COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
HAROLD VAUGHN, ' No. 08-11-00036-CR Appellant, ' Appeal from the v. ' 371st District Court THE STATE OF TEXAS, ' of Tarrant County, Texas Appellee. ' (TC# 1186711D) '
OPINION
Appellant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. We
affirm.1
BACKGROUND
After Brooklyn Baker and Ashley Darden had closed and locked the store at which they
worked in Fort Worth, three men with guns directed them to unlock the store and turn off the
store’s alarm system, and then directed Ashley to unlock the store’s safe. The store had both an
internal safe and an external safe. Ashley explained to the men that it would take longer to open
the internal safe due to its timers. After she quickly opened the external safe, one of the men
bagged up the cash found within it. Ashley was then directed to open the internal safe.
1 As this case was transferred from our sister court in Fort Worth, we decide it in accordance with the precedent of that court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. During this time, Brooklyn was able to see the robbers’ faces. When the robbers noticed
Brooklyn was watching them, one of the men forced her to the floor, cocked his gun over her head,
and told Ashley that he would shoot Brooklyn if Ashley did not open the safe. The store’s phone
then rang and the robbers directed Ashley to answer the telephone. When Ashley answered the
phone, it was silent. After Brooklyn heard sirens, one of the robbers told the other two robbers to
leave. The three robbers then left through the store’s back door.
After the security system at the store had been disarmed, personnel at the store’s security
monitoring service began monitoring the store’s cameras, relayed information to police, and
officers were dispatched to the store. After hearing the dispatch regarding an armed robbery,
Officer Domingo Martinez was the first officer to arrive at the store. While alone in his vehicle,
Officer Martinez waited for other officers to arrive and testified that he expected to see three armed
individuals. Officer Martinez heard a “latch sound” and a door slam, and then observed three
individuals in dark clothing emerge from the back of the store. After Officer Martinez shouted,
“Stop, police!,” the three individuals ran away and two of them climbed a fence. At the fence,
Officer Martinez encountered the third individual, who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt bearing a
design and instructed him to get on the ground. In open court, Officer Domingo Martinez
identified Appellant as the third individual who he encountered at the fence. Officer Martinez
also identified Appellant as being present in a photograph admitted into evidence during trial.
The photograph, which was taken at the scene and admitted into evidence, shows Appellant seated
on the ground near the fence wearing a hooded jacket bearing a repeated pattern, dark pants, and
white shoes. Another photograph of the area shows U.S. currency inside a white plastic bag
bearing the name of the store that had been robbed and a handgun on the ground in close proximity
2 to the fence.
Over counsel’s hearsay and confrontation clause objections, a security recording
containing video and still images of the store after the store’s alarm had been disarmed was
admitted into evidence and published to the jury. Images of the individuals who entered the store
were included in the still images, which were taken from the security system’s recording.
At trial, Ashley did not make an in-court identification of Appellant, and explained that she
could only provide a physical description of the three men. During voir dire examination,
Brooklyn first noted that she was unable to make an in-court identification of any of the robbers
and, in a subsequent voir dire examination, she identified Appellant as being present during the
robbery. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to permitting Brooklyn to testify
regarding identity.
After the trial court overruled Appellant’s hearsay and confrontation clause objections,
Officer B.K. McHorse testified that during a show up, clerk Brooklyn Baker identified Appellant
as one of the individuals who had entered the store. Officer McHorse explained that at both the
time of Appellant’s arrest and during the show up, Appellant was wearing the same clothes, which
included a “hoody.” Brooklyn testified that she was interviewed by Officer McHorse, told him
about the robbery, described the robbers and their clothing, and, during the show up, recognized
the robber who was wearing a “hoody” and black pants.
Crime Scene Officer Timothy Lee collected Appellant’s clothing from him at the jail
where he was being held. Among the clothing that Officer Lee collected from Appellant were
black pants, white tennis shoes, and a sweat jacket with a distinctive pattern across the front.
The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts in the indictment. During the punishment
3 phase of trial, Appellant pleaded true to a repeat offender notice and the conviction was published
to the jury. After hearing punishment and mitigation-of-punishment evidence, the jury sentenced
Appellant to thirty years’ confinement on each count.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
of the identity element of the offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon because the
store’s employees, Ashley and Brooklyn, did not identify Appellant as one of the robbers. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011) (a person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, the
person intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or
death and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon). After a thorough review of all the evidence, we
disagree.
Standard of Review
Identity is an element of aggravated robbery that must be proved. See Greene v. State,
124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). In conducting a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, we review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution” and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact in resolving conflicts in
testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011).
4 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Wise, 364
S.W.3d at 903. Thus, we do not resolve any conflicts of fact or reevaluate the weight and
credibility of the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Isassi v. State,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
HAROLD VAUGHN, ' No. 08-11-00036-CR Appellant, ' Appeal from the v. ' 371st District Court THE STATE OF TEXAS, ' of Tarrant County, Texas Appellee. ' (TC# 1186711D) '
OPINION
Appellant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. We
affirm.1
BACKGROUND
After Brooklyn Baker and Ashley Darden had closed and locked the store at which they
worked in Fort Worth, three men with guns directed them to unlock the store and turn off the
store’s alarm system, and then directed Ashley to unlock the store’s safe. The store had both an
internal safe and an external safe. Ashley explained to the men that it would take longer to open
the internal safe due to its timers. After she quickly opened the external safe, one of the men
bagged up the cash found within it. Ashley was then directed to open the internal safe.
