Harrington v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 18, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-05159
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 KELLIE K. HARRINGTON,

10 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C19-5159-MAT

11 v. ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY 12 ANDREW M. SAUL, DISABILITY APPEAL Commissioner of Social Security, 13 Defendant. 14

15 Plaintiff Kellie K. Harrington proceeds through counsel in her appeal of a final decision of 16 the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner). After a hearing before 17 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application for Disability 18 Insurance Benefits (DIB). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record (AR), 19 and all memoranda, this matter is AFFIRMED. 20 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 21 Plaintiff was born on XXXX, 1971.1 She obtained her GED and previously worked as a 22

23 1 Dates of birth must be redacted to the year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2) and LCR 5.2(a)(1).

ORDER 1 bartender, cashier, waitress, deli worker, caterer helper, and babysitter. (AR 286, 958.) 2 Plaintiff filed SSI and DIB applications in October and November of 2011, alleging 3 disability beginning February 28, 2006. (AR 254, 261.) She remained insured for DIB through

4 June 30, 2009 and was required to establish disability on or prior to that “date last insured” (DLI) 5 to receive DIB. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.321. Her applications were denied initially and on 6 reconsideration. 7 ALJ Timothy Mangrum held a hearing, taking testimony from plaintiff and a vocational 8 expert (VE) (AR 29-53), and issued a decision dated October 29, 2013 (AR 12-23). He found a 9 June 29, 2009 decision by ALJ Catherine Lazuran denying 2006 SSI and DIB applications (see 10 AR 57-66) administratively final and the doctrine of res judicata to apply. However, considering 11 Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988), and Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 97-4(9), ALJ 12 Mangrum found the presumption of continuing non-disability resulting from the prior unfavorable 13 decision rebutted by new medical evidence and noted plaintiff had amended her alleged disability

14 onset date to June 30, 2009, the day after ALJ Lazuran’s decision. The ALJ thereafter concluded 15 plaintiff was not disabled from February 28, 2006 through the date of the decision. 16 Plaintiff timely appealed, the Appeals Council denied review (AR 1), and this Court 17 subsequently reversed and remanded based on a stipulation of the parties. (AR 681-82.) The 18 Appeals Council remanded the matter (AR 685-86) and ALJ Mangrum held another hearing, 19 taking testimony from plaintiff and a VE (AR 621-50). In a decision dated June 23, 2017, ALJ 20 Mangrum issued a partially favorable decision, finding plaintiff not disabled or entitled to DIB at 21 any time through her June 30, 2009 DLI, not disabled prior to October 31, 2011, the date of her 22 SSI application, but that plaintiff became disabled and entitled to SSI as of that date. (AR 605- 23 13.) Plaintiff appealed to this Court and, by Order dated August 29, 2018, the Court affirmed the

ORDER 1 finding of disability beginning October 31, 2011 and remanded for further administrative 2 proceedings in relation to plaintiff’s DIB claim, as described further below. (AR 993-1008.) 3 On remand, the Appeals Council affirmed the finding of disability as of October 31, 2011

4 and remanded the remaining matter to a different ALJ to take any further action needed to complete 5 the record and to issue a decision on the issue of disability before October 31, 2011. (AR 1014.) 6 On remand, ALJ Larry Kennedy did not find it necessary to hold a new hearing given that the only 7 issue was analysis of plaintiff’s DIB claim. (See AR 951.) In a December 27, 2018 decision, ALJ 8 Kennedy found plaintiff not disabled through her June 30, 2009 DLI. (AR 950-60.) Plaintiff 9 appealed this final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. 10 JURISDICTION 11 The Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 12 DISCUSSION 13 The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

14 whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2000). At step one, it must 15 be determined whether the claimant is gainfully employed. The ALJ found plaintiff had not 16 engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date through the DLI. 17 At step two, it must be determined whether a claimant suffers from a severe impairment. 18 The ALJ found, through the DLI, plaintiff had severe impairments of anxiety disorder, personality 19 disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder. Step three asks whether a claimant’s impairments meet or 20 equal a listed impairment. The ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a listing. 21 If the impairments do not meet or equal a listing, the Commissioner must assess RFC and 22 determine at step four whether the claimant has demonstrated an inability to perform past relevant 23 work. The ALJ found, through the DLI, plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at

ORDER 1 all exertional levels, but with the following non-exertional limitations: able to do work involving 2 simple, repetitive tasks and some detailed tasks; not involving much exercise of judgment or 3 decision making; involving minimal interaction with coworkers or supervisors and occasional to

