Harper v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank

7 Watts & Serg. 204
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 15, 1844
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 7 Watts & Serg. 204 (Harper v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harper v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 7 Watts & Serg. 204 (Pa. 1844).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Rogers, J.

This is an ejectment to recover 424 acres 22 perches of land, claimed by the plaintiff on a warrant to Moses Foulk, dated the 4th March 1806, surveyed the 20th December 1794, of which George Ege was the owner. A judgment was obtained against Ege to the April term 1S20, on which there w’as an execution, levy and inquisition on the Mount Holly iron-works, of which the tract in dispute, as the plaintiff alleges, constitutes a part. The property was sold, and plaintiff was the purchaser.

The defence is rested on two groundsr

1. That the levy does not embrace the land in dispute.

[211]*2112. That it was regularly sold at a treasurer’s sale for taxes, and that the title under that sale is vested in the defendant.

To meet the first ground of defence,-it was material to prove that before the levy was made by the sheriff, George Ege claimed title to the land covered by the warrant to Moses Foulk; and for that purpose the plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the record of the board of property, in a proceeding in which the said George Ege and Thomas Thornburgh were plaintiffs, and Samuel White was defendant. They also offered in evidence a certified draft of a tract of land surveyed in the name of Samuel White, on a warrant for 200 acres, dated the 8th September 1814. These two pieces of testimony, although offered separately, and not in their proper order, must be considered together as one whole, for they are inseparably connected, and serve to explain each other. The transaction appears to have been thus: William Linn, the deputy-surveyor, surveyed a tract of land on a warrant granted to Samuel White for 200 acres. At the time of the survey, a family was residing on the land! George Ege claimed part of the tract by virtue of the Moses Foulk warrant, and the other part was claimed by Thomas Thornburgh, by virtue of a warrant to himself. These facts the deputy-surveyor, as he was bound to do, (vide Sergeant Land Law, 173, and the Act of 22d January 1802; 3 Smith Laws 480), noted on the survey, and certified the same to the surveyor-general, particularly describing the respective claims by blue and red lines. This was in the nature of a caveat against accepting the survey, and prevented the surveyor-general from issuing a patent to White, until the expiration of ten years from the time of the return, without the order of the board of property after hearing the parties. And in pursuance of this, this pi'oceeding, it cannot be doubted, was had. The parties were all present, for George Ege and Thomas Thornburgh, the caveators, were plaintiffs, and Samuel White was defendant; and, after a full hearing, the board decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Taking it altogether, there is not even an imperfection in the record. Undoubtedly the court had jurisdiction; no petition or citation was necessary; the return of the deputy-surveyor being in the nature of a caveat, and it manifestly appearing that all the parties in interest were present at the hearing. It is said that the paper offered is not a full copy, and that the certificate is defective ; but it does not strike me that it is liable to this objection. It purports to be the whole record, and we cannot intend it to be otherwise, unless something appears in the certificate itself, or on the record, indicating the reverse. We must take it that it embraces all that remains in the office; for even if the record was incomplete, it would be no objection to its admission in evidence. In Edmiston v. Schwartz, it is ruled that where the prothonotary certified that a paper offered in evidence was truly copied from .the records of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland county, [212]*212it was' sufficient evidence that it was a copy of the whole record. So a certificate from the prothonotary that a paper contains a copy of the record, means a copy of the whole record. Voris v. Smith, (13 Serg. & Rawle 334). The deputy-secretary of the Land Office certifies that it is a true copy of the proceeding, as recorded in Minute Book No. 8, pp. 272-3, remaining in the office of the secretary of the Land Office. This we cannot but understand as being a certificate of the whole proceeding of the board of property, recorded in the minute book of the Land Office, the proper and only place of recording such proceedings, according to the usages of the office. We cannot suppose there is any other place or manner of making such entries. Taking, therefore, the two bills of exception together, we think the court was right in admitting the testimony for the purpose for which it was offered.

The remaining objection is to the charge, and this arises on the following state of facts: The land in dispute, the Moses Foulk tract, was part of a body of lands consisting of ten tracts, lying contiguous to each other, held under different warrants, called the Mount Holly estate, or Mount Holly iron-works. The property, as one whole, was returned and assessed by the proper officer of the county as seated lands, for taxes, for the years 1806, 7 and 8; which taxes, as the jury have found, were regularly paid by the owners of the property, under whom the plaintiffs claim. After-wards, it being discovered that the holder or owner of the tract in dispute had omitted to file a description of the land, as is directed in the Act of the 28th March 1806, and in that particular had failed to comply with the injunctions of the Act, the commissioners, without any notice whatever to the owners, proceeded to assess a fourfold tax, as is therein prescribed. For payment of these taxes, so assessed, the tract in dispute was sold, and the person under whom the defendant claims became the purchaser; and this, it is contended, vests in him a complete and indefeasible title. It has been repeatedly held that proof of payment of the tax avoids the title which a purchaser at a treasurer’s sale would otherwise acquire. Unless, therefore, there is something peculiar to this case which makes it an exception, the title of the defendant is defective. And this, it is contended, is the case, because the holder omitted to comply with the injunction of the Act of the 28th March, under which the tract in dispute was sold. It is assumed that this Act, as well as the Act of the 4th April 1805, to which it is a supplement, was intended to apply to the holders of more than one tract, lying contiguous to each other, to avoid fraud, the result of a contrary practice. This may in part be true, but not altogether, as the provisions of the Act apply as well to the owner of one warrant, as to the holder of several warrants lying in one body. The mischief would seem to have been, that the owner of unseated lands frequently withheld his land from taxation altogether; for remedy whereof, it is made his duty, [213]*213under the penalty of a fourfold tax, to return it, with a particular description thereof, for taxation, in order that that species of property may contribute in proportion to the current expenses of the county. By the first Act, passed the 4th April 1805, the land is only liable to the imposition of a fourfold tax when secreted by the holder, implying by that term that it had been fraudulently concealed from the knowledge of the commissioners. In the Act of the 28th March 1806, which repeals the former Act, the word secretly

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
7 Watts & Serg. 204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harper-v-farmers-mechanics-bank-pa-1844.