Harrington v. Laney

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1071
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-1071

Filed 15 October 2025

Anson County, No. 22CVS000390-030

ROBERT TERRY HARRINGTON, Plaintiff,

v.

CURTIS WAYNE LANEY, CYNTHIA ROWELL LANEY, and the ESTATE of DANIEL HEDGEPETH, Defendants.

Appeal by defendants from judgment entered 24 May 2024 and order entered

20 June 2024 by Judge Matthew B. Smith in Anson County Superior Court. Heard

in the Court of Appeals 10 June 2025.

Taylor Law Group, by William Taylor, for plaintiff-appellee.

Crow Law Firm, PLLC, by Harry B. Crow, Jr., for defendants-appellants.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

This case arises from a dispute over property ownership. Plaintiff contests

certain land conveyances, alleging the conveyances are invalid because the person

purportedly having power of attorney over the property owner lacked the power to

convey the property. Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute

of limitations, we reverse the trial court’s decision. HARRINGTON V. LANEY

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

In September 2022, Plaintiff Robert Terry Harrington initiated an action for

quiet title against Defendants Curtis Laney and Cynthia Laney alleging the deed

that conveyed their current residence (the “Property”) to them was invalid because

Defendant Curtis Laney lacked the legal authority to deed himself the Property.

More than six years earlier, on 24 June 2016, Plaintiff’s parents executed an

agreement naming Curtis Laney and Daniel Hedgepeth (now deceased) as their

attorneys in fact (the “POA agreement”). Shortly after executing the POA agreement,

Plaintiff’s parents executed a deed conveying the Property to Defendant Curtis

Laney. In September 2016, Plaintiff’s father passed.

In 2018, Defendants conveyed the Property back to Plaintiff’s mother. That

same day, Defendant Curtis Laney acting on behalf of Plaintiff’s mother executed a

deed granting a remainder interest in the Property to himself and his wife (the “2018

deed”). Defendant Curtis Laney executed this last deed using his purported authority

under the 2016 POA agreement.

On 26 June 2019, Plaintiff’s mother died, whereupon Defendants took

ownership of the property under the 2018 deed.

In September 2022, Plaintiff filed this action claiming that he is the rightful

owner of his mother’s Property. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the 2018 deed

executed through the 2016 POA agreement was void because his mother lacked the

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necessary mental capacity to execute the 2016 POA agreement and the POA was,

otherwise, fraudulently obtained by Defendants. Plaintiff presented the following

evidence at trial to support his claim: Plaintiff’s mother mis-initialed the 2016 POA,

she was of “advanced age,” Defendant Curtis Laney was caring for her financial and

health needs, she had recently undergone abdominal surgery around the time of the

2016 POA, she could not drive, she was in nursing homes around 2015 with dementia,

and she could no longer live alone in 2018 because of cognitive issues.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding Plaintiff’s mother did

not possess the requisite mental capacity to execute the 2016 POA. Based on this

verdict, the trial court entered judgment, ordering the 2018 conveyances to Defendant

Curtis Laney invalid. Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

or, alternatively, a new trial. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion.

Defendants appeal.

II. Analysis

Defendants present the following issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in

presenting to the jury the issue of Plaintiff’s mother’s capacity to execute the 2016

POA agreement; (2) considering the jury instructions, the answers to issues two

through five are invalid; (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims,

as they were barred by the statute of limitations; and (4) the trial court erred in failing

to submit the issue of laches to the jury.

We first address Defendants’ statute of limitations argument.

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Defendants pleaded the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to

Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims center on fraud and,

accordingly, the three-year statute of limitations for fraud should apply. See N.C.G.S.

§ 1-52(9). Plaintiff disagrees as to where the core of his claims lies. He contends “the

claims were based on quiet title and the powers of attorney as a contract” which are

subject to other statutes of limitations.

We have held that “[t]here is no express statute of limitations governing

actions to quiet title under [N.C.G.S.] § 41-10. It is thus necessary to refer to

plaintiffs’ underlying theory of relief to determine which statute, if any, applies.”

Walter v. Walter, 275 N.C. App. 956, 966 (2020).

In this case, Plaintiff’s argument at its core hinges on the validity of the June

2016 POA agreement. This Court has held that “there is, as a general matter, little

reason to draw distinctions between powers of attorney and contracts.” O’Neal v.

O’Neal, 254 N.C. App. 309, 312 (2017) (citation omitted). Thus, at its core, Plaintiff’s

claim is a contract claim, and claims arising out of contract must be brought within

three years of the time the cause of action accrues. N.C.G.S. § 1-52(1). Whether the

cause of action accrued when the POA was executed on 24 June 2016 or when

Defendant’s became the owner of the Property upon the death of Plaintiff’s mother in

June 2019, Plaintiff did not bring this action within three years of either date, having

commenced this action in September 2022.

Plaintiff also asserts his claims should fall under either N.C.G.S § 1-38

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(pertaining to possession under color of title) or N.C.G.S. § 1-47 (pertaining to validity

of deeds). Neither statute, though, reach the heart of this matter (i.e., the contract

claim). Thus, neither is the appropriate statute to apply to Plaintiff’s claims.

Further, Plaintiff argues, even if a three-year statute of limitations is applied,

his claims should not be barred due to potential disabilities Plaintiff and his mother

endured. Pursuant to our state’s “survivor statute,” if a person entitled to bring an

action dies before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, an action

may be commenced by his or her personal representative within one year of the death.

N.C.G.S. § 1-22. Presuming the three-year statute applicable to his mother’s claim

was tolled due to his mother’s incapacity before her death, Plaintiff had only one year

after her death (until 26 June 2020) to file a claim on her behalf. But Plaintiff did

not bring suit until 21 September 2022, more than two years past the deadline.

Plaintiff also argues the one-year deadline should have been tolled due to his own

incapacity. However, the survivor statute does not designate any one person in

particular—such as an heir, like Plaintiff—as the sole representative responsible for

bringing a decedent’s claim. See N.C.G.S. § 1-22. And no representative brought

Plaintiff’s mother’s claim within a year following her death.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment because Plaintiff failed to bring his

claims within the applicable statute of limitations. Because we reverse the trial

court’s ruling on statute of limitations grounds, we need not address Defendants’

remaining arguments.

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REVERSED.

Judges MURRY and FREEMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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