4 minimal interaction with the public; and involving low pressure and infrequent changes in 5 activities. With that RFC, the ALJ found plaintiff unable to perform past relevant work. 6 If a claimant demonstrates an inability to perform past relevant work, or has no past 7 relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate at step five that the claimant 8 retains the capacity to make an adjustment to work that exists in significant levels in the national 9 economy. The ALJ found, through the DLI, plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations had little or no 10 effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels and a finding of not 11 disabled appropriate under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. The ALJ adopted the prior ALJ’s 12 RFC and vocational findings, including the ability to perform representative occupations such as 13 collator and garment sorter, and adopted and incorporated the finding plaintiff could perform jobs

14 existing in significant numbers in the national economy. He found plaintiff not under a disability 15 through the DLI. 16 This Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the decision is in 17 accordance with the law and the findings supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 18 whole. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). Accord Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 19 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We will set aside a denial of benefits only if the denial is unsupported 20 by substantial evidence in the administrative record or is based on legal error.”) Substantial 21 evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant 22 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Magallanes v. 23 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). If there is more than one rational interpretation, one of

ORDER 1 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the Court must uphold that decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 2 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly apply the rule of mandate or to adequately

4 explain how he was applying the doctrine of res judicata and Chavez/AR 97-4(9). She further 5 argues, for the period between the June 30, 2009 DLI and the finding of disability as of October 6 30, 2011, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence and her testimony or to properly 7 assess her RFC or render a finding at step five. She requests remand for an award of benefits or, 8 alternatively, further proceedings. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision has the support 9 of substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 10 Prior Court Decision 11 As previously described by the Court, ALJ Mangrum separately addressed plaintiff’s SSI 12 and DIB applications in the 2017 decision. “Considering SSI, the ALJ found plaintiff’s 13 impairments worsened as of her October 31, 2011 application date. He did not need to ‘determine

14 whether her impairments changed or worsened before then for the purpose of [the SSI] application 15 given that [SSI] benefits are not payable prior to her application date.’” (AR 1000 (citing AR 610; 16 20 C.F.R. § 416.335).) Finding medical opinions dated between 2012 and 2016 supported 17 plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her PTSD, ALJ Mangrum found the “evidence 18 established plaintiff had the capacity to perform a reduced range of sedentary work since October 19 2011, with significant difficulty maintaining adequate pace and attendance at work.” (Id.) In 20 addressing the DIB application, ALJ Mangrum “described the issue as centered on whether 21 plaintiff was disabled on her June 30, 2009 DLI, the day after the prior, final decision[]” finding 22 her not disabled. (Id.) ALJ Mangrum concluded plaintiff had not established she had new severe 23 impairments or the worsening of impairments the day after the June 2009 decision. (See AR 1001.)

ORDER 1 In challenging ALJ Mangrum’s 2017 decision, plaintiff argued the ALJ inaccurately 2 framed the issue as whether her condition worsened on June 30, 2009, and that the issue was 3 whether she provided new evidence showing she was more limited between that date and October

4 30, 2011 than she was found to be by ALJ Lazuran. (See AR 1002 (“That is, she did not need to 5 show her actual condition was worse on June 30th than it was on June 29th, but that it was worse 6 on June 30th than ALJ Lazarun found it to be on June 29th.”)) She maintained greater limitation 7 than found by ALJ Lazuran, pointing to evidence dated before and after her DLI, while the 8 Commissioner offered a different interpretation of the evidence. (See AR 1002-04.) 9 The Court found as follows: 10 The decision to separately discuss, first, plaintiff’s SSI application and, second, her DIB application allowed for a gap in 11 the consideration of the evidence. That is, the ALJ deemed irrelevant any evidence dated after June 30, 2009 and prior to 12 October 31, 2011 by first finding plaintiff entitled to SSI benefits as of the application date, but necessarily no earlier, and then 13 considering whether she had demonstrated changed circumstances as of June 30, 2009. This approach did not allow for consideration 14 of the opinions of Dr. [Amanda] Ragonesi rendered in June 2010 and February 2011, or any other evidence or testimony as related to 15 the time period between plaintiff’s DLI and the SSI application date. While the Commissioner here offers her own reasons for rejecting 16 such evidence, the Court is required to review the ALJ’s decision “based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ— 17 not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of SSA, 554 18 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009).

