Harrington v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n

205 N.W. 116, 232 Mich. 101, 1925 Mich. LEXIS 821
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 1, 1925
DocketDocket No. 4.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 205 N.W. 116 (Harrington v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrington v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 205 N.W. 116, 232 Mich. 101, 1925 Mich. LEXIS 821 (Mich. 1925).

Opinion

Steere, J.

On May 8, 1917, plaintiff’s decedent, John C. Vogel, lost his life in a fire which partially consumed a moving picture theatre known as the Crown Theatre, located in the village of Red Jacket, Houghton county, Michigan, of which he was owner and manager. He held an accident insurance policy issued to him by defendant under the terms of which a maximum death loss of $5,000 was provided with certain conditions and limitations, that involved here being:

“The insurance provided for loss by accidental means shall not exceed: * * * (2) Five Hundred Dollars ($500) if the loss be caused by (a) * * * (6) Asphyxiation by any kind of gas:” * * *

Plaintiff as Vogel’s administrator presented to defendant proof of death loss claiming the full sum of $5,000 named in the policy, which defendant declined to pay, contending that Vogel’s death was caused by asphyxiation by gas and offered to pay the sum of $500 as provided in the policy for death so occasioned. Plaintiff refused to accept tender of that amount and brought suit on the policy. Defendant pleaded issuably in denial of the amount claimed, but admitted a liability of $500 and offered to pay that amount. Reversal in defendant’s favor of a previous judg *103 ment in this case will be found in 210 Mich. 327. A new trial was granted for the reason that the trial court had erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendant to show deceased’s death resulted from asphyxiation by gas. On the trial the facts were mostly stipulated and the evidence practically undisputed except that relating to the cause of death.

The theatre was in a brick building about 98 feet long and 22 feet wide with a flat roof composed of wood covered by a-composition of tar and felt. The stage was at the west end and the operating rooms at the east end of the building. There was a bed-room 12 or 15 feet square on the same floor and level with the operating rooms, located about 78 feet from the stage on the south side of the east end of the building, partitioned off with pine or hemlock ceiling and unplastered. Vogel was sleeping in this room when the fire broke out. It started at about 6 p. m. in the dressing room under the stage near the southwest corner, burnt the stage drop and set curtains, wings and other things in that end, went up the wall and burnt through the roof and along it to the east. In its course it burned a small hole through the ceiling of the bed-room in which Vogel was sleeping, but otherwise there was no fire in that room although the products of combustion invaded it through the door, transom, ceiling, etc., filling it to such extent that Vogel apparently perished from their effects.

Before the case came on for trial the parties stipulated as to procedure:

“That if the defendant, either as a matter of law or by verdict of the jury, fails to establish its affirmative defense upon which it reserves the right to introduce testimony, the judgment of the court shall be in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), with interest and costs, but that if the defendant shall establish its affirmative defense of breach of warranty, and the court shall hold, as a matter of law, that the facts established constitute a *104 legal defense, then and in that event the judgment shall be in favor of the defendant, with the costs to be taxed, but if the defendant shall fail to establish its special defense of breach of warranty, or if, having established the facts, the court shall hold, as a matter of law, that the same does not constitute a complete ■ defense, and the defendant shall further establish that the death of plaintiff’s decedent was within the limitation set up and alleged as a further special defense, then and in that event, the court shall enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of five hundred dollars ($500), with.interest; the costs to be determined according to the state of the pleadings.”

When the case was called and the jury sworn defendant’s counsel admitted in open court as true every fact alleged in plaintiff’s declaration necessary to prove to entitle him to recover, stated that defendant relied solely on its affirmative defense under the second subdivision of the conditions in the policy for reduction of the loss to $500 and suggested that under Circuit Court Rule No. 42 defendant had the right to open and close the case. This was conceded and the court in explanation of the situation said to the jury:

“To put it in plain language, this insurance policy * * * contains a clause that if in case of loss by asphyxiation by any kind of gas, the recovery can only be $500, and the defense takes upon itself the affirmative proof that death was caused by asphyxiation by gas or gases, and will take the opening and closing, that is the only issue, practically, in the case. * * * If the defense fails to bring itself within the limitation, then the recovery would be under the other clause of the policy.”

Defendant’s counsel then made his opening statement to the jury and proceeded with the defense. At the close of the evidence both parties moved for a directed. verdict. The court announced the motions would be held for consideration under the Empson Act and submitted the case to the jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the maximum amount *105 of. the policy with interest. The court thereafter heard defendant’s motion for á judgment non obstante, which was denied and followed by a motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the great-weight of the evidence, which was also denied. Defendant brings the case to this court on numerous assignments of error.

To establish its contention defendant introduced documentary evidence of the cause of death, consisting of plaintiff’s proofs of loss served upon it containing.his own statement under oath that deceased was found dead in a burning building and the cause of his death was “suffocation,” an affidavit of the chief of the fire department saying that he found deceased lying on the floor near his bed and “the room was' filled with smoke and gas,” that he pulled him about five feet toward the window and then “had to rush for the open door to escape from death myself,” the attending physician’s statement under oath giving the cause of death as “suffocation from smoke” and his unsuccessful professional treatment “artificial respiration and oxygen, pulmotor,” a sworn statement of a “disinterested friend or neighbor” that the cause of death was “suffocated,” and a verified copy of the coroner’s certificate that the coroner’s jury found deceased “met his death by suffocation.” Also the record of death in the clerk’s office of Calumet township giving the cause as “suffocated by smoke and gas,” and a certified copy of death certificate on file with the State health department showing the cause of deceased’s death was “suffocated by smoke and gas on May 8, 1917.” This was followed by testimony of witnesses as to certain circumstances of the fire, and expert testimony relative to asphyxiation, as applied to the circumstances shown.

Defendant’s oral proofs showed that the fire was discovered by two men who were working on a picture *106

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
205 N.W. 116, 232 Mich. 101, 1925 Mich. LEXIS 821, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrington-v-interstate-business-mens-accident-assn-mich-1925.