GM objected to the introduction of Mr. Harris’ medical records at the Expedited Hearing. GM argued that, although it had copies of most of the medical records Mr. Harris sought to introduce, Mr. Harris failed to notify GM of the exact records he intended to rely upon. For that reason, GM asked the Court to exclude the medical records. The Court respectfully denies GM’s request with respect to all the records except for one.

The rules governing mediation and hearing procedures provide the following: “All motions for expedited hearing must be accompanied by affidavits and any other information demonstrating that the employee is entitled to temporary disability or medical benefits.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(1)(a) (2015). The Court interprets this rule to require that a party must provide copies of any medical records it intends to present at an Expedited Hearing, except for those used for impeachment or rebuttal, to the opposing party prior the Expedited Hearing. Essentially, if the proffering party provided a copy of the medical record to the objecting party concurrently with, or prior to, filing the Request for Expedited Hearing, the medical record is admissible if authenticated by the signature, or electronic signature, of the doctor.

GM agreed that it received the medical records Mr. Harris submitted as proof prior to the hearing except for Exhibit 9, Dr. Davidson’s July 27, 2015 medical records addendum. GM did not stipulate to admission of the records but, with the exception Exhibit 9, there are no grounds for exclusion. For that reason, the Court denies GM’s motion to exclude the medical records proffered by Mr. Harris with the exception of Exhibit 9.

Regarding Exhibit 9, the Court finds that Mr. Harris did not present a copy of this record to GM prior to the hearing. Further, Mr. Harris did not submit a certificate from the doctor’s office authenticating the record, and the record is unsigned. (Ex. 9.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Harris failed to give GM appropriate notice of the

3 record, and the record does not meet the requirements for admissibility in an Expedited Hearing. For these reasons, the Court excludes Exhibit 9.1

II. Mr. Harris Failed to Demonstrate a Likelihood of Success On the Merits at Trial

The Workers’ Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014).

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2015 TN WC 162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harris-charles-v-general-motors-tennworkcompcl-2015.