19 It is true that, in order to receive DIB benefits, plaintiff was required to establish disability on or before June 30, 2009. 20 C.F.R. 20 §§ 404.131, 404.321. The June 29, 2009 final decision provided an extraordinarily narrow window in which to make such a showing. 21 However, medical opinions that post-date the DLI may be relevant to determining whether a claimant was disabled on or before the 22 DLI. Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1988) (medical opinions cannot be disregarded solely because they post- 23 date the DLI); accord Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1034

ORDER 1 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester, 81 F.3d at 832. But see Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may discount 2 post-DLI opinion where it does not have retrospective applicability or where it is inconsistent with pre-DLI evidence). The ALJ here 3 stated, with no further discussion, that there were no records documenting worsening or establishing new impairments 4 specifically related to June 30, 2009. (AR 611.) He otherwise limited his discussion to the evidence [dated June 25, 2009] from 5 Dr. [Kees] Hofman. In so doing, the ALJ failed to address significant probative evidence. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 6 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ need not discuss each piece of evidence in the record, but must explain why significant probative 7 evidence has been rejected), and Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ must consider all medical 8 opinion evidence.”).

9 The ALJ’s decision does not, for example, sufficiently analyze the evidence associated with PTSD. The ALJ rejected the 10 opinion of Dr. Hofman, in part, because it was rendered five days prior to the DLI, did not address worsening, reiterated Dr. 11 [Lawrence] Moore’s opinion of plaintiff’s substantial problems with social interaction, and was similar to opinions and treatment notes 12 considered by ALJ Lazuran. (AR 611.) However, unlike the opinions of Dr. Moore in 2006, 2007, and 2008 (AR 361-80), Dr. 13 Hofman, prior to the DLI, diagnosed plaintiff with PTSD and specifically attributed her social limitations to that condition (AR 14 510-11 (“Avoids all public situations; lives like hermit; easily triggered with anxiety or anger – severe PTSD – flashbacks, 15 nightmares etc”)). In the evaluation dated closest to the opinion of Dr. Hofman, Dr. Moore did recognize “some indication of PTSD 16 related symptomatology[.]” (AR 366 (May 21, 2008).) By July 17, 2012, Dr. Moore identified PTSD, with features of generalized 17 anxiety disorder, as plaintiff’s sole Axis I diagnosis. (AR 516.) Dr. Ragonesi had, in the interim, twice diagnosed PTSD. (AR 480-83 18 (June 9, 2010), 491 (February 2, 2011).) The ALJ, moreover, pointed specifically to plaintiff’s testimony and the “multiple 19 opinions supporting her testimony about the severity of her PTSD[]” in finding her disabled as of October 31, 2011. (AR 610.) Yet, the 20 decision contains only a partial evaluation of the evidence associated with PTSD. 21 The ALJ, in sum, erred in failing to fully consider the 22 medical opinion evidence and plaintiff’s testimony in relation to the DIB claim. As argued by plaintiff, this error potentially implicated 23 both the RFC assessment and the conclusion at step five.

ORDER 1 (AR 1004-06.) The Court did not find the matter properly remanded for an award of benefits and 2 instead concluded: 3 The Court has no difficulty in finding this matter properly remanded for further proceedings. While the ALJ failed to conduct a sufficient 4 analysis, plaintiff’s road to an award of benefits is an exceedingly narrow one in light of the June 29, 2009 final decision and plaintiff’s 5 June 30, 2009 DLI. However, the ALJ, not the Court, is tasked with the responsibility of considering the evidence, assessing testimony 6 and the RFC, and in reaching a conclusion at step five. On remand, the ALJ should conduct that analysis in relation to plaintiff’s DIB 7 application.

8 (AR 1007.) 9 Challenges to 2018 ALJ Decision 10 Plaintiff argues ALJ Kennedy violated the law of mandate by only briefly discussing 11 various medical opinions, not finding PTSD a severe or even medically determinable impairment, 12 and failing to properly evaluate the evidence as directed by this Court. She avers error in the 13 failure to explain how res judicata and Chavez/AR 97-4(9) applied. She also argues res judicata 14 and Chavez/AR 97-4(9) do not apply and that, even though ALJ Lazarun’s findings became final 15 for the period through June 29, 2009, ALJ Kennedy was not precluded from making different 16 findings and drawing different conclusions for the period beginning June 30, 2009. Plaintiff avers 17 error in the failure to make a new RFC determination and new step five finding. 18 These arguments lack merit. As stated in the prior Court Order, plaintiff’s DIB claim 19 requires him “to establish disability on or before June 30, 2009” and the prior final decision finding 20 plaintiff not disabled through June 29, 2009 provides an “extraordinarily narrow window” in which 21 to make that showing. (AR 1005.) On remand, ALJ Kennedy considered plaintiff’s DIB claim as 22 of the June 30, 2009 DLI and assessed the significant probative evidence relating to that claim, 23 including evidence pre-dating and post-dating the DLI. (See AR 956-58.) The mere fact ALJ

