Harrigan v. Hertz Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Harrigan v. Hertz Corp.

276 A.D.2d 747, 715 N.Y.S.2d 334, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10912

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 30, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 276 A.D.2d 747 (Harrigan v. Hertz Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harrigan v. Hertz Corp., 276 A.D.2d 747, 715 N.Y.S.2d 334, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10912 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Berke, J.), dated January 12, 2000, which denied their respective motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based upon the failure of the plaintiff Cheryl B. Harrigan to sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the motion papers submitted by the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff Cheryl B. Harrigan were not serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Feuerman v Achtar, 246 AD2d 577; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Krausman, Goldstein and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Berke, J.), dated January 12, 2000, which denied their respective motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based upon the failure of the plaintiff Cheryl B. Harrigan to sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the motion papers submitted by the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff Cheryl B. Harrigan were not serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Feuerman v Achtar, 246 AD2d 577; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Krausman, Goldstein and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

276 A.D.2d 747, 715 N.Y.S.2d 334, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10912, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrigan-v-hertz-corp-nyappdiv-2000.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack