Harper v. Trumbull

Opinion

PAUL ALLEN HARPER, Case No. 23-cv-02623-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND v. JUDGMENT

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL, Re: Dkt. No. 61 Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Harper’s motion to alter or amend the judgment previously entered in this case. Dkt. No. 61. For the reasons detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion. On January 29, 2024, the Court granted the late Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on judicial immunity grounds. Dkt. No. 55. Following that order, the Clerk entered judgment in favor of Judge Trumbull against Plaintiff Harper and closed the case. Dkt. No. 56. A few weeks later, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default, Dkt. No. 57, which the Clerk declined to enter, Dkt. No. 58. On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 among others. Dkt. No. 61. Though the filing is difficult to parse, it appears that Plaintiff seeks an order altering or amending the Court’s dismissal order and the Clerk’s entry of judgment in Defendant’s favor. Because Plaintiff Harper proceeds pro se and there is some ambiguity concerning the basis for the request, the Court will construe the filing liberally as a motion for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion for relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Rule 59(e), “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that such motions may only be granted in limited circumstances: “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” See Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is construed as a denial of relief under Rule 60(b). See McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255, n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Rule 60(b), in turn, permits a party to seek relief from a final judgment for any reason that justifies relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) is a “catchall provision” that applies only when the reason for granting relief is not covered by any of the enumerated reasons set forth in Rule 60, which include, among others, “mistake inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” (Rule 60(b)(1)), “newly discovered evidence” (Rule 60(b)(2)), and “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party” (Rule 60(b)(3)). See United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005). Motions for reconsideration should not be frequently made or freely granted; they are not a substitute for appeal or a means of attacking some perceived error of the court. See Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court deems reconsideration of its dismissal order and entry of judgment against Plaintiff unwarranted under either Rules 59(e) or 60(a). Though Plaintiff’s arguments are murky, he appears to claim that Defendant Trumbull failed to appear in or defend this action after her passing in January 2024, invalidating the Court’s subsequent order on her motion to dismiss. This argument is neither here nor there: though Judge Trumbull had regrettably passed by the time the 1 appear. Plaintiff also seems to take issue with the Court’s characterization of his case as a “civil 2 rights” action, and the applicable statute of limitations. For one, the Court specifically stated in its 3 dismissal order that “it need not reach the question of whether Plaintiff's claims” were time- 4 barred, so any disagreement about the applicable statute of limitations is functionally irrelevant. 5 Dkt. No. 55 at 4n.5. And two, regardless of how Plaintiff's complaint is characterized (as a “civil 6 rights” action or as a “Fourteenth Amendment due process of law violation,” as urged), the 7 dispositive fact is fixed: Defendant Trumbull was absolutely immune from civil liability for acts 8 performed in her judicial capacity as a federal magistrate judge. See Dkt. No. 55. Since Plaintiff 9 did not and cannot adequately plead that the judicial acts with which he takes issue were made in 10 the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” his suit cannot proceed for the reasons discussed in the 11 dismissal order. 12 Even if Plaintiff's motion had been timely under Rule 59(e) (which it was not, since it was 13 filed more than 28 days after entry of judgment), these arguments are plainly inadequate to secure 14 the requested relief. Plaintiff has not pointed to newly discovered evidence, manifestly unjust 15 clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law which would justify amending or altering 16 judgment under that provision. See Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 740. Nor is relief appropriate under 17 Rule 60(b)’s more expansive grounds to grant relief from judgment, as Plaintiff has not persuaded 18 the Court that any of the enumerated reasons — or any other reason — justifies revisiting its prior 19 order. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 The Court DENIES the motion to alter or amend the judgment. Dkt. No. 61. No further 22 filings will be accepted in this closed case. If Plaintiff continues to disagree with the orders and 23 judgment entered in his case, appeal is the sole appropriate recourse. 25 ) Dated: 3/28/2024 26 Appr 3 Nhl). HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 27 United States District Judge 28