Harper v. Virginia Blood Services

Richmond County Circuit Court

Harper v. Virginia Blood Services

35 Va. Cir. 50, 1994 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147

CourtRichmond County Circuit Court

DecidedOctober 11, 1994

DocketCase No. LX-424-1

StatusPublished

This text of 35 Va. Cir. 50 (Harper v. Virginia Blood Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Richmond County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harper v. Virginia Blood Services, 35 Va. Cir. 50, 1994 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Va. Super. Ct. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

By Judge Melvin R. Hughes, Jr.

In this case, plaintiff has brought suit against his former employer and a former co-worker for defamation. He alleges that he was terminated and suffered other damages to his reputation after the employee defendant told the employer that the plaintiff had made statements to her which she considered personal. Plaintiff allegedly asked whether the defendant was single and if she lived alone. The motion for judgment also alleges that the defendant reported to the employer that plaintiff touched her inappropriately. Plaintiff claims that the “slanderous allegations” of the employee “were ratified [by the employer] as evidenced by plaintiffs termination.”

Defendants, the employer and the co-employee, demur on the basis that (1) plaintiff’s employment was terminable at will and (2) plaintiff's defamation claim is not a per se one and no special damage is alleged.

The fact that plaintiff may have been a terminable at will employee and that no special policy consideration has been alleged to have been violated to justify his termination, as in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), is of no moment because the employment loss is said to be an element of damage resulting from defamation. It is up to plaintiff to show that the loss came about because of the defamation and not for other causes, including his employer’s ability to terminate at will.

There is no basis in the pleadings to conclude that this is a case of defamation per se. While in a defamation case that is not per se, the plaintiff has to allege special damages, a claim of actual injury not confined to pecuniary loss, but including such elements as damage to reputa[51]*51tion, standing in the community, embarrassment and humiliation, as here, is sufficient Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981).

For these reasons, the demurrer is overruled.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

By Judge Melvin R. Hughes, Jr.

In this case, plaintiff has brought suit against his former employer and a former co-worker for defamation. He alleges that he was terminated and suffered other damages to his reputation after the employee defendant told the employer that the plaintiff had made statements to her which she considered personal. Plaintiff allegedly asked whether the defendant was single and if she lived alone. The motion for judgment also alleges that the defendant reported to the employer that plaintiff touched her inappropriately. Plaintiff claims that the “slanderous allegations” of the employee “were ratified [by the employer] as evidenced by plaintiffs termination.”

Defendants, the employer and the co-employee, demur on the basis that (1) plaintiff’s employment was terminable at will and (2) plaintiff's defamation claim is not a per se one and no special damage is alleged.

The fact that plaintiff may have been a terminable at will employee and that no special policy consideration has been alleged to have been violated to justify his termination, as in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), is of no moment because the employment loss is said to be an element of damage resulting from defamation. It is up to plaintiff to show that the loss came about because of the defamation and not for other causes, including his employer’s ability to terminate at will.

There is no basis in the pleadings to conclude that this is a case of defamation per se. While in a defamation case that is not per se, the plaintiff has to allege special damages, a claim of actual injury not confined to pecuniary loss, but including such elements as damage to reputa[51]*51tion, standing in the community, embarrassment and humiliation, as here, is sufficient Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981).

For these reasons, the demurrer is overruled.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

35 Va. Cir. 50, 1994 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harper-v-virginia-blood-services-vaccrichmondcty-1994.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack