Harper v. Ryan

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 20, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-00298
StatusUnknown

This text of Harper v. Ryan (Harper v. Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harper v. Ryan, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 JDN

2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT 8 OF ARIZONA 9 10 Gary Jerome Harper, No. CV 18-00298-PHX-DGC (CDB) 11 Plaintiff, 12 vs. ORDER 13 Charles L. Ryan, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff Gary Jerome Harper, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex- 17 Florence, South Unit, brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 18 Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles L. Ryan and Corizon Health 19 for the alleged denial of adequate healthcare in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 20 (Doc. 1.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 61.) 21 Harper filed his Response to the Motion, and, although ordered to do so, Defendants did 22 not file a reply. (See Doc. 64 at 3.) The Court will deny Defendants’ Motion.1 23 I. Background 24 Harper is terminally ill with cancer, and he alleged that Ryan set up and 25 implemented policies that limit or deny treatment for terminally ill prisoners. (Doc. 1.) 26 27 1 Upon the filing of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court issued 28 an order with the notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), which informed Harper of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 64.) 1 Harper alleged that Corizon failed to comply with orders from the treating specialist, 2 including orders for follow-up treatment and prescribed medications. (Id.) Harper also 3 alleged that Corizon failed to provide medication and treatment for pain, fever, and 4 complications related to his catheter. (Id.) According to Harper, Defendants failed to 5 provide post-surgery follow-up treatment, treatment for an infection surrounding his 6 suprapubic catheter, pain management treatment related to his cancer, and denied requests 7 to send him to an oncologist. (Id.) Harper seeks injunctive relief and damages. (Id. at 10.) 8 Ryan and Corizon move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Harper 9 cannot show that he suffered a constitutional violation as a result of a Corizon policy; 10 (2) there is no evidence any Corizon agent was consciously aware of a serious risk to 11 Harper’s health and disregarded it; (3) Ryan cannot be liable as a supervisor because there 12 is no evidence he was aware of Harper’s medical issues and he had no direct involvement 13 in Harper’s healthcare; and (4) Harper fails to present evidence that a policy, practice, or 14 custom caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. (Doc. 61.) 15 II. Summary Judgment Standard 16 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 17 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The 19 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 20 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 21 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 22 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 23 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 24 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then 25 shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact 26 in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 27 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 28 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see Triton

-2- 1 Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need 2 not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. 3 Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with 4 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 5 Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 7 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 8 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 9 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make credibility determinations; it must 10 believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 11 255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The court need 12 consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Further, where the nonmovant is pro se, the court must consider 14 as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all of the pro se litigant’s contentions that 15 are based on personal knowledge and that are set forth in verified pleadings and motions. 16 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004); see Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 17 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 Finally, where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the court may also consider 19 developments that postdate the motions to determine whether an injunction is warranted. 20 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). 21 III. Relevant Facts 22 In 2007, Harper was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and he had recurrences 23 in 2011 and 2014. (Doc. 63 at 24.) His last oncology appointment was in 2014 with Dr. 24 John Kelly in Tahoe, Nevada. (Id. at 24, 39.) Harper also suffers from idiopathic 25 neurogenic bladder, testicular epididymitis (inflammation), and thyroid disorder, among 26 other conditions. (Id. at 32, 34, 39.) 27 28

-3- 1 Harper entered the custody of the ADC in March 2017.2 On March 31, 2017, while 2 at the Phoenix Alhambra Reception facility, Harper saw Dr. Sheldon Epstein for a physical. 3 (Doc. 62 ¶ 1; Doc. 68 ¶ 1.) At this appointment, Harper was listed as 5 feet 11 inches tall 4 and weighing 158 pounds. (Doc. 63 at 2.)3 As to Harper’s medical history, Dr. Epstein 5 noted Hodgkin’s lymphoma, remission 2014; bone marrow and left cervical node biopsies; 6 radiation and chemotherapy 2007–2014; bedtime nausea; and chronic arthralgias (joint 7 pain). (Id.) Dr. Epstein assessed the following: malignant neoplasm (growth of tissue); 8 thyrotoxicosis (excess thyroid hormone), chronic pain syndrome, calculus of kidney 9 (kidney stone), tachycardia, and nausea. (Id. at 3.) Dr. Epstein ordered Meclizine (for 10 nausea), Meloxicam (for chronic pain syndrome), and Propranolol (for Tachycardia). (Id. 11 at 4–5.) Dr. Epstein also issued Special Needs Orders (SNOs) for Harper to be given a 12 lower bunk, catheter supplies, and daily showers. (Id. at 5.) In the “Plan Notes” section 13 of the medical record, Dr. Epstein wrote that Harper needs an endocrine appointment. (Id. 14 at 5-6.) 15 On April 4, 2017, Harper saw Nurse Practitioner (NP) Denehy. (Doc. 62 ¶ 2; 16 Doc.

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Harper v. Ryan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harper-v-ryan-azd-2020.