ALD-171 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1995 ___________
HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations; CIVIL PROCESS CLERK FOR THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-08583) District Judge: Honorable Evelyn Padin ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Affirmance Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 26, 2025 Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 7, 2025) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, appeals an order granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss his complaint. Because this appeal does not present a substantial
question, we will grant the appellees’ motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s
order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In his complaint, Jean-Baptiste alleged that the Department of Justice and the FBI
conspired with his family to kidnap and kill him in retaliation for his submission of
lawsuits against the government. He also asserted that the defendants issued “National
Security Letters” to “slander, harass, discriminate, and destroy[]” his character. Jean-
Baptiste further claimed that the FBI monitored his cell phone to track his location. As
bases for relief, Jean-Baptiste cited common law, a criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 242), as
well as various civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986).
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste’s claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and that he failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Over Jean-
Baptiste’s objections, the District Court granted that motion, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over his “patently insubstantial” claims.1 Jean-Baptiste timely
1 The District Court also properly denied as moot Jean-Baptiste’s outstanding motions, including a motion for a preliminary injunction. Coronavirus Rep. v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Because the district court properly dismissed with prejudice all of the claims against Apple, it correctly denied the remaining pending motions as moot.”). Earlier in the proceedings, the District Court had denied Jean- Baptiste’s motions for sanctions and summary judgment, terminated his motions relating to discovery pending resolution of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and held in abeyance his motions to amend the complaint. To the extent that Jean-Baptiste seek to challenge those rulings on appeal, we conclude that the District Court properly disposed of his motions. 2 appealed. The appellees have filed a timely motion for summary affirmance. Jean-
Baptiste has filed motions seeking various forms of relief.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary
review over a District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d
Cir. 2012). We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record if the appeal
does not present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations,
taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fleisher v. Standard
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff alleges facts that allow a
court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see generally Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (stating that a complaint’s factual allegations are
“clearly baseless” if they are “fanciful, fantastic, [or] delusional” (citations omitted)).
Pleadings of pro se litigants like Jean-Baptiste are construed liberally, but “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
In his complaint, Jean-Baptiste vaguely alleged that there is a conspiracy to harm
him, implicating the FBI, his uncle, and a “white supremacy group of psychopaths.” As
evidence of the plot, Jean-Baptiste pointed to events on July 6, 2024, when he traveled
3 from Irvington, New Jersey, with his uncle to the airport to pick up Max Saurel Amazan.
Jean-Baptiste asserted that his uncle, who was “nervous and very uncomfortable,”
“pulled into [a] driveway” to drop off Amazan. According to Jean-Baptiste, this was a
“clear red flag” because his uncle “never ever dropped anyone in a long driveway on the
side of their home even in the snow or rain, he’s not that considerate of a person to do
that.” Jean-Baptiste also found “alarming” the fact that Amazan “said he came from
Indiana to see his son for a week [but] had no luggage at the airport.” As further support
for the alleged conspiracy, Jean-Baptiste noted that, after the events of July 6, his uncle
and Amazan “are still very uncomfortable around [him] … and can’t look at [him] in the
eye directly at all.”
The complaint’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief could
be granted. Jean-Baptiste’s allegations of a conspiracy are pure speculation, based
entirely on innocuous behavior by his uncle and Amazan. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d
1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that conspiracy claims may not be based
“merely upon . . .
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ALD-171 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1995 ___________
HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations; CIVIL PROCESS CLERK FOR THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-08583) District Judge: Honorable Evelyn Padin ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Affirmance Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 26, 2025 Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 7, 2025) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, appeals an order granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss his complaint. Because this appeal does not present a substantial
question, we will grant the appellees’ motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s
order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In his complaint, Jean-Baptiste alleged that the Department of Justice and the FBI
conspired with his family to kidnap and kill him in retaliation for his submission of
lawsuits against the government. He also asserted that the defendants issued “National
Security Letters” to “slander, harass, discriminate, and destroy[]” his character. Jean-
Baptiste further claimed that the FBI monitored his cell phone to track his location. As
bases for relief, Jean-Baptiste cited common law, a criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 242), as
well as various civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986).
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste’s claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and that he failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Over Jean-
Baptiste’s objections, the District Court granted that motion, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over his “patently insubstantial” claims.1 Jean-Baptiste timely
1 The District Court also properly denied as moot Jean-Baptiste’s outstanding motions, including a motion for a preliminary injunction. Coronavirus Rep. v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Because the district court properly dismissed with prejudice all of the claims against Apple, it correctly denied the remaining pending motions as moot.”). Earlier in the proceedings, the District Court had denied Jean- Baptiste’s motions for sanctions and summary judgment, terminated his motions relating to discovery pending resolution of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and held in abeyance his motions to amend the complaint. To the extent that Jean-Baptiste seek to challenge those rulings on appeal, we conclude that the District Court properly disposed of his motions. 2 appealed. The appellees have filed a timely motion for summary affirmance. Jean-
Baptiste has filed motions seeking various forms of relief.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary
review over a District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d
Cir. 2012). We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record if the appeal
does not present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations,
taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fleisher v. Standard
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff alleges facts that allow a
court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see generally Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (stating that a complaint’s factual allegations are
“clearly baseless” if they are “fanciful, fantastic, [or] delusional” (citations omitted)).
Pleadings of pro se litigants like Jean-Baptiste are construed liberally, but “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
In his complaint, Jean-Baptiste vaguely alleged that there is a conspiracy to harm
him, implicating the FBI, his uncle, and a “white supremacy group of psychopaths.” As
evidence of the plot, Jean-Baptiste pointed to events on July 6, 2024, when he traveled
3 from Irvington, New Jersey, with his uncle to the airport to pick up Max Saurel Amazan.
Jean-Baptiste asserted that his uncle, who was “nervous and very uncomfortable,”
“pulled into [a] driveway” to drop off Amazan. According to Jean-Baptiste, this was a
“clear red flag” because his uncle “never ever dropped anyone in a long driveway on the
side of their home even in the snow or rain, he’s not that considerate of a person to do
that.” Jean-Baptiste also found “alarming” the fact that Amazan “said he came from
Indiana to see his son for a week [but] had no luggage at the airport.” As further support
for the alleged conspiracy, Jean-Baptiste noted that, after the events of July 6, his uncle
and Amazan “are still very uncomfortable around [him] … and can’t look at [him] in the
eye directly at all.”
The complaint’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief could
be granted. Jean-Baptiste’s allegations of a conspiracy are pure speculation, based
entirely on innocuous behavior by his uncle and Amazan. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d
1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that conspiracy claims may not be based
“merely upon . . . suspicion and speculation” and stating that general allegations of
conspiracy not based on facts are conclusions of law that are insufficient to state a claim).
Furthermore, although Jean-Baptiste alleged that he was slandered by “National Security
Letters,” he failed to describe the allegedly false information in those letters or indicate
that they were communicated to a third party. See Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 876
A.2d 885, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (listing elements of defamation claim).
And Jean-Baptiste’s assertion that the FBI improperly monitored his cell phone does not
satisfy the plausibility test. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that the plausibility
4 determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense”). Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the District Court’s conclusion that providing Jean-Baptiste with leave to amend his
complaint would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
111 (3d Cir. 2002).
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the appellees that the appeal presents no
substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we grant
their motion for summary affirmance and will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.2
2 Jean-Baptiste’s pending motions are denied. 5