Harrigan v. City of Wilmington

12 A. 779, 13 Del. 140, 8 Houston 140, 1888 Del. LEXIS 5
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedFebruary 21, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 12 A. 779 (Harrigan v. City of Wilmington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrigan v. City of Wilmington, 12 A. 779, 13 Del. 140, 8 Houston 140, 1888 Del. LEXIS 5 (Del. Ct. App. 1888).

Opinion

Comegys,.J.,

(charging the jury.) There have been two cases tried in this court which involve the question of the immunities and liabilities of this city in the exercises of functions under its charter with respect to its streets, which includes grading, making culverts, sewers, etti., and in one of them the diversion of a watercourse from its natural channel into an artificial one, to-wit, a sewer-In both those cases it was decided in effect that the corporation was not liable for any want of proper judgment in the plan of a sewer, or that of any other improvement. The function of deciding upon the proper course to be taken in making an improvement was held to be in fact a judicial one, as involving discretion ; and, the exercise of discretion being an operation of the mind, it is in fact a mental conclusion, and therefore one of judgment. How, it is unquestionable law that no one clothed with discretionary power over a subject is to be held liable for a mere mistake of judgment in the exercise of it. Were the law otherwise, the greatest injury would result to perfectly honest persons, whose judgment might, in the main, with respect to that and other subjects, be generally correct. All our overseers of roads are clothed with the same sort of discretion, generally speaking, with respect to the common roads, that the city of Wilmington is with respect to the streets thereof. It is true, the overseers have no authority, by virtue merely of their office, to make culverts or sewers, but they are frequently clothed with such by the Levy Court. When conferred, the decision as to the size of [143]*143them, and the place where they shall be located, is a discretionary, or a judicial, or quasi judicial one. If the overseer should make a mistake or error of judgment in the provision, he would be free from personal liability; and, if the county could be sued, it would not be liable for his want of judgment, if reasonable care and pains had been taken in selecting him for the service. The city of Wilmington can by itself (it being a mere public corporation or municipal body) do nothing towards deciding upon or making any improvement whatever. It acts, however, through agents in making its decisions as to action; but they are chosen by the inhabitants who are voters therein, as citizens thereof. It is they who represent the city, exercising its public functions through their own discretionary judgment. They are not liable for any error of judgment merely in deciding upon a plan of improvement, nor is the city,—especially as the city charter provides for the appointment of an engineer in chief to devise all the means for carrying such improvement into effect. I do not mean to say that the city would enjoy an immunity from liability if the means adopted to make an improvement—for instance the building of a sewer—were grossly and palpably inadequate for the purpose required, forbidding the idea of any sort of reasonable care and diligence; but that it is absolutely free from such where reasonable pains have been used to ascertain the best course to be taken. In the absence of proof to the contrary, or of such circumstances as compel a different view, the city and its officers must be taken, in any case, to have exercised the best judgment they were capable of. Such being the case, it results that, if the city made any mistake with respect to making the Adams street sewer, or collecting the waters that had theretofore passed down the Norris brook, or run into it, it must be held to be one of judgment merely, imposing no liability on the city for the mistake made, if in fact any were made at all. But I wish the jury to understand that what has been said with respect to immunity of the city from responsibility for error of judgment is meant to be confined to cases where competent persons—for example, a [144]*144city engineer—have been previously consulted, and have given an opinion which has been followed. But where the city authorities have not followed the advice of such engineer, or have not applied for it all, but have acted upon their own judgment, as they have the right to do, they—that is, the corporation whose affairs they are—must take the consequences of their mistake or error of judgment, if such there shall be found to have been. That is to say, neither a municipal body, nor its officers, are bound to take scientific counsel before they undertake to build a sewer, change a water course, collect water in a confined conduit, etc., but if any mistake be made which might have been avoided by due care in taking advice prior to the act, as should have been done, and following it, the city would be liable. There would, in such case, be prima facie, negligence on the part of the city; but like all mere presumptions, it would be liable to be rebutted by proof that damage claimed to have resulted from such imputed negligence did not, in fact, arise from it at all. Therefore, in this case, if the jury should believe that the engineer-in-chief of the city at that time advised against making the Adams street sewer where it was afterwards built, and yet the alleged damage to the plaintiff did not ensue frpm such a location, the plaintiff would not, because of disregard of such advice by the city simply, have any right to recover for such damage. Though the location was against the engineer’s advice, yet it is testified to by Mr. Robinson, the present officer, that the plans of the sewer were made by such former engineer. Therefore the only mistake with respect to that sewer that the city could be held liable for would be its location, and not its size, which was followed from the plans of the late engineer.

I have heard no evidence tending to show that the alleged damage to the plaintiff was owing to the location of the Adams-Street sewer, but it has been assigned to other causes, which I shall now proceed to consider. One of the causes is that the Reed-Street sewer had not sufficient capacity to vent the water which in time of heavy, unusual rains, would be poured upon what I will call the “Har[145]*145rigan Block/’ (that is, the block between Monroe, Reed, Adams, and Front streets,) by and through the Adams-Street sewer. The other (or rather the reason advanced for the volume and velocity of of the water passing down by that sewer) is that such were greatly enhanced by drawing the water out of the Montgomery lot, (opposite the Harrigan block, on the north side of Front street,) and emptying it into such sewer. The object of making all sewers is, primarily, to collect waters when they are upon the surface naturally, —that is, in a relatively wide space,—and confine them in the small one, of a pipe, or tunnel, for transmission to their ultimate destination. The right to do this is unquestionable; and if it be exercised with proper care and diligence, no responsibility can result therefrom. The simple question with respect to that, then, would seem to be whether the sewer was adequate to the service to which it was-put. If so, no one would have cause to complain. Inadequacy would necessarily be potent or evident to the the most ordinary observer. There is before the jury some evidence of such inadequacy given by one or two of the plaintiffs witnesses • one of them being John Neylor, testifying with respect to the character of the storm which occasioned the damage sued for in this action. He states that the water seemed to come out .qf the inlets to the sewer at Front street, as well it might when the character of that storm, as spoken of by witnesses on both sides, is considered.

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Bluebook (online)
12 A. 779, 13 Del. 140, 8 Houston 140, 1888 Del. LEXIS 5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrigan-v-city-of-wilmington-delsuperct-1888.