ORDER 1 Kennedy reached the same findings as ALJ Mangrum and declined to disturb those findings on 2 remand, including in relation to PTSD, plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and the RFC, does not 3 establish error.2 Nothing in the Court’s decision mandated different conclusions be reached. Nor

4 was ALJ Kennedy required or was there a reason to explicitly address the doctrine of res judicata 5 or Chavez/AR 97-4(9). ALJ Kennedy reviewed the medical and other evidence of record to 6 determine whether it supported plaintiff’s allegation of disabling limitations as of June 30, 2019 7 and, finding the evidence of record supported the prior ALJ decision, declined to disturb it. (See 8 AR 956.) In conducting that analysis, ALJ Kennedy properly complied with and carried out the 9 explicit directive of this Court. See Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016) (a lower 10 court is generally ‘bound to carry the mandate of the upper court into execution and [may] not 11 consider the questions which the mandate laid at rest.”) (citation omitted). 12 Plaintiff further fails to demonstrate error in the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence and 13 conclusions reached. The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s testimony and the medical

14 evidence and resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in the record. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. 15 Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014); Carmickle v. Comm’r of SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 16 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s 17 decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 18 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 19 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Morgan v. Commissioner of the 20 21 2 The ALJ did not, moreover, simply adopt the analysis of ALJs Mangrum and Lazuran. At step 22 three, for example, ALJ Kennedy noted records from August and September 2009 did not document any significant social deficits, that a June 25, 2009 mental status examination showed intact cognitive functioning, and that a June 30, 2009 report and subsequent records showed no limitation in adapting or 23 managing oneself. (AR 954-55.)

ORDER 1 SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 2 The ALJ found plaintiff’s anxiety, personality, and alcohol abuse disorders severe at step 3 two and other impairments mentioned in the record not causing significant limitations in

4 functioning, but taken into account in assessing plaintiff’s RFC. (AR 953-54.) He found no 5 impairment meeting or equaling a listing. (AR 954-55.) He found plaintiff’s symptoms not 6 entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence of record and affecting plaintiff’s ability 7 to work only to the extent they would be reasonably accepted as consistent with the objective and 8 other evidence, and the evidence to support the symptom evaluation, RFC assessment, and step 9 four and five conclusions in the prior ALJ decision. (AR 955-59.) 10 The ALJ also addressed the medical evidence. (See AR 956.) In a June 30, 2009 record, 11 plaintiff reported a history of depression and anxiety, but an examination noted no debilitating 12 functional limitations. (AR 520, 527.) Contemporaneous records also failed to show mental 13 impairments as limiting as alleged. (AR 956.) In January 2009, plaintiff reported doing well and

14 an examination found intact memory, cooperative and alert behavior, calm and appropriate affect, 15 normal speech, good eye contact, and intact hygiene, and, in August 2009, no psychiatric 16 abnormalities were observed by providers or reported by plaintiff. (AR 400-01, 569-70.) Plaintiff 17 reported alcohol abuse in September 2009 and was noted to be alert and fully oriented, with no 18 reports of anxiety or depression symptoms and no psychiatric abnormalities observed. (AR 567- 19 68.) In July 2011, plaintiff reported her mental health symptoms were worsening. (AR 564.) The 20 ALJ found this correlated to plaintiff’s established onset of disability and indicated the severity of 21 her symptoms at that time did not reflect her functioning on June 30, 2009. (AR 956.) He found, 22 overall, the medical evidence did not objectively show plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations would 23 prevent her from working with the RFC found in the prior decision and consequently adopted and

ORDER 1 incorporated that RFC. The ALJ’s consideration of the evidence is rational. 2 In evaluating the opinion evidence (see AR 957-58), the ALJ first considered the June 2012 3 opinion of State agency physician Charles Wolfe, M.D., limiting plaintiff to medium work with