1 As this case was transferred from our sister court in Fort Worth, we decide it in accordance with the precedent of that court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. During this time, Brooklyn was able to see the robbers’ faces. When the robbers noticed
Brooklyn was watching them, one of the men forced her to the floor, cocked his gun over her head,
and told Ashley that he would shoot Brooklyn if Ashley did not open the safe. The store’s phone
then rang and the robbers directed Ashley to answer the telephone. When Ashley answered the
phone, it was silent. After Brooklyn heard sirens, one of the robbers told the other two robbers to
leave. The three robbers then left through the store’s back door.
After the security system at the store had been disarmed, personnel at the store’s security
monitoring service began monitoring the store’s cameras, relayed information to police, and
officers were dispatched to the store. After hearing the dispatch regarding an armed robbery,
Officer Domingo Martinez was the first officer to arrive at the store. While alone in his vehicle,
Officer Martinez waited for other officers to arrive and testified that he expected to see three armed
individuals. Officer Martinez heard a “latch sound” and a door slam, and then observed three
individuals in dark clothing emerge from the back of the store. After Officer Martinez shouted,
“Stop, police!,” the three individuals ran away and two of them climbed a fence. At the fence,
Officer Martinez encountered the third individual, who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt bearing a
design and instructed him to get on the ground. In open court, Officer Domingo Martinez
identified Appellant as the third individual who he encountered at the fence. Officer Martinez
also identified Appellant as being present in a photograph admitted into evidence during trial.
The photograph, which was taken at the scene and admitted into evidence, shows Appellant seated
on the ground near the fence wearing a hooded jacket bearing a repeated pattern, dark pants, and
white shoes. Another photograph of the area shows U.S. currency inside a white plastic bag
bearing the name of the store that had been robbed and a handgun on the ground in close proximity
2 to the fence.
Over counsel’s hearsay and confrontation clause objections, a security recording
containing video and still images of the store after the store’s alarm had been disarmed was
admitted into evidence and published to the jury. Images of the individuals who entered the store
were included in the still images, which were taken from the security system’s recording.
At trial, Ashley did not make an in-court identification of Appellant, and explained that she
could only provide a physical description of the three men. During voir dire examination,
Brooklyn first noted that she was unable to make an in-court identification of any of the robbers
and, in a subsequent voir dire examination, she identified Appellant as being present during the
robbery. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to permitting Brooklyn to testify
regarding identity.
After the trial court overruled Appellant’s hearsay and confrontation clause objections,
Officer B.K. McHorse testified that during a show up, clerk Brooklyn Baker identified Appellant
as one of the individuals who had entered the store. Officer McHorse explained that at both the
time of Appellant’s arrest and during the show up, Appellant was wearing the same clothes, which
included a “hoody.” Brooklyn testified that she was interviewed by Officer McHorse, told him
about the robbery, described the robbers and their clothing, and, during the show up, recognized
the robber who was wearing a “hoody” and black pants.
Crime Scene Officer Timothy Lee collected Appellant’s clothing from him at the jail
where he was being held. Among the clothing that Officer Lee collected from Appellant were
black pants, white tennis shoes, and a sweat jacket with a distinctive pattern across the front.
The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts in the indictment. During the punishment
3 phase of trial, Appellant pleaded true to a repeat offender notice and the conviction was published
to the jury. After hearing punishment and mitigation-of-punishment evidence, the jury sentenced
Appellant to thirty years’ confinement on each count.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
of the identity element of the offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon because the
store’s employees, Ashley and Brooklyn, did not identify Appellant as one of the robbers. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011) (a person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, the
person intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or
death and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon). After a thorough review of all the evidence, we
disagree.
Standard of Review
Identity is an element of aggravated robbery that must be proved. See Greene v. State,
124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). In conducting a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, we review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution” and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact in resolving conflicts in
testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011).
4 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Wise, 364
S.W.3d at 903. Thus, we do not resolve any conflicts of fact or reevaluate the weight and
credibility of the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.
2000). Rather, our role is limited to determining whether the necessary inferences are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). As such, if the record
supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the fact finder resolved any inconsistencies in
favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489-90 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The same
standard of review is applicable for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State,
820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Paulson v. State, 28
S.W.3d 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Application
Brooklyn testified that the three robbers left through the store’s back door. Officer
Martinez observed three individuals exiting the back of the store and encountered Appellant at the
fence near a gun and a bag, which bore the store’s logo and contained money. During trial,
Officer Martinez identified Appellant as the person he saw and apprehended at the fence. The
jury also had before it photographic and video evidence as well as testimony regarding Appellant’s
clothing at the time of his arrest, during the show up, and its collection from him at the jail.
From our review of all the evidence, we conclude that the jury’s necessary inferences are
reasonable based upon the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most
5 favorable to the verdict and defer to that resolution. See Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 155; Clayton,
235 S.W.3d at 778); Moff, 131 S.W.3d at 489-90. As the evidence is sufficient to support the
jury’s finding of Appellant’s identity, Appellant’s issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice March 13, 2013
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Antcliff, JJ. Antcliff, J., not participating
(Do Not Publish)