Harold Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 11, 2019
Docket19A-CR-501
StatusPublished

This text of Harold Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Harold Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harold Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 11 2019, 9:23 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Talisha Griffin Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Harold Jones, October 11, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-501 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela D. Davis Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No. 49G16-1807-F6-22512

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-501 | October 11, 2019 Page 1 of 6 [1] Harold Jones appeals his convictions of Level 6 felony intimidation 1 and Class

A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. 2 Jones argues his convictions

should be overturned because the victim’s testimony was incredibly dubious.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 9, 2018, Jones was visiting his girlfriend, D.B., at the residence she

shared with her mother, U.L.; one-year-old son, K.B.; grandfather, Mason; and

grandmother, Debra. U.L., with whom Jones had prior sexual history, was in

the living and dining area of the home when she saw Jones come out of the

bathroom. U.L. told Jones that K.B. wanted to watch television. Jones

responded, “it’s not his mother’s fucking tv, it[’]s mine.” (Tr. Vol. II at 9.)

U.L. commented that the language Jones was using around the child was

“hostile.” (Id.)

[3] Jones responded to U.L.’s comment by getting “in her face” and calling her “a

little shit[.]” (Id. at 10, 11.) U.L. repeatedly asked Jones to get out of her face,

and when he did not, she pushed Jones away. Jones then smacked U.L.’s face,

and U.L. responded by throwing her phone at Jones. The phone struck Jones

in the face.

1 Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2). 2 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-501 | October 11, 2019 Page 2 of 6 [4] Jones then punched U.L. in the face. U.L. stated “you were fucking me and

eating me out, why are you hitting me now?” (App. Vol. II at 16.) U.L’s

father, Mason, escorted Jones out of the house after the altercation. Jones

formed his hand into the shape of a gun, pantomimed shooting U.L., and stated

“bitch, don’t you come over here, I’ll shoot you.” (Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Because

U.L. knew Jones owned a gun, she interpreted his gesture as a credible threat to

shoot her, and she called the police.

[5] Upon their arrival, the police found Jones, D.B., and K.B. in a car parked

across the street from the house. Jones and D.B. admitted there had been a

confrontation. U.L. was “[v]ery agitated, extremely upset[,]” (id. at 27), and

“very emotional[.]” (Id. at 32.) U.L.’s injuries were documented at the

hospital, including a puncture wound on her upper thigh, and bruises and

scratches on her arms and face. Photos taken at the hospital depict redness and

a scratch where Jones had hit her.

[6] The State charged Jones with Level 6 felony domestic battery, 3 Level 6 felony

intimidation, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, 4 and Class A

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. At the conclusion of a bench

trial held on July 11, 2018, the court convicted Jones of Level 6 felony

intimidation and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. The

3 Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2). 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-501 | October 11, 2019 Page 3 of 6 court imposed a 365-day suspended sentence and ordered 180 days of probation

subject to early termination upon the completion of 13 weeks of anger

management classes.

Discussion and Decision [7] When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we examine the evidence

presented in a light most favorable to the verdict. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d

1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). We give deference to the trial court and affirm the

verdict unless there is “no substantial evidence of probative value to support it.”

Id.

[8] Jones asserts the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because

U.L.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. The incredible dubiosity rule allows

an appellate court to review the factual findings, but only where (1) “a sole

witness presents” (2) “inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or

the result of coercion” and (3) “there is a complete lack of circumstantial

evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind.

2015). We will infringe upon a trial court’s finding only if a showing is made

under all three prongs. Id. at 765.

[9] At Jones’ trial, five witnesses testified and most of them provided corroborating

statements. The story U.L. consistently told and retold was not improbable.

Her testimony was not contradictory or equivocal. She testified that there was

a verbal alteration that led to physical violence and intimidating threats.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-501 | October 11, 2019 Page 4 of 6 Finally, considerable circumstantial evidence existed including pictures

showing the injuries sustained by U.L., two responding police officers testified

to U.L.’s injuries and to seeing Jones in the car across from the home, and the

testimony of both D.B. and Jones confirmed an altercation occurred. As such,

the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply in this case. See, e.g., Id. at 755

(incredible dubiosity rule does not apply because of multiple witnesses, lack of

testimonial inconsistencies, and the existence of circumstantial evidence).

[10] A person commits intimidation when he communicates a threat with the intent

of making a person fearful of retaliation. Ind. Code §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(2),

(b)(1)(A). U.L. testified Jones threated to kill her in retaliation for the fight and

for revealing the alleged affair. These facts meet the elements of intimidation.

See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 85 N.E.3d 626, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding there

was sufficient evidence to support conviction for intimidation where a

reasonable fact finder could conclude threats were made with the intent to put

the victim in fear for his safety).

[11] The elements of battery resulting in bodily harm are knowingly or intentionally

touching someone “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner” causing bodily harm.

Ind.

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Related

Elmer J. Bailey v. State of Indiana
979 N.E.2d 133 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2012)
Charles Moore v. State of Indiana
27 N.E.3d 749 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2015)
Daniel Lee Pierce v. State of Indiana
29 N.E.3d 1258 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2015)
Robert R. Fleming v. State of Indiana
85 N.E.3d 626 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2017)

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