Harriet H. Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
DecidedMarch 19, 2026
Docket02-26-00019-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Harriet H. Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Harriet H. Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harriet H. Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00019-CV ___________________________

HARRIET H. NICHOLSON, Appellant

V.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-005783-1

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Appellant, Harriet H. Nicholson, was declared a vexatious litigant on

January 5, 2022, and is now subject to a prefiling order that prohibits her from filing

any action in a Texas court without first obtaining permission from the local

administrative judge.1 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101. Despite that

prefiling order, Nicholson filed a notice of restricted appeal in this cause without an

accompanying order permitting the filing. Because Nicholson has not complied with

the filing requirements, we dismiss the appeal. See id. §§ 11.101, 11.1035.

Under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, “a clerk of a

court may not file a[n] . . . appeal[] . . . presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject

to a prefiling order under Section 11.101 unless the litigant obtains an order from the

appropriate local administrative judge . . . permitting the filing.” Id. § 11.103(a).2

Chapter 11 further describes the procedures courts must follow when vexatious-

litigant litigation is mistakenly filed. See id. § 11.1035(b). Courts must dismiss such

litigation unless the vexatious litigant demonstrates that she has obtained an order

permitting the filing from the appropriate local administrative judge. See id.; In re G.T.,

1 Available at Office of Court Administration, List of Vexatious Litigants Subject to a Prefiling Order, http://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious- litigants/ (last updated Mar. 11, 2026, and last visited Mar. 16, 2026) The only statutory exceptions—neither of which applies here—authorize an 2

appellate-court clerk to file (1) an appeal from a prefiling order entered under Section 11.101 designating a person a vexatious litigant or (2) a timely writ of mandamus under Section 11.102. See id. § 11.103(d).

2 No. 04-25-00636-CV, 2025 WL 3538967, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 10,

2025, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); Johnson v. Parker, No. 03-19-00067-CV, 2019

WL 3922908, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing

vexatious litigant’s appeal because litigant had failed to file proof of the local

administrative judge’s permission to appeal).

Because the record filed in this court did not show that Nicholson had

obtained permission from the local administrative judge to file this appeal, on

February 9, 2026, we notified her that this appeal would be dismissed unless she

obtained an order granting permission to proceed from the appropriate local

administrative judge by March 2, 2026. Nicholson has not furnished such an order,

but she has filed several other documents showing that she does not have permission

to pursue this appeal. In one, she admitted that she sought permission from the local

administrative judge to file this appeal, and she stated that the judge “left the bench,

made off-record calls, and returned to deny the prefiling order.” Nicholson has also

separately provided a copy of the judge’s signed order denying her request to “further

appeal the [underlying case] and appeal filed in the Court of Appeals for the Second

District of Texas, Cause 02-26-00019-CV.”

Because Section 11.1035 is clear that courts must dismiss an appeal unless the

litigant obtains an order permitting the filing—which Nicholson has not—we dismiss

her appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.1035(b); Tex. R. App. P. 42.3,

43.2(f); Hernandez v. Fernandez, No. 08-25-00188-CV, 2025 WL 2315442, at *1 (Tex.

3 App.—El Paso Aug. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Morgan v. Abbott,

No. 02-19-00475-CV, 2020 WL 2073747, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30,

2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). All pending motions are denied as moot.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice

Delivered: March 19, 2026

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

§ 11.101
Texas CP § 11.101
§ 11.1035
Texas CP § 11.1035

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Harriet H. Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harriet-h-nicholson-v-nationstar-mortgage-llc-txctapp2-2026.