4 postural and environmental limitations (AR 133-35), and found it inconsistent with the record, 5 which failed to establish more than minimal physical limitations on June 30, 2009. He gave some 6 weight to March and May 2012 opinions of State agency doctors Thomas Clifford, Ph.D., and 7 Steven Haney, M.D. (AR 116-18, 135-37), noting they considered evidence post-dating the DLI 8 and finding their assessed limitations to only simple, routine tasks and inability to perform complex 9 tasks inconsistent with the treatment records showing intact mental status. The ALJ gave little 10 weight to Dr. Hofman’s June 25, 2009 opinion of severe limitations in most areas of social 11 functioning. (AR 509-13.) He found it inconsistent with the record as a whole, which documented 12 intact or nearly intact functioning, and not supported by Dr. Hofman’s own examination findings, 13 including a normal (30/30) mental status examination and not including observations consistent

14 with the severe limitations assessed. He gave little weight to June 2010 and February 2011 15 evaluations by Dr. Ragonesi assessing marked limitations, particularly in social functioning. (AR 16 474-91.) The evaluations took place at least a year after the June 30, 2009 DLI and had little 17 relevance to plaintiff’s functioning on that date. On both occasions, Dr. Ragonesi opined 18 limitations with a duration of six-to-twelve months, further indicating her opinions did not pertain 19 to plaintiff’s DLI. The ALJ gave little weight to September 2011 opinions of Dr. Renee 20 Eisenhauer, finding them consistent with contemporaneous records, but with little relevance to the 21 date in question, which preceded the assessment by more than two years. (AR 492.) He gave no 22 weight to a March 2006 opinion of Dr. Moore and a May 2007 opinion of Dr. Jamie Carter, which 23 significantly predated the alleged onset date and contained observations and opinions with very

ORDER 1 little relevance to plaintiff’s functioning on June 30, 2009. (AR 375-80, 797-803.) 2 The ALJ also noted assessments post-dating the October 30, 2011 established onset of 3 disability, including, inter alia, a February 2012 evaluation by Dr. Carter, a July 2012 evaluation

4 by Dr. Moore, a December 2014 evaluation by Dr. David Morgan, and a November 2016 5 evaluation by Dr. Russell Bragg. (AR 958 (citations to record omitted).) The findings and 6 opinions in these evaluations significantly postdated the June 30, 2009 DLI and had little relevance 7 to plaintiff’s condition and functioning on that date. The ALJ noted this opinion evidence had 8 been considered in the prior, favorable SSI finding and found no reason to disturb that analysis. 9 While plaintiff offers a different interpretation, the ALJ here rationally construed the 10 opinion of Dr. Hofman as inconsistent with the medical record and with Dr. Hofman’s own 11 findings on examination. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008), and 12 Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). He reasonably found other medical 13 opinions pre-dating and post-dating the DLI of limited relevance to plaintiff’s functioning on that

14 date, and properly considered the timing and duration of limitations assessed by Dr. Ragonesi a 15 year and two years after the DLI. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) 16 (ALJ may discount post-DLI opinion where it does not have retrospective applicability or where 17 it is inconsistent with pre-DLI evidence). Indeed, the ALJ’s consideration of the proximity of the 18 opinions to the DLI was necessary given the extraordinarily narrow window of time at issue in this 19 case. Notably, the ALJ made no similar observation in relation to the opinion of Dr. Hofman, 20 rendered only days prior to the DLI. The ALJ further appropriately considered that a number of 21 medical opinions supported the conclusion plaintiff’s impairments worsened and warranted a 22 finding of disability some two-and-a-half years after the DLI. The ALJ’s consideration of the 23 medical opinion evidence is both rational and supported by substantial evidence.

ORDER 1 Nor do any other of plaintiff’s arguments have merit. Plaintiff asserts, for example, the 2 ALJ improperly rejected her testimony about the extent of her symptoms and limitations based 3 solely on the absence of objective evidence supporting the degree of limitations alleged. Garrison

4 v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the ALJ properly considered 5 inconsistency between plaintiff’s allegations and the objective and other medical evidence. (AR 6 956); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. ALJ Kennedy also reasonably 7 found the evidence to support the prior ALJ’s decision (AR 956), wherein ALJ Mazuran (see AR 8 611) properly considered an absence of support in the record, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 9 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (while absence of full corroboration by objective medical evidence does not 10 alone suffice to reject symptom testimony, “the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in 11 determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”); evidence of inconsistent 12 activity, Bray v. Comm’r of SSA, 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); and plaintiff’s testimony 13 she was capable of more things in 2009 in comparison to later years, see Light v. Social Sec.

14 Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (ALJ may consider inconsistencies in a claimant’s 15 testimony). Plaintiff, as such, fails to demonstrate reversible error. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the reasons set forth above, this matter is AFFIRMED. 18 DATED this 18th day of December, 2019. A 19 20 Mary Alice Theiler United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23

ORDER