Harrington v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad

146 S.W. 820, 163 Mo. App. 194, 1912 Mo. App. LEXIS 210
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 1, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 146 S.W. 820 (Harrington v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrington v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 146 S.W. 820, 163 Mo. App. 194, 1912 Mo. App. LEXIS 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

BROADDUS, P. J.

This suit was instituted by the plaintiff to recover-damages on account of tbe death of her liusband, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant railroad company. The plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $5600 from which defendant appealed to this court.

[195]*195For a dear comprehension of the issues raised by the appeal it becomes necessary to set forth the grounds upon which the plaintiff relied to make out her case. Omitting preliminary statements of the petition, the allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant are as follows: “Plaintiff states that on said 11th clay of December, 1909, and for a longtime continuously prior thereto plaintiff’s husband, Patrick Harrington, was in the employ of defendant as a switchman in defendant’s said yards, and as said switchman for defendant it became and was the duty of plaintiff’s said husband to get upon, ride upon and be upon certain freight cars and especially the freight cars hereinafter referred to, while said cars were being moved over and upon the tracks of defendant’s in the aforesaid switch yards, and more especially into a certain coal house or coal shed hereinafter referred to.

“Plaintiff states that at all said times defendant owned, controlled and used in said switch yards a certain incline track leading into and running into and through a certain coal shed or house in said switch yards, that said coal shed or house was a long frame structure elevated above the ground at a distance of from twenty to thirty feet, and was about one hundred feet in length, that one of defendant’s aforesaid tracks proceeded up the incline and into said coal shed. That it was the duty of plaintiff’s said husband on said 11th day of December, 1909, in the performance of his said duties as said switchman of defendant to be upon certain coal ears then and there being pushed, shoved, or run by defendant up said incline and into said coal shed; that upon the occasion herein referred to defendant through its servants and agents was then and there in the act of shoving, pushing or running certain freight cars including coal cars up said incline and into said coal shed, that while plaintiff’s said husband was in the performance of his said duties as said [196]*196switchman for defendant, and while acting within the line of his duties as said switchman, he was thrown from one of said cars, and onto the tracks of defendant’s at or near the entrance of said shed on account of the carelessness and negligence of defendant, its servants and agents as hereinafter set forth in allowing, permitting and causing said car to be run up said incline and into said coal shed and against a certain flat car called a sand car, then and there standing on the track at or near said coal shed and upon said elevated structure.

■“Plaintiff states that on account of the carelessness and negligence of defendant’s servants and agents above referred to and hereinafter set forth her said husband, Patrick Harrington, was then and there thrown from said car and upon said track and was then and there run over, upon and against and was dragged, pushed and shoved by the wheels of the aforesaid cars, and plaintiff’s said husband was thereby and on account thereof, and as direct result thereof, then and there killed.

“Plaintiff states that the carelessness and negligence of defendant, its servants and agents above referred to consisted in this, to-wit:

“First. Defendant, through its servants and agents then and there in charge of said engine and cars carelessly and negligently ran said cars up said incline and into said coal shed, and into and against! said sand car at a dangerously high rate of speed, and at a recklessly high rate of speed, and at an unneces sarily and unusually high rate of speed.

“Second. Defendant, through its servants and agents then and there in charge of said engine and cars carelessly and negligently failed and neglected to have said engine and cars under proper control, while said cars were proceeding up said incline, into and through said coal shed, but on the contrary defendant’s said servants, and agents ran, pushed or [197]*197shoved said cars up said indine and into and through said coal shed while said cars were so out of control of said employees in charge thereof, that said engine and cars could not be properly stopped, ox the speed thereof properly checked in a reasonable time, or reasonable space to properly handle said cars with safety to said employees and to properly place said cars where they were intended and desired to be placed.

“Third. Defendant’s said servants and agents then and there in charge of said engine and cars, carelessly and negligently failed and neglected to stop said cars at the proper place, which was before said cars run in contact with, struck or hit said sand car. Plaintiff states that it was the desire and intention of defendant that the car furthest from said engine should be stopped or ‘spotted’ at a point before the same reached said sand car, or struck said sand car, or run into said sand car, but through the carelessness and negligence of said servants and agents then and there in charge of said engine and cars, in running said cars and in not stopping said cars at the proper place, and in not ‘spotting’ said cars in the proper place, said ears were permitted, allowed and caused to run against, into, and upon said sand car as above set forth.

“Fourth. The servants and agents of defendant then and there in charge of said engine and carelessly and negligently run said cars too far, thereby striking and running into the aforesaid sand car, thereby causing said cars and especially the car upon which plaintiff’s said husband was riding as aforesaid, to jerk, jolt, stop or slacken its speed in a quick, sudden and violent manner, and in an unnecessarily and unusually quick, sudden and violent manner, thereby throwing plaintiff’s said husband and causing plaintiff’s said husband to fall from said car onto the track, and to be run over and killed as above set forth.

[198]*198“Fifth. The servants and agents of defendant then and there in charge of said engine and cars carelessly and negligently failed to give the proper signals or to give said signals at the proper time to stop said cars at the proper place and to stop said ears before they ran into, upon and against the sand car all as above set forth.

■ “Sixth. The servants and agents of defendant’s then and there in charge of defendant’s said engine and cars carelessly and negligently failed and neglected to properly obey and act upon the signals given them to stop said cars before said cars ran into, upon and against said sand car, all as above set forth.

“Seventh. The servants and agents of defendant then and there in charge of said engine and cars, carelessly and negligently failed and neglected to tell plaintiff’s said husband or to warn plaintiff’s said husband, that said cars were going to be, or about to be run into, upon or against said sand car, all as above set forth.

“Eighth.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Manes v. St. Louis, San Francisco Railway Co.
220 S.W. 14 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1920)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 S.W. 820, 163 Mo. App. 194, 1912 Mo. App. LEXIS 210, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrington-v-chicago-burlington-quincy-railroad-moctapp